SdM: Good afternoon, I am here with Jan Egeland, so I will give the floor to Jan so that we have some questions related to its own area of attention, separately from the political ones. So I will more or less address now the other issues and will take some questions of course. 

First of all, let's confirm that, as you all know, we are preparing the intra-Syrian new round of talks next week. They would be starting on the 16th, we are aiming [at finishing] as a target towards the 19th . These [talks] will be rather business-like, rather short comparing to other meetings, but there are two reasons for that, first one is that we wanted to hit the iron while its hot, let’s be frank. After the Astana meeting which took place and which we attended proactively, there has been some outcomes that we find extremely, potentially, promising and we want to connect, as much as possible, that outcome with some political horizon.

We all know that no cease-fire or de-escalation will ever work unless there is, for a long time, at least in the long term or in medium-term, some type of a political horizon. 

And secondly, because we are in a way going to do it anyway but in this case we would like to do it as soon as possible. Secondly because, as you know the holy month of Ramadan starts and is not a reason for stopping talks, or not having them but, certainly does have an impact. 

And three, we are getting into what we hope, a more business-like type of approach and I will be able to elaborate on that on Monday, where we will have a specific press conference, curtain raiser, regarding on how, I would say, the new approach in this case will be applied, in terms of rooms, facilitation, in terms of media access and so.

But all that with the purpose of trying to make sure that having had several rounds which were more preparatory, sometimes very declaratory, they can start becoming more business-like.

Much is happening, as you know more than anyone else, related to international meetings. Those meetings which are both bilateral and multilateral, have an impact and, in my opinion and my hope, and I know of the Secretary-General’s hope, is that they are all in the direction of helping a political process. We had the bilateral meetings as you know yesterday in Washington, there will be bilateral meetings between the US and Turkey at the highest level, there are going to be international occasions in the next few weeks and related to the G7, G20, in other words, several meetings, not only G7 and G20.

Now regarding Geneva, I just want to say that on the outcome of Astana, and Jan would be able to make more comments on that based on our discussions we had today on the humanitarian follow-up to the Astana meeting, we are talking about the de-escalation areas, the ones suggested by the Astana team.Then there are, as you know, other areas which are being discussed or planned regarding the interim stabilisation area. But when we talk about the four de-escalation areas, these have the potential of affecting, hopefully positively from a humanitarian point of view, at least 2.6 million people. So we are talking anyway of a major impact, if as we hope that would work.

I will stop there, take your questions, and then after that I will give the floor to you, Jan.

Q: You talk about it’s been promising with the Astana deal, what concretely do you see has changed on the ground after the deal, and what makes you believe in this deal as the opposition rebels are not part of it and there is no  trust between the regime and the opposition about this deal. 

SdM: All valid points, I cannot deny it, especially, I cannot deny the level of distrust or the scepticism that is legitimate in a case like this, after how many ceasefires or temporary reduction of violence we have already faced. But there is something different:  the first one is, you must have seen it, I was in Astana, I witnessed it officially, there was a signature. There was a signature put on a paper by three guarantors, that in a way symbolises more than what is simply a verbal declaration.

Secondly, the three countries which have been identifying themselves as guarantors, do have, if they want to and if they put their own political weight behind it, the capacity of making this arrangement potentially working. Spoilers will be there, spoilers are there, but that should be an element of at least giving it some hope.

Three, there is an alternative to that, and the alternative would be simply to do nothing and have another ten, God forbid, Aleppo. So against that background, we add a touch of the will of optimism, whenever there is an initiative and this is a serious initiative because we saw the negotiation, to want to give it a chance.  Now it is also true that some members of the opposition did not attend and some actually left the meeting, but I was there, most of them were seated there, and most of them were part of that ceremony, and most of them are having the possibility of deciding between option one and option two. So I would give it a stronger chance to be showing that it has a strong chance. And the UN is supportive of that. The alternative another 10 Aleppo, we can’t afford it.

Q: You talked about promising possibilities from Astana but there is also the possibility that the three guarantor would content themselves with more of a kind of quality partition of Syria, the frozen conflict, rather than what I think you are working towards here, which is peace and political transition. I just wanted to have that security with your four baskets, do you see what have outlined there from Astana, something with you would be prepared to kind of prioritise?

SdM: This concept of a partition, which of course, has always been a danger affecting the future and the present of Syria, and by the way you remember, many of you, that that was a subject which came up even when Iraq or Afghanistan conflicts were in their most tense moments. There was the possibility of conceptualising partitions de facto, and they didn't take place, thank God, because countries need to be able to maintain their unity at the end of the day.

Now what I want to underline, and that's the way we are looking at it, that any concept of stabilisation area or de-escalation are, by definition, preceded by one word, that we all know, it is called interim, and interim is a way to address urgent issues without creating a permanent precedent. The only ones who ever actually so far succeeded in creating real partitions hoping that that would be permanent is ISIS, and we all know what everyone feels about that.

Q: Question of two aspects of Astana, one is about the de-escalation zones, so there are supposed to be monitors or observers, could you tell us what is the prognostic for an agreement on who might actually monitor these zones, because it seems to be a key aspect, and the other question is about detainees or prisoners, I heard, and I don’t know if it is true that there was a deal on prisoner releases,  when do you expect to see the first prisoner releases and how many people?

SdM: Tom, you are really very specific there. First of all regarding the operational implementation of the Astana memorandum, I think one of the issues that makes me, you know it, we are by definition optimists, so I have to put that up front. But what  makes me more optimistic about the chances for this memorandum to work out, is that they've been very careful about not announcing at midnight, tonight everything will be cleared, clarified and everything will work, and then suddenly something happens which then delegitimises it or makes it less likely to happen. 

There are, as I won’t go into details, days, 14 days. There is a date in June as well in other words there is a staggered approach in order to make it as professionally effective as possible, and that requires also a discussion which is ongoing regarding who will be doing the observation, the monitoring, perhaps even checkpoints and so on. I would not elaborate at this stage because they are part of discussions among the guarantors and with our support of course, when required, since we have a lot of expertise. 

Now regarding the other two aspects that were discussed and were discussed, in my opinion, quite constructively with some papers that were, almost to the last point detailed, agreed upon. One is on detainees, abductees and missing people, there are many categories. That paper is now almost completely, I won’t say blessed but finalised. So to tell you when the first detainees will be released is premature.  What I can tell you is that, that has gone much more faster than I was fearing it would. And it is linked in a way because there was a discussion also on humanitarian demining, which was also a paper that has produced quite a lot of operational details in which the UN is directly involved because we do have UNMAS. And, in fact, there is a potential mission of UNMAS in the area in order to be able to see how we can actually help like we have done in many other countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia. 

Q: (interpreted from French) There is a something that I didn’t understand regarding Astana meeting. Is that true that the armed opposition delegation who participated in Astana must fight Al Nusra Front in their area? And regarding Geneva, is here a shift in the format? Will there be direct talks? Will invitees be the same as previously?

SdM: (Interpreted from French) I won’t answer your first question for the moment, frankly because if you read the memorandum, and you probably did, this is what we saw on the paper that the three guarantors, who had obviously consulted both sides present in Astana, the Opposition and the Syrian Government, and I haven’t seen them raising their hands aggressively against that. There has been a reaction from some of them, vis a vis one of the guarantors but not on the paper itself. But I won’t go into interpreting the document at this point.

On the question addressing the format, yes it is true. This time, maybe helped by the fact that there are many conferences taking place in this building, and the use of smaller meeting rooms, we will try to use the business-like approach. More intimate meetings, smaller rooms in which we can look at each other in the eyes. On proximity [talks]: honestly, in the current conditions, we can go much deeper with proximity[talks] than with a formal meeting together. We already did it, formally it took place. , This means we have the intention, if we find the right moment, to go back to that, but I think it is better to do business-like meetings in the proximity format. I will use every occasion to go beyond this. It is of course ideal for every mediator. Last question please.

Q: You mentioned an interesting point about that the safe zones should be considered as interim. The flipside of what you said is that there could be partition ultimately. The flipside of that is that the parties on the ground may use the safe zones as an opportunity to retrench and possibly then later attack other areas. I'm just wondering how concerned are you that this might be a prelude to a new Government offensive on Idlib in particular. There can be two options, either a political solution or more fighting essentially once the safe zones are created. What makes you so sure that the political will be the route rather than more fighting? And if you could also just address the arming of the Kurds which has cost some problems with Turkey. How that affects, how you see that possibly impacting the developments particularly with the guarantors? Thank you.

SdM: Regarding the first question on how do I see this impacting and having possible implications. Allow me to be focused. The Syrian people, at this stage and if you ask them, anyone, they will tell you the first thing: please Mr de Mistura or Mr anyone, we have as a priority no more bombing, no more shelling, no more heavy killing as we have seen for four years. That is their question, that is the question they ask all the time. Now that is why first things first. The first thing, if as we hope and want to work, this would produce as it is expected a de-escalation and therefore what we call a stabilisation in that sense an interim, that means no people being killed anymore by that. That would give us the time to go to any other steps but I will not prejudge or become presumptive on what if in that case. Let's cross that bridge first. That bridge has been crossed in the past and it didn't last long so we need to make that happening, and it is linked to what you will be hearing now from Jan. There are deliverables linked to that, humanitarian aid. There are deliverables coming to that which means also medical access. There are deliverables, which is also access in general. So all that is not a small bridge to cross, then we will talk about the rest. If, at the same time we are having some momentum in progress on any of the political issues, which provide a horizon for what is taking place, then you can see that the two things are moving. Meanwhile, up there, bilateral meetings are taking place in the real politic too, and they are all connected to what we are trying to do. Thank you very much, I'm not elaborating on military issues as you know, normally I don't. Thank you.