S/1999/356 27 March 1999
Amorim
REPORT OF THE FIRST PANEL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THE NOTE
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 30 JANUARY 1999
(S/1999/100), CONCERNING DISARMAMENT AND CURRENT AND FUTURE
ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION ISSUES
1. The panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing
monitoring and verification issues, established pursuant to the note issued by
the President of the Security Council on 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100), is
submitting its report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraphs 1,
2, 3 and 4 of the aforementioned note.
I) Mandate, composition,
working methods and plans of work
2. The panel was constituted in the context of increasing
concern, among Security Council members, with the interruption of United
Nations activities in Iraq in the area of disarmament/ongoing monitoring and
verification, in particular since mid-December. During the discussions in the month of January, Security Council
members felt that it was urgent to consider the parallel objectives of
re-establishing an effective presence of the United Nations and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq in the area of
disarmament/prevention of development of proscribed weapons and addressing the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.
In parallel, the issues of prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property were
also brought to the fore.
3. On 30 January 1999, the Security Council decided that it
would be useful to establish three separate panels on Iraq and to receive
recommendations from them no later than 15 April 1999. In paragraph 2 of document S/1999/100, the
Security Council invited Ambassador Celso L. N. Amorim of Brazil to chair each
of the panels.
4. The constitution of the panel on disarmament and current
and future ongoing monitoring and verification was defined in paragraph 4 of
document S/1999/100, which reads as follows: "The first panel, on
disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues,
would involve the participation and expertise from the United Nations Special
Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations
Secretariat, and any other relevant expertise.
The panel would assess all the existing and relevant information available,
including data from ongoing monitoring and verification, relating to the state
of disarmament in Iraq".
5. As announced by the Chairman on 12 February 1999, the first
panel was composed as follows: Ichiro Akiyama, Jacques Baute, Kaluba Chitumbo,
Ron Cleminson, Rachel Davies, Jayantha Dhanapala, Charles Duelfer, Roberto
Garcia Moritan, Gennady Gatilov, Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Hideyo Kurata, Liu
Jieyi, Johan Molander, Jack Ooms, Daniel Parfait, GianPiero Perrone, Horst
Reeps, Paul Schulte, Tom Shea, and Nikita Smidovich.
6. The panel met from 23 to 27 February and from 22 to 27
March. Taking into account paragraph 3
of document S/1999/100, the Chairman held consultations with panel participants
and members of the Security Council on appropriate working methods and plans of
work. The panel decided that it should
assess, from a technical point of view and a broad perspective, the work of the
United Nations and IAEA in Iraq in the area of disarmament /ongoing monitoring
and verification of proscribed weapons.
To this end, the panel considered information from a variety of sources
and heard short briefings on different aspects: (1) the ongoing monitoring and
verification regime; (II) the export/import monitoring mechanism; (III) the
nuclear, missile, chemical weapons and biological weapons areas; and (IV)
overhead imagery.
7. In accordance with the note by the President of the Security
Council, the main objective of the panel was '"to make recommendations to
the Security Council on how, taking into account relevant Security Council
resolutions, to re-establish an effective disarmament/ongoing monitoring and
verification regime in Iraq. This
mandate reflects the Security Council assessment that an effective presence of
inspectors on the ground remains the most effective way to provide assurance
that Iraq does not retain, acquire or rebuild its proscribed weapons
programmes.
II) Introductory
questions
8. The phrasing of the mandate (how... to re-establish",
etc.) carries with it an implicit recognition that the task of getting
inspector's back to Iraq is not
self-evident. In effect, the panel has
been asked to contribute to such an objective by devising technically feasible
options which the Security Council may choose to implement. The panel recognized that the scope of its
mandate implied that it would devise its recommendations from a technical, and
not a political, point of view, while conceding that it could not ignore the
political and indeed the legal context in which those deliberations were taking
place. The panel deliberated against
the background of discussions in the Council, where a number of proposals on
how to address the present situation are still under consideration. On the one hand, a clear line had to be
drawn between what is technical, and therefore germane to the panel's work, and
what Is political in its content, which is the exclusive province of the
Security Council. On the other hand,
the panel had to be conscious that some of the technical options may propitiate
political consequences if the Security Council so decides.
9. In the context of the debate on the above mentioned
proposals, the President of the Security Council for the month of January
presented the following question to Council members: "while recognizing that
there may be disarmament tasks to be carried out, wouldn't it be possible to
perform those tasks, with a renewed approach, under a reinforced Ongoing
Monitoring and Verification (OMV) system (With disarmament elements factored
into it)?" This question helped to
focus the discussions on ways to move forward in the short-term and may be
viewed as being at the origin of the establishment of the panel on
disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification. The same question was presented to panel members.
10. Always bearing in mind the mandate conferred upon it by the
Security Council, the panel decided that it should first achieve an
understanding of the current status of disarmament/ongoing monitoring and
verification in that country. Such a
discussion could neither be exhaustive nor excessively detailed, but a broad
overview of the work undertaken by the United Nations and IAEA in Iraq to date,
including their cooperative arrangements, was considered useful.
11. A further step was to evaluate, bearing in mind the basic
elements of the OMV regime, as conceived in the plans approved by resolution
715, as well as the need of ensuring the full implementation of all relevant
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, in particular resolutions 687,
707, 715 and 1051, the possibility of addressing remaining disarmament
issues/areas of uncertainty through their integration into a reinforced OMV
regime. By providing a satisfactory
answer to the fundamental question of whether it is feasible to factor those
outstanding issues into an OMV developed to its full potentiality, while
avoiding policy judgements, the panel might be enlarging the scope of options
for the Security Council.
III) Disarmament
12. Panel members had it clear that it was not their objective to evaluate,
in its minute detail, every single aspect of each particular proscribed weapons
area. Such an assessment had been made
on a number of occasions by the competent institutions in charge of the
disarmament/ongoing monitoring verification work in Iraq and is included in
various reports to the Security Council, which were presented to the panel as
part of the "existing and relevant Information available". Therefore, what follows is not an attempt to
summarize such assessments (much less to substitute for existing papers) but an
indication of subjects discussed, in relation to which different shades of
opinion were expressed.
13. The panel heard briefings by experts from the United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA on the current status of
disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification in the four proscribed weapons
areas (nuclear, missiles, chemical, biological). These briefings were, concentrated on specific priority
disarmament issues. In the case of
UNSCOM this reflected its understanding of the desire of the Council to focus
on selected important parts of the requirements of its resolutions. UNSCOM has decided to work on the basis of
priority issues, setting aside other aspects such as proscribed weapons
research and development activities, procurement, etc. The satisfactory resolution of these
priority questions would considerably increase the level of confidence of
UNSCOM's overall verification. If the
priority issues are not satisfactorily resolved, then it is likely that the
settlement of other outstanding disarmament issues will assume greater
importance. The Iraqi Government
provided the Chairman with some documentation with its views on the
disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification process. This documentation was also considered by
the panel.
Nuclear Weapons
Achievements
14. The IAEA has been able, in the course of its eight years of
extensive inspection activities, to develop a technically coherent picture of
Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme covering the stages from the production
and procurement of natural uranium compounds, through Iraq's development of
enrichment processes, to the design and experimental work for the eventual
weaponization of highly enriched uranium.
Iraq's programme had been very well funded and was aimed at the
development and production of a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, but there
were no indications that Iraq had achieved its programme's objective. Most of the IAEA activities involving the destruction,
removal and rendering harmless of the components of Iraq's nuclear weapons
programme which to date have been revealed and destroyed were completed by the
end of 1992. In February 1994, the IAEA
completed the removal from Iraq of all weapon-usable nuclear material
essentially research reactor fuel. On
the basis of its findings, the Agency is able to state that there is no
indication that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons or any meaningful amounts of
weapon-usable nuclear material or that Iraq has retained any practical
capability (facilities or hardware) for the production of such material.
Current status/remaining questions
15. In the nuclear weapons
area, questions remain with regard to the lack of certain technical
documentation, external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons
programme and Iraq's abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme. However, the uncertainty deriving from those
few remaining concerns does not present any technical impediment to the full
implementation of the IAEA's OMV plan.
Iraq has yet to adopt the necessary measures to implement its
obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and enact penal laws to
secure their enforcement. This issue
applies to the other proscribed weapons areas as well.
Proscribed Missiles
Achievements
16. With regard to items selected as key for the purpose of the
verification of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related
operational assets, UNSCOM was able to destroy or otherwise account for: (a)
817 out of 819 imported operational missiles of proscribed range; (b) all
declared mobile launchers for proscribed Al Hussein class missiles, including
14 operational launchers; the disposition of 9 of the 10 imported trailers used
for the indigenous production of mobile launchers; and the destruction of 56
fixed missile launch sites; (c) 73 to 75 chemical and biological warheads of
the declared 75 operational special warheads for Al Hussein class missiles; 83
of the 107 imported and some 80 of the 103 indigenously produced conventional
warheads declared by Iraq to be in its possession at the time of the adoption
of resolution 687.
17. As a means to compensate for Iraq's failure to present
required evidence for the establishment of a material balance of the critical
components for the indigenous production of proscribed missiles, UNSCOM has
established a rough correlation between the total estimated weight of engine
components and, the total weight of ingots and other remnants presented by Iraq
as a result of its unilateral destruction.
UNSCOM has also concluded that Iraq does not possess a capability to
indigenously produce either BADR-2000 missiles or assets known as the
"Supergun". UNSCOM has
obtained a broad understanding of Iraq's efforts to develop a missile delivery
system for nuclear weapon's and a detailed picture of Iraq's procurement effort
for its proscribed missile programmes.
Current status/remaining questions
18. In the missiles area, the main concerns mentioned during the
briefing related to the determination whether or not the current assessment of
the quantity of special warheads identified among the remnants excavated
accounts for all special warheads declared to have been produced by Iraq or if
the declaration is indeed correct.
Satisfactory resolution of the following issues was considered essential
for the achievement of a satisfactory material balance: a) the reasons why no
remnants of 50 conventional warheads declared as unilaterally destroyed were
recovered; b) accounting for proscribed propellants claimed to have been
unilaterally destroyed; c) accounting for the unilateral destruction of seven
indigenously produced missiles; d) accounting for the unilateral destruction of
combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies for indigenously produced missiles.
Chemical Weapons
Achievements
19. UNSCOM has supervised or been able to certify the
destruction,, removal or rendering harmless of large quantities of chemical
weapons (CW), their components and major chemical weapons production equipment
as follows: (a) over 88,000 filled and unfilled chemical munitions; (b) over
600 tonnes of weaponized and bulk CW agents; (c) some 4,000 tonnes of precursor
chemicals; (d) some 980 pieces of key production equipment; (e) some 300 pieces
of analytical instruments. The prime CW
development and production complex in Iraq was dismantled and closed under
UNSCOM supervision and other identified facilities have been put under
monitoring. It was pointed out that
UNSCOM has been able to establish material balances of major weapon-related
elements of Iraq's CW programme only on the basis of parameters as declared by
Iraq but not fully verified by UNSCOM.
20. UNSCOM has been able to make considerable progress in the
verification of other CW-related activities in Iraq, among them the uncovering
of Iraq's VX project, CW research and development projects, Iraq's procurement
network and efforts for its CW programme.
On the basis of all these findings, UNSCOM obtained a good understanding
of the major parameters of Iraq's CW programme.
Current status/remaining questions
21. In the chemical weapons area it was noted during the briefing
that satisfactory resolution is required especially with regard to: a)
discrepancies with Iraq's declarations on the expenditure of CW munitions in
the 80s, as indicated by figures contained in a document detailing consumption
of special munitions by Iraq; b) evidence of 550 artillery shells filled with
mustard declared to have been lost shortly after the Gulf War; c) accounting
for five hundred R-400 bombs, which could be done through the verification of
the disposition of the parachute tail sections of those bombs; d) Iraqi
declarations on the production and weaponization of the chemical agent VX, in
particular with regard to the military plans for the use of VX during various
periods, the different precursors available and the synthetic routes pursued;
and e) the material balance of CW production equipment.
Biological Weapons
Achievements
22. UNSCOM uncovered the proscribed biological weapons
programme of Iraq, whose complete existence had been concealed by Iraq until
1995. This and subsequent work has
permitted it to obtain significant insights into Iraq's biological warfare
capabilities, including a broad understanding of the main delivery systems.
UNSCOM has also gained a detailed, albeit incomplete, picture of Iraq's
procurement activities for its biological warfare programme.
23. UNSCOM ordered and supervised the destruction of Iraq's
main declared BW production and development facility, Al Hakam. Some 60 pieces of equipment from three other
facilities involved in proscribed BW activities as well as some 22 tonnes of
growth media for BW production collected from four other facilities were also
destroyed. As a result, the declared
facilities of Iraq's BW programme have been destroyed and rendered harmless.
Current status/remaining questions
24. In the biological area, Iraq's Full Final and Complete
Disclosure (FFCD) has not been accepted by UNSCOM as a full account of Iraq's
BW programme. A full disclosure of the
scope and nature of the programme was considered outstanding by UNSCOM. The briefing indicated that this evaluation
was corroborated by technical evaluation meetings called by UNSCOM including at
the request of Iraq. The briefing also
indicated that critical gaps need to be filled to arrive at a reasonably
complete picture. It has also been
recognized that due to the fact that BW agents can be produced using low
technology and simple equipment, generally dual-use, Iraq possesses the
capability and knowledge base through which biological warfare agents could be
produced quickly and in volume.
25. The elements presented above indicate that, in spite of
well-known difficult circumstances, UNSCOM and IAEA have been effective in
uncovering and destroying many elements of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes
in accordance with the mandate provided by the Security Council. It is the panel's understanding that IAEA
has been able to devise a technically coherent picture of Iraq's nuclear
weapons programme. UNSCOM has achieved
considerable progress in establishing material balances of Iraq's proscribed
weapons. Although important elements
still have to be resolved, the bulk of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes has
been eliminated. In this connection,
reference was made to a possible "point of impasse" in the further
investigation of these issues under the current procedures which might
correspond to an apparent diminishing return In recent years.
26. Although there were differences in the panel members'
perception and understanding of remaining issues, including as regards their
relevance to the overall verification process, It is evident that a
satisfactory resolution of certain areas, in particular those identified as
priority, would contribute to the overall assurance that any disarmament and/or
monitoring and verification mechanism could provide. Or, in other words, there seems to be an inverse correlation
between resolution of those issues by Iraq and the overall degree of intrusiveness
of the regime to be implemented.
27. It has been indicated on various occasions that "some
uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide technical verification process
which aims to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or
activities. The extent to 'which such
uncertainty is acceptable is a policy judgement". Both UNSCOM and IAEA have therefore been
adopting a pragmatic approach which assumes that 100% of verification may be an
unattainable goal.
IV) Ongoing Monitoring
and Verification
28. The OMV system was conceived to provide assurance that Iraq is
not undertaking proscribed activities.
The plans approved by resolution 715 (docs. S/22871/Rev.1 and 22872/Rev.1) establish the mechanisms for the
monitoring and verification of Iraq.
The dynamic nature of these mandates implies that procedures and
practices under the Plans may be continuously adjusted. Key among the tools given by the Security
Council to both IAEA and UNSCOM under the Plans are full and free access at any
time to all sites, facilities, areas, locations, activities, materials and
other items, including documentation, and to all persons and all Information
that, in the judgement of IAEA and UNSCOM, may be necessary for their
monitoring activities.
Adopted procedures and practices to date
29. The IAEA's monitoring plan has been operational since August
1994. Since that time, work has
continued in order to increase the scope and technology of OMV measures,
although it is recognized that any OMV mechanism will always encompass a
component of disarmament of varying degrees.
The Agency's OMV plan is designed to give assurances as to the absence
of prohibited equipment, materials and activities. The plan takes fully into account the extensive technological
expertise developed by Iraq in the course of its clandestine nuclear
programme. The Plan also takes into
account the uncertainties referred to in paragraph 15 above and is predicated
on the assumption that Iraq retains the capability to exploit, for nuclear
weapons purposes, any relevant material or technology to which it may gain
access in the future.
30. The design and operation, since 1994, of UNSCOM's monitoring
system have been based on a number of assumptions regarding the conditions
under which the Plan for OMV would be implemented. It was believed that, before proceeding exclusively to monitoring
and verification activities, the Commission would receive, from Iraq, full and
complete disclosures of all its proscribed activities and capabilities and that
the identification and disposal of all proscribed weapons, materials and
programmes would have been achieved.
Based on this expectation, the way UNSCOM had been pursuing the
monitoring and verification system was not designed to search for proscribed
weapons and materials. This task has
been carried out by UNSCOM separately through disarmament activities and
Investigations. In view of this
Atwo-track@ approach UNSCOM was able to conduct its monitoring activities in
the least Intrusive manner, consistent with the objectives for ongoing
monitoring and verification set forth by the Security Council.
Current status
31. Inspectors from both the Agency and the Special
Commission departed from Iraq on 16 December 1998. As a consequence, the OMV plans are not operational at this
moment.
V) Relationship between disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification
Integration, including legal aspects
32. The briefings referred to above demonstrated clearly that
although disarmament and monitoring and verification address different
dimensions of the broader problematic of disarmament/reacquisition of
proscribed weapons, both can be implemented through the use of the same - or
similar - tools. Disarmament assumes
the existence of proscribed weapons and/or capabilities, which must be located,
accounted for and, eventually, disposed of.
The monitoring and verification system's immediate goal is to attempt to
determine that proscribed activities are not being carried out. Experience has shown, however, that actions
in disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification can be mutually supportive,
and that there are many similarities and complementarities between them. Both can be achieved, in an integrated
fashion, through the use of on-site inspections with full access, including
no-notice inspections, sample analysis, aerial surveillance, evaluation of
documentation, interviews, installed monitoring equipment, or, most
effectively, a combination of them.
33. Discussions in the panel have also revealed that, from a
technical standpoint, the ongoing monitoring and verification is not
incompatible with the continuing search for satisfactory resolution of
outstanding elements from proscribed weapons programmes. It was made clear that UNSCOM's decision to
separate aspects related to monitoring from those related to disarmament had
been taken at the executive level, based on certain assumptions that seemed to
be warranted at the time. It was
recognized however, that it is technically possible to carry out further the
resolution of remaining issues mentioned above under the framework of OMV,
provided adequate arrangements are established to ensure the full exercise of
the rights contemplated by the Plans.
The panel recognized that, due to different degrees of confidence, more
effort should be placed in areas which have caused greater concern, as seems to
be the case in the biological and some chemical weapons areas. In order to be effective, the reinforced OMV
system should be able not only to certify that present activities are in
accordance with Security Council resolutions but also to address unresolved
issues, whenever necessary. Indeed, the
retention of the right to investigate any aspect of proscribed weapons
programmes would be a fundamental element of the integrated system. As in the case of disarmament, cooperation
by Iraq is essential.
Legal framework
34. The reinforced OMV system should be based on the full
implementation of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by
Security Council resolution 715 (1991), provided the rights enshrined therein
and In resolutions 687, 707 and 1051 are fully exercised. The plans establish that the IAEA and UNSCOM
should, through inspections and aerial overflights, as well as through the
provision of information by Iraq, monitor and verify that activities, sites,
facilities, material and other items, both military and civilian, are not used
by Iraq in contravention of its obligations under relevant Security Council
resolutions. It is understood that, for
operational reasons, the full potential of UNSCOM's plan has never been
explored. The existing plans provide an
adequate legal framework for implementing a rigorous and effective system of
monitoring and verification, and thus for integrating into it the investigation
of unresolved issues regarding proscribed weapons programmes.
35. The possibility of continuing the investigation of proscribed
weapons programmes under the reinforced monitoring regime is explicitly
provided for in the plans. Paragraphs
22 and 23 of the plan presented by UNSCOM and 36 and 37 of the IAEA's Plan
refer to the discovery of any item, including documentation, or activity in
contravention of resolutions 687, 707 or of the Plan. Paragraph 24 of UNSCOM's Plan and 38 of the IAEA's Plan referred to
above instruct UNSCOM and IAEA to bring to the attention of the Security
Council any findings that indicate that Iraq is not in compliance with its
obligations under resolutions 687 and 707.
From a legal perspective, the ability to carry out specific operations
aimed at clarifying certain questions and detecting if there is an attempt to
retain proscribed items which escaped the destruction/removal, rendering
harmless process is fully guaranteed.
Technical feasibility and necessary arrangements
36. The IAEA's OMV activities have been using essentially the same
procedures and techniques initially employed to detect the presence of
prohibited equipment, materials and activities. These procedures must not only credibly ensure such absence at
routinely inspected locations, but also provide a significant probability of
detection at other locations. Further
clarification of remaining questions
can therefore be integrated into the IAEA's Plan, provided the Agency is able
to fully exercise the rights of access enshrined in the Plan.
37. In the case of the other proscribed weapons areas,
satisfactory resolution of remaining issues under the OMV plan would require
modifications in some assumptions for the operation of the OMV plan, procedures
and practices that were being used to date.
More specifically, changes in the basic assumptions of the OMV plan
would require the strengthening of the monitoring and verification system to
maintain its effectiveness so that the Security Council mandate can be carried
out. As stated earlier, the OMV plan,
as it was being implemented before the interruption of inspections, was based
on the assumption that: a fairly complete knowledge of the past would have been
obtained, not having been designed to explicitly resolve remaining disarmament
issues. The positive resolution of
priority issues related to proscribed activities before the starting of the
monitoring and verification system would surely contribute to an increase in
the degree of confidence that the system would otherwise provide. Such uncertainties, however, could be offset
through a reinforced OMV, based on the assumption that Iraq has the knowledge
and technical expertise to exploit, for proscribed purposes, any relevant
materials or technologies which it may retain or gain access to In the future.
38. IAEA and UNSCOM have both contemplated the possibility of
integrating remaining disarmament issues into their OMV plans. In paragraph 34 of its latest report
(doc. S/1999/127) the Agency states
that "provided that it is able to exercise its right to full and free
access in Iraq, the IAEA is in a position to proceed with the full
implementation of its OMV plan and, as part of that plan, to investigate
further the remaining questions and concerns and any other aspect of Iraq's
clandestine nuclear programme arising out of new information acquired by the
IAEA".
39. UNSCOM, in turn, points out in its latest reports that
"the present review of the OMV system takes into account the possibility
that the mandated objective of the full accounting of Iraq's proscribed weapons
and verification of Iraq's prohibited programmes will not be achieved but the
Commission may, nevertheless, be required to operate its OMV system under the
shadow of Iraq possibly retaining prohibited materials"(paragraph 23 of
S/1999/94).
40. Panel members agreed that the adoption of a reinforced OMV
might represent a refocusing and evolution of patterns of work as pursued by
UNSCOM. The reinforced OMV system
should make maximum use of synergies, cross checks and cross fertilizations
between the activities of the four disciplines (nuclear, biological, chemical,
missile) and the Export/import Monitoring Mechanism in order to ensure
confidence in the continuing absence of proscribed activities as well as
clarification and progressive resolution of disarmament issues. It was pointed out that the benefit of the
integrated approach would be that all information gathered from these
concurrent activities would be analyzed systematically, considered against other
data and examined in a multidisciplinary context. The net effect could be to enable rapid and effective work
towards confirmation of Iraq's disarmament status, provided the rights set
forth in Security Council resolutions 687, 707,, 715 and 1051 are fully
respected.
41. Changes on the ground resulting from the adoption of a
reinforced OMV would be related rather to the intensity, frequency,
intrusiveness and methods than to rights, which would remain unaltered, since
all actions required are already permitted under relevant Security Council resolutions.
42. Panel members acknowledge that this evolution of UNSCOM's work
will have implications for its organizational structure and resourcing, which
it might be premature to address in detail at this stage. However, it was considered useful to present
some of the parameters under which unresolved or not sufficiently resolved
disarmament issues can be integrated into OMV:
a) Full implementation of the rights enshrined in the OMV
plans, particularly full access to locations, individuals and information as
well as the right to implement any relevant technology;
b) Re-establishment of baselines of what Iraq had acquired and
achieved in each of the proscribed weapons areas on the basis of the knowledge
so far accumulated;
c) Identification of critical milestones at which any
resumption of proscribed activities could be detected, as a means to address
the potential consequences of possible uncertainties,
d) Further development of lists of
equipment/procedures/methods and a
corresponding degree of
intensity/frequency/intrusiveness bearing in mind the amount of intellectual
property Iraq acquired; prioritisation of methodology accordingly;
e) Regular inspections
of military sites;
f) Increase in the
number of inspector and supporting staff taking into account technical
expertise and-wide geographical representation;
g) Improvement of
mobility/access through the establishment of regional centres and/or the use of
fixed and rotary wing aircraft;
h) Enhancement of
in-house scientific analytical capability to increase speed and independence of
results;
i) Improvement of
structures to promote linkages and information flows
across disciplines and
activities; and
J) Identification of a
long-term, adequate and independent source of funding.
43. It was noted that Iraq should confirm the rights and
privileges of UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors and support staff, and, consistent
with past experience, confirm that the health and safety of said personnel will
be protected at all times when these Individuals are within the territory of
Iraq.
44. Discussions on the specific question of techniques and
tools were held. Although it was
recognized that this debate was of a preliminary character, some time was
devoted to issues related to efficiency, cost-effectiveness and the degree of
intrusiveness of the different techniques.
In this regard, it was noted that, although not a substitute for on-site
inspections, overhead imagery may play, for instance, a very powerful role in providing
indications of the presence of prohibited activities. The role of such a means in providing timely and accurate
reference data to support, supplement and/or enhance inspection activities had
already been proven in Iraq. The panel
concluded that overhead imagery has already played an important role in the
effective implementation of the OMV plans and that it should be exploited to
the limit of its technical capabilities.
There would be advantages in the United Nations and the IAEA being able
to derive independent conclusions there from.
45. The Export/Import Monitoring Mechanism would remain a critical
component of the reinforced OMV. This
system of information/notification would have to be reinforced and greater
reliance would have to be placed in the provision of information by suppliers,
particularly if conditions related to the volume of commercial transactions
into Iraq are changed. In any case, the
lists of dual-use equipment, the last version of which dates back to 1995,
should be revised. It has been noted
that, due to particularities in Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass
destruction, these lists are already more comprehensive than those of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and other non-proliferation arrangements, such as
the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group.
46. For the reinforced OMV system to achieve its objectives, Iraqi
cooperation will be necessary in particular in the sense of: a) providing
immediate unobstructed access to all locations by United Nations and IAEA
teams; b) not interfering with monitoring equipment; c) providing documentation
to determine the legitimacy of activities under monitoring; d) providing all
available information and materials related to past proscribed activities; e)
ensuring access to personnel involved in such activities for interviews without
interference; f) ensuring that relevant evidence is not concealed, removed or
destroyed; g) ensuring access by fixed or rotary wing aircraft; h) adopting
national legislation, as appropriate.
At the same time, Member States are expected to cooperate fully for the
effective functioning of the system.
VI) Organization and
methods
General observations
47. The panel had in mind, in making its suggestions in this and
other areas,- that it should work within the existing legal framework for the
implementation of Security Council resolutions related to proscribed weapons in
Iraq. The panel also notes that there
are proposals before the Security Council, which have also been mentioned
during the panel meetings, that may imply changes in Security Council
resolutions. It will be a matter for
the Security Council to judge upon the desirability of their adoption. Nevertheless, the panel thought it worth
examining adjustments in current practices and procedures within the present
legal framework. The nomenclature in
the following paragraphs was used In the discussions without prejudice to any
future Security Council decision.
48. The panel held its discussions an this subject bearing in mind
the experience accumulated during the past eight years of inspections but also
the possibility of a reinforced OMV system as delineated above. In the course of debates on how to improve
the operation of the system, reference was made to the desirability of reinforcing
overall coordination, including within the UN system, without prejudice to a
close relationship between the executive body and the Security Council. This implies the possibility of the
Executive Chairman bringing any urgent matter to the attention of the Security
Council. As a subordinate organ of the
Security Council, the executive body derives its effectiveness and authority
from this close relationship, both in terms of political supervision and of
providing support for its activities.
49. ln this context, suggestions were made, inter-alia, with
regard to the possibility of restructuring the Commission as a collegiate
body. Without prejudice of the close
relationship referred to in paragraph 48, the Commission could provide for
independent advice, guidance and general oversight, both at expert and
diplomatic levels, on carrying out activities under the monitoring and
verification plan and any problems, referred to it, that might arise in that
connection. It would carry out
functions entrusted to it by the Security Council, possibly including: a)
consideration of any matter relating to the execution of the monitoring plan
referred to it by the Security Council for advice; b) consideration of regular
reports from the Executive Chairman on the conduct of operations; c)
consideration of particular issues referred to it by the Executive Chairman
with a view to their resolution or to a recommendation to the Security Council;
d) consideration of complaints by Iraq regarding the conduct of inspections; e)
establishment of rosters of experts for possible selection to serve on
monitoring operations; and f) advice on personnel policy.
50. Recognizing the role of the Secretary-General in this
regard, the Commission's composition would also be reviewed by the Security
Council so that it possibly includes a core of technical experts;
representatives from among Security Council members; the
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and possibly other
representatives of the Secretariat. It
is thought that among the technical experts a representative of the IAEA and of
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) might be
included. In order to ensure proper
liaison of the collegiate body with the Security Council, the meetings of the
Commission might be presided over by a representative of a non-permanent member
of the Security Council. The Commission
should meet at least every three months (apart from emergency meetings).
51. Some suggestions were made that, at the operational level, the
implementation of the reinforced OMV should be entrusted to a renovated UNSCOM,
consistent with the provisions of such a system. This may have staffing Implications that were not considered at
length by the panel. It is understood
that the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC) would continue to
play a pivotal role and may have to be further reinforced. The renovated UNSCOM should ensure a clear
United Nations identity and be guided by the principles of full independence,
rigour and transparency in order to ensure the effectiveness of its work and
credibility of its results. It was felt
that, at this stage, due to the amount of knowledge acquired by UNSCOM, as well
as to the intrinsic interrelationship between the missile, biological and chemical
weapons fields, these tasks should remain concentrated on this renovated United
Nations body. Nevertheless it was noted
that organizations such as OPCW might contribute, under appropriate
arrangements, including through participation in the Commission. In the future, if Iraq becomes a party to
the CWC, as urged in Security Council resolutions, cooperation arrangements
similar to those currently associated with the work of IAEA in Iraq might be
considered, provided they are consistent with mandates set forth in relevant
Security Council resolutions, if the Security Council so decides.
Recruitment
52. A central component in ensuring an effective and credible
system is the recruiting of staff who are technically competent, committed to
the objectives of the Security Council resolutions, impartial, and, if
possible, have some experience of inspections.
A personnel management strategy should ensure the optimum mix of
qualifications, background and of long-term and short-term staff. Without prejudice to these requirements,
staff selection should also reflect the desirability of establishing broad
national representation to the extent possible. Cost efficiency and technical effectiveness could be promoted by
complementing permanent staff with temporary staff selected, to the extent
possible, within a roster of specialists (see paragraph 49 above).
53. Appointments for one year or more
should continue to be made in terms of Article 101.3 of the Charter of the
United Nations. All appointees would be
regarded as International civil servants subject to Article 100 of the
Charter. Taking into account United
Nations policy, recourse to cost-free personnel should be limited. Efforts should be made to increasing,
wherever operationally possible, personnel employed directly by the United
Nations. All employees should be
subject to an enforceable Special Service Agreement. This will require full cooperation from Member States.
Training
54. Considerable weight should be given to training needs
with the objective of developing and reinforcing core inspection skills and
competences. Training programmes should
encompass both technical and cultural issues as well as relevant safety
procedures. Particular emphasis should
be placed on the importance of understanding national sensitivities in the
course of Inspections. Emphasis should
be given to structural pre-inspection training. For short-term appointments, on-the-job training would be the
regular practice. Inspection planning
and staffing should reflect those training needs. Continuity in the field is essential.
Equipment/technology
55. Appropriate specifications should be established for all
monitoring equipment, including power units, to be installed in Iraq and on
arrangements for its maintenance by suitably qualified personnel. Systematic and rapid selection and
independent procurement of adequate emerging monitoring technologies should be
promoted, as appropriate.
Information
56. Information has been recognized as an essential component
of a reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification regime, whether provided by
Iraq, or generated by inspections, or from any other source, including Member
States. Internal handling of
information should reflect the absolute need to protect the confidentiality of
operations planning and to give assurances to providers that the sources and
methods are being properly protected.
This requires clear procedures for receipt, handling, storage and access
to sensitive information. Evaluation
and assessment of information collected should be rigorous and impartial. This can be facilitated by adopting clear
analysis concepts and methodologies, and by using a modem database and
computer-based analysis tools. The
greater the confidence in the security culture of the organization the more
information Member States are likely to provide.
57. Any information should be assessed strictly on the basis of
its credibility and relevance to the mandate.
The substantive relationship with intelligence providers should be one-way
only, even if it is recognized that dialogue with providers may be necessary
for clarifications and refinement of assessments. The OMV mechanism should not be used for purposes other than the
ones set forth in Security Council resolutions.
Other practices and procedures
58. In conducting inspections or monitoring operations,
effectiveness should be the primary consideration. A rigorous and comprehensive approach should be adopted to
planning and in-field activities and should take into account the difficulties
encountered in the past in Iraq, including instances of obstruction and/or
deception. At the same time unnecessary
confrontation or disproportionate reactions should be avoided.
59. Cooperative arrangements among different disciplines
should be promoted through the development of structures to improve linkages
and information flows across disciplines and activities. The composition of inspection/monitoring
teams should reflect mission requirements.
Confidentiality should be maintained during all stages of the planning
and execution phases. Within the limits
dictated by that requirement, inspector's should be appropriately briefed on
the broader objectives of the project in which their activities are inserted
and should be given access to the reports of the missions to which they have
contributed.
60. The Issue of relations with the media was raised. The panel found that, ideally, there should
be a single point of contact with the press, which could benefit from the
expertise of the existing UN and/or IAEA public relations machinery. Public comment by the verification entity
and its personnel should be limited and restricted to the factual. Political evaluations or comments that carry
obvious political implications should be left to the Security Council.
VII) CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
61. The panel carried out its work bearing in mind the objective
of presenting a meaningful contribution to the Security Council on how to
re-establish a UN presence in Iraq in the area of disarmament/ongoing
monitoring and verification. The panel
considered that refocusing or 'relensing' the approach towards
disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification, without departing from the
existing framework of rights and obligations laid down in Security Council
resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, might offer the
opportunity to enlarge the scope of policy options for the Security
Council. To this end, the panel
concentrated a great part of its work on discussing the technical feasibility
of a reinforced OMV system capable of addressing, through integration,
remaining unresolved disarmament issues.
The panel concluded that such a reinforced OMV system, which should
include intrusive Inspections and investigation of relevant elements of past
activities, is viable.
62. The framework for this system is well-known, encompassing
Security Council resolutions 687, 707, 715 and 1051. In fact, what is being called a reinforced OMV is the OMV system
itself as conceived in the plans approved by resolution 715 developed to its
full potentiality. The panel points out
that there is no need to change resolution 715 to that effect.
63. Several suggestions were made in relation to questions
pertaining to organization and methods of work, including institutional
arrangements, bearing in mind the reinforced OMV system. They are outlined in
chapter VI of this report. The panel
recommends that the Security Council devotes appropriate attention to these
ideas.
64. The panel notes that the longer inspection and monitoring
activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive
implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk
that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programmes or retain
proscribed items. A materialization of
such a risk that is attributable to the absence of inspections would have
extremely negative consequences for the credibility of international
non-proliferation efforts in general, and for the credibility of the United
Nations and IAEA in particular.
65. It has been repeatedly pointed out that UNSCOM's and IAEA's
current inability to implement their mandates in Iraq renders them unable to
provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under
Security Council resolutions and that it is essential that inspection teams
return to Iraq as soon as possible. The
current absence of inspectors has exponentially increased the risk of
compromising the level of assurance already achieved, since it is widely
recognized that the re-establishment of the baseline will be a difficult
task. The loss of technical confidence
in the system could become irretrievable.
The panel considers that the status quo is not a practical alternative
and recommends that efforts be made with a view to restoring an international
inspection regime in Iraq that is effective, rigorous and credible.
66. The effectiveness of the monitoring and verification system
depends on its being comprehensive and intrusive. Rigorous implementation is critically dependent upon the full
exercise of the rights of full and free access set forth in relevant Security
Council resolutions. The monitoring and
verification system is an integral whole that can be meaningfully implemented
only in its entirety. At the same time,
mandates should be carried out objectively in a technically competent and
thorough manner with due regard to Iraqi sovereignty, dignity and
sensitivities, including religious and cultural ones, as well as those related
to commercial confidentiality.
67. Given the difficulties experienced in the past, this will
require firm and active support by the Security Council for the implementation
of the reinforced OMV system.
implementation of the OMV system is predicated on Iraqi cooperation. Ensuring appropriate cooperation by Iraq
means that, in one way or another, Iraq will have to be engaged by the Security
Council, sooner rather than later. Of
course the OMV system cannot be conceived as an enticement for Iraq to invite
it into its territory. Indeed the
reinforced OMV would be, if anything, more intrusive than the one so far
practiced. It is in the hands of the
Security Council to devise ways of ensuring that Iraq accepts such monitoring
and verification.
68. In summary, the panel agreed on the possibility of an integrated
system that is a reinforced OMV within the existing legal framework of
resolutions 687, 707, 715 and 1051 as well as the Memorandum of Understanding
of 23 February 1998, which would be capable of addressing the outstanding
disarmament issues. Some of the
parameters necessary for the implementation of
such a system were outlined in relevant chapters of this report. They will surely need further elaboration,
once the suggested approach is accepted by the Security Council. However, even the best system would be
useless if it were to remain a blueprint on paper only. To be effective, any system has to be
deployed on the ground, which is impossible without Iraqi acceptance. How this acceptance will be obtained is the
fundamental question before the Security Council.