S
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/1995/284
10
April 1995
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
NOTE
BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
The Secretary-General has the
honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive
Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
95-10422 (E) 120495 /...
*9510422*
Annex
Report of the Secretary-General on the
status of the implementation
of the Special Commission's plan for
the ongoing monitoring and
verification of Iraq's compliance with
relevant parts of section C
of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991)
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I. INTRODUCTION
..........................................
1 - 2 3
II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
................................. 3 -
4 3
III. ACTIONS
TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN ......................... 5 - 127 6
A. Ongoing monitoring and verification operations
.... 5 - 96 6
1. Missile activities
............................ 5 - 23 6
2. Chemical activities
........................... 24 - 58 10
3. Biological activities
......................... 59 - 87 16
4. Nuclear activities
............................ 88 - 92 22
5. Aerial surveillance
........................... 93 - 96 23
B. Export/import mechanism
........................... 97 - 113 23
1. Actions to establish the mechanism
............ 99 - 107 24
2. Actions to implement the mechanism
............ 108 - 113 25
C. National implementation measures ..................
114 - 116 26
D. Organization
...................................... 117 - 127 27
1. Executive Office, New York
.................... 117 - 122 27
2. Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre
.... 123 - 127 28
IV. FUTURE OPERATIONS
..................................... 128 - 132 29
A. Financial status of the Special Commission
........ 128 - 130 29
B. Operations and organization
....................... 131 - 132 30
V. CONCLUSIONS ...........................................
133 - 136 30
Appendix.
Inspection schedule ......................................... 32
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The
present report is the seventh submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security
Council resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, by which the Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Security Council
every six months on the implementation of the Special Commission's Plan for
ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of
section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It updates the information contained in the
first six reports (S/23801, S/24661, S/25620, S/26684, S/1994/489 and
S/1994/1138 and Corr.1).
2. Further
information concerning developments relating to the implementation of the plan
is contained in the report to the Security Council of
15 December 1994 (S/1994/1422 and Add.1), the seventh report provided
in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991), the addendum to which
covers in detail the array of ongoing monitoring and verification activities
undertaken by the Commission in the period from June to December 1994.
II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
3. The
basic elements of the ongoing monitoring and verification system are regular
inspections of relevant facilities, inventories of dual-purpose items 1/ and
accounting for all inventoried items until they are consumed, disposed of or no
longer operable. The inspections and
the establishment and maintenance of accurate inventories will be underpinned
by a full array of interlocking activities:
aerial surveillance with a variety of sensors, remote sensors, tags and seals,
a variety of detection technologies, information obtained from other sources
and, when sanctions on the dual-purpose items are lifted, notifications under
the export/import control mechanism. No
one of these elements on its own would suffice to provide confidence in the
system, but together they should constitute the most comprehensive
international monitoring system ever established in the sphere of arms
control. Confidence in its
effectiveness will rely, inter alia, on the following:
(a) Possession by the Commission of a full picture
of Iraq's past programmes and a full accounting of the facilities, equipment,
items and materials associated with those past programmes, in conjunction with
full knowledge of the disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to
Iraq, the technologies acquired by Iraq in pursuing the past programmes, and
the supplier networks it established to acquire those elements of the
programmes that it could not acquire indigenously. This information provides the baseline data from which ongoing
monitoring and verification proceeds;
Knowledge
of the level of technology attained by Iraq, of the production and acquisition
methods it used and of the materials and equipment it had available are all key
to designing a system of monitoring that addresses issues of concern and
focuses monitoring effort where it would be most effective and efficient. For example, within Iraq, the system should
focus more of its efforts on those technologies and production methods that
Iraq is known to have mastered than on technologies and methods that Iraq is
known not to have mastered, whereas, for the export/import monitoring regime,
the converse would be true, with effort focusing on those items that Iraq would
have to import in order to reactivate a proscribed weapons programme. Clearly, knowing where to focus effort
requires knowledge of what Iraq achieved in its past programmes;
Similarly,
knowledge of the procurement methods and routes used by Iraq for its past
programmes is key to the design of an effective and efficient export/import
monitoring regime. This system should
be designed to be effective against the procurement routes and methods that
Iraq is known to have used in the past.
Testing whether it is, is predicated on knowing those routes and
methods;
Full
accounting for the materials, items and equipment associated with the past
programmes is directly related to what assets should be monitored under the
system. Dual-purpose materials, items
and equipment from the past programmes must be monitored, along with other
dual-purpose capabilities available to Iraq. Uncertainties relating to the
accuracy or completeness of this accounting will consequently lead to
uncertainties as to whether the ongoing monitoring and verification system is
indeed monitoring all the materials, items and equipment which should be
monitored;
Under
Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715 (199l), Iraq is obliged to
provide the above information, which the Commission then verifies through its
inspection and analysis activities.
Iraq is required to update its declarations on its dual-purpose
activities and capabilities every six months;
(b) Completion of comprehensive monitoring and
verification protocols for each site at which monitoring will be conducted as a
consequence of the dual-purpose items present or activities undertaken
there. These protocols are the product
of the baseline inspection process, i.e., inspections for the purposes of
identifying all dual-purpose capabilities requiring monitoring, tagging and
inventorying, sensor installation and protocol-building as necessary. They collate all the information required
for future ongoing monitoring and verification of, and contain recommendations
as to the conduct of such monitoring at, the specified site;
(c) Successful testing of the system of ongoing
monitoring and verification in order to:
- Establish a clear understanding and practice
of how the elements of the system, including the actions required of Iraq,
should operate;
- Evaluate the effectiveness of its elements,
both individually and as a whole;
(d) Continuing reassessment of the operation of
the system of ongoing monitoring and verification in order to make adjustments
necessary in the light of Iraq's industrial development and of any further
information which becomes available on Iraq's past programmes. Because of the scale of those past
programmes, the damage caused during the Gulf war and Iraq's own actions in
allegedly destroying material evidence, in particular documentation, elements
could remain unclear for a long time.
While these elements, except where otherwise indicated in the present
report, are not such as to call into question the effectiveness and
comprehensive nature of the monitoring system, the Commission will continue to
seek out the information to clear them up.
The entire process of verification of Iraq's declarations has been
rendered both difficult and prolonged as a result of Iraq's refusal or
inability to produce the documentation relating to its past programmes and
Iraq's providing the Commission with frequently changing accounts of certain
elements of its programmes. This has
required the Commission to undertake more intensive investigations than would
otherwise have been necessary. It has
also had to seek information from other Governments of former suppliers to
Iraq's programmes. This has consumed
considerable periods of time. This
procedure is still ongoing and will be vigorously pursued by the Commission. The full responsibility for the delays lies
with Iraq. In addition to unclear
elements of the nature referred to above, new information may become available
to the Commission requiring investigation in the future. Iraq clearly understands this to be the case
and the Deputy Prime Minister has on several occasions provided explicit
assurances that Iraq will in no way hinder or interfere with such
investigations.
While the system is premised on the provision
by Iraq of accurate and complete declarations of its dual-purpose activities
and capabilities and cannot be operated at its most effective and least
intrusive without such full declarations, it has also been designed to be
robust. Experience has shown that, even
when initially presented with inadequate declarations, the Commission has been
able, through the deployment of its various resources and the exercise of its
inspection rights, to elicit the information required for the system to be
established. The Commission recognizes
that it has received full cooperation from Iraq in setting up and now in
operating the monitoring system. It has
also received assurances from Iraq, at the highest levels, that this
cooperation will continue as the Security Council takes decisions in respect of
easing or lifting sanctions and the oil embargo. However, should Iraq seek systematically at any time in the
future to block the work of the Commission by, for example, preventing access
to sites, the Commission would not be able to provide the Security Council with
the assurances it seeks concerning Iraq's compliance with the terms of
paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991).
If such a case were to arise, the Commission would immediately inform
the Council.
4. Once
the sanctions imposed on Iraq under resolution 661 (1990) are eased or lifted,
in accordance with paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991), to the extent that
the export to Iraq of dual-purpose items is again permitted, a further
essential element of the overall monitoring of Iraq's dual-purpose capabilities
will be the export/import mechanism envisaged under paragraph 7 of resolution
715 (1991).
III. ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN
A. Ongoing monitoring and verification
operations
1. Missile activities
Summary
5. The
Commission has essentially completed the accounting of facilities, equipment
and materials used in the past proscribed missile programmes of Iraq. The Commission must complete its
verification of certain elements of Iraq's account to ensure that all items
subject to ongoing monitoring and verification are indeed included in the
monitoring programme. The Commission is
still waiting for responses to requests for information from a number of
countries from which Iraq acquired or sought to acquire items for proscribed
purposes about those transactions. In
most cases, the remaining outstanding issues do not involve the receipt by Iraq
of prohibited items, but deal with the technological level attained during, and
the intended direction of, Iraq's past missile activities. Consequently, their resolution is required
to ensure the right focus of ongoing monitoring and verification efforts.
6. The
Commission completed the baseline survey of Iraq's permitted missile and
related dual-purpose capabilities in May 1994.
Installation of sensors and tags for monitored missiles and production
equipment and related dual-purpose items was completed in July 1994 and the
resident missile monitoring team began its monitoring activities in August
1994. Since then, the Commission has
established a viable mechanism for monitoring Iraq's design, testing and
production of permitted missile systems and related dual-purpose items. Iraq has provided support to ensure the
proper operation of the monitoring system. The missile monitoring is now
operational.
Past programmes
7. The
lack of precision in the initial information provided by Iraq on its past
ballistic missile programmes and the alleged destruction of documents by Iraq
in late 1991 have made obtaining a complete understanding of Iraq's past
ballistic missile programmes extremely difficult. The Commission has exerted considerable efforts to verify the
information provided in Iraq's "Full, final and comprehensive report on
ballistic missile activity", received in 1992. However, parts of the information provided have proved confusing,
misleading or inaccurate. The
Commission, therefore, embarked on an effort to seek corroborating information
from a variety of sources to provide the verification required by the Security
Council. Many of the details of those
programmes have been elucidated.
However, several issues remain to be resolved. These issues do not, in general, involve the delivery to or
possession by Iraq of prohibited items, but bear directly on the technology
level attained by Iraq. The
Commission's understanding of this is important for the design and operation of
the monitoring system.
8. Iraq's
ballistic missile programme was initially centred around the single- stage,
liquid-engine 8K14 (SCUD B) missile, for which it first received missiles and
mobile launchers, together with associated support equipment, starting in 1974. Iraq has stated that in 1987 it started a
programme to extend the range of these missiles and to reverse-engineer the
system. In total, Iraq imported 819
such missiles and 11 mobile launchers for them. In addition, it produced indigenously 8 mobile launchers and
constructed or was in the process of constructing 60 fixed launch sites for
these missiles. The Commission has
supervised or verified the destruction, and accounted for the expenditure, of
the above assets.
9. The
Commission has received numerous reports of the importation by Iraq of SCUD
systems from countries other than the supplier of the 819 missiles described
above. No evidence has been found of
such imports. The Commission assesses
that no additional missiles of this type or support equipment were indeed
supplied to Iraq.
10. In
its efforts to extend the range of the imported SCUD B missiles, Iraq used
simple techniques which did not add significantly to its missile technology
base. However, its reverse-engineering
efforts included the acquisition of sophisticated production machinery and
technology as well as the acquisition from various suppliers of components for
missile systems. In particular, Iraq
gained expertise in missile propulsion systems and their propellants, guidance
and control and airframe production technologies, and acquired the hardware for
high-precision machining. The above
notwithstanding, Iraq was not successful in its efforts to acquire an indigenous
capability to produce indigenously entire missile systems through its
reverse-engineering efforts.
11. Beginning
in 1985, Iraq started a cooperative effort with other countries to develop a
high-technology, two-stage missile system designed for a range of around 1,000
km, called the BADR 2000 in Iraq. In
this effort, Iraq constructed sophisticated production facilities and imported
high-technology production equipment for the fabrication of the first
solid-propellant stage of this system.
The Commission assesses, however, that no complete BADR 2000 missiles
were produced by Iraq. The Commission
has supervised and verified the destruction of all known items, production
equipment and infrastructure directly associated with that programme. The Commission currently believes that Iraq
did not acquire any technology or equipment for the production of any other
aspects or components of that system, e.g., guidance and control and launchers.
12. The
Commission believes that it has a broad understanding of the achievements of
Iraq's past missile programmes and of the level of technological development of
Iraq in this area. It further believes
that it has accounted for the majority of the materials, items and equipment
associated with these past programmes.
Investigations into the disposition of some remaining items,
particularly related to the former missile reverse-engineering project, are
continuing. The Commission believes it
has been able to design a reasonable monitoring system based on this level of
technology and that all the physical assets that should be monitored are indeed
being monitored.
13. However,
there are still aspects of Iraq's past programmes, regarding the direction of
its research and development efforts, that require further clarification. The Commission has, over the past six
months, requested and received information on Iraq's past activities from many
supporting nations. The information
provided, in most cases, corroborates information provided by Iraq in its
subsequent declarations. A few cases
require continued investigation by the Commission to eliminate any possibility
that they present potential loopholes in the ongoing monitoring and
verification mechanism. The following
cases exemplify such issues.
14. Supersonic
parachute recovery system. In 1988,
Iraq initiated the development of a supersonic parachute recovery system for
the Al Hussein missile warhead. The
programme continued through 1990. Iraq
approached at least three different companies for the development, production
and supply of the system. However, no
systems were provided to Iraq. The
Commission is currently investigating and verifying the programme's purpose and
scope. Information available to the
Commission from the potential suppliers does not corroborate Iraq's current
declarations about the programme.
15. Unsymmetrical
dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH). UDMH is
a liquid fuel which can improve the performance of liquid-propellant rocket
engines. In 1987, Iraq began inquiring
about and procuring facilities, equipment, training and materials concerning
every aspect of the use and production of UDMH and related systems in
missiles. The programme continued until
January 1991. Iraq declared that it had
unilaterally destroyed 10.5 tons of UDMH in May 1991. The Commission has been unable to verify this. Further, Iraq declared that no experiments
were performed using UDMH. The
Commission has information which contradicts this statement. If Iraq mastered the technologies required
for UDMH rocket engine design, the Commission would need to modify the ongoing
monitoring and verification regime in the missile area to take account of
Iraq's access to these technologies.
The Commission is continuing to investigate this issue to ensure that it
has an accurate account of Iraq's past activities in this regard.
Baseline data
16. The
monitoring system in the missile area has been designed by assessing the
critical aspects of each stage of the production of permitted missile systems
to ensure that no components are produced or diverted for use in proscribed
missile systems. Consequently, monitoring
focuses on Iraq's non-proscribed missile research, development, testing and
production activities, facilities and equipment. In addition, the system also monitors other facilities with
related dual-purpose technologies and items and high-precision engineering
manufacturing capabilities which could be used to support a clandestine effort
to produce proscribed missiles.
17. The
Commission completed the baseline survey of all of Iraq's declared missile and
related research, development, test and production facilities in
May 1994. Thirty-two baseline
inspections were conducted during UNSCOM 71/BM 22. The baseline process included identifying the critical
technologies and equipment, recommending the appropriate level of monitoring for
the same and creating the detailed protocols necessary for conducting
inspections at each site.
18. The
Commission completed the installation of 41 monitoring cameras at 15 sites
related to missiles or associated dual-use technology in July 1994. These cameras were tested during August 1994
and the system became operational in September 1994. The Commission completed the tagging and inventorying of 182
items of missile-related equipment in July 1994. The Commission completed a technical baseline survey of missile
systems to be subject to monitoring in June 1994, and the tagging of all
relevant operational missiles in Iraq in July 1994. The resident missile monitoring team initiated
its inspection activities in August 1994.
Ongoing monitoring and verification apparatus
19. The
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant
parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), approved by the
Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991), states that facilities,
equipment, other items and technologies which could be used for the
development, construction, modification or acquisition of ballistic missiles
with a range greater than 150 kilometres should be subject to monitoring and
verification. The Commission has
undertaken to fulfil this requirement of the Security Council by designing a
multi-level, comprehensive monitoring system covering Iraq's missile research,
development, testing and production facilities as well as facilities with
related dual-use capabilities. The
monitoring system provides for: the
periodic no-notice inspection of facilities by the Baghdad resident missile
monitoring group; camera surveillance of critical areas and key production
machines; inventory control, by tagging and regular inspection, of items and
machinery located at key, related and dual-use facilities; special inspection
teams to address specific issues (e.g., research and development activities);
inspections to verify Iraq's compliance with existing resolutions; and aerial
inspections and surveillance.
20. In
order to accomplish the above tasks, the Commission has undertaken inspections
of research, development, testing, production and modification activities and
facilities. Inspection of research and
development facilities establishes the technological capabilities of Iraq and
helps identify any modifications necessary for the current monitoring
regime. Inspection of testing
facilities, including the witnessing of testing activity, provides assurance
that current missile systems and those under development do not exceed the
constraints established by the resolutions.
Inspection of production and modification facilities guarantees that all
missiles produced are accounted for and that no proscribed missile systems are
produced. This is backed up by
inspections of sites not currently under monitoring to ensure that no
activities requiring monitoring are conducted at the site in question, thereby
ensuring, through a programme of such inspections, the comprehensiveness of the
monitoring system (i.e., that all that should be is monitored). Finally, the verification inspections of the
operational missile ensures that no modification to extend the maximum range of
these missile systems will go undetected.
21. The
resident missile monitoring teams have conducted 178 inspections since the last
report. These inspections have
established the effectiveness of the monitoring regime in verifying the current
status of Iraq's non-proscribed missile programmes and related technology. The resident team is entrusted with the
inspection of Iraq's missile and related facilities to ensure that there is no
research or development into or production of missile systems exceeding the
specifications of the resolutions, that all declared equipment is accounted for
and that records agree with information on research, development and production
available from other sources. Further,
regular collection and review of video coverage of missile-related activities
in critical areas and key equipment is conducted to guarantee that the
Commission accounts for and tags all produced missiles subject to monitoring
and that no production of proscribed missile systems occurs.
22. Since
the last report the Commission has conducted three inspections of the tagged
operational missiles to ensure that Iraq has not modified any missile to extend
its range beyond that allowed by the resolutions. These inspections are conducted on a random sample of
10 per cent of the operational missile force three times per annum. No modifications of missiles under
monitoring were detected.
23. The
Commission has conducted, on a regular basis, research and development update
inspections to confirm that current missile designs will not exceed the limits
established by the resolutions. Such
inspections are designed to review the technical details of the design,
development and testing of missile systems and missile-related technological
developments twice per annum. These
inspections are designed to identify any requirement to modify the monitoring
regime to assure its continued effectiveness.
The Commission conducted its latest research and development update
inspection in March 1995.
2. Chemical activities
Summary
24. During
the high-level talks held at Baghdad in February 1995, Iraq promised to present
a new full, final and complete declaration of its past chemical warfare
activities in order to comply with the requirements of resolution
707 (1991). This it did on 25
March 1995, during the most recent visit of the Executive Chairman to
Baghdad. The new information provided
is now being verified, in particular the claim that significantly reduced
quantities of chemical warfare agents were produced.
25. The
chemical monitoring system in Iraq is now operational, with the installation of
its monitoring equipment almost complete.
The additions and modifications to the system which are in the course of
being made are not such as to undermine the effectiveness of the overall
regime. Together with an efficient
export/import monitoring regime, this system is expected to preclude Iraq from
resuming prohibited chemical activities.
Past programmes
26. In
order to resolve outstanding issues relating to its past chemical weapons
programmes, Iraq provided on 25 March 1995 a new "full, final and
complete" declaration of all aspects of its past chemical weapons
programmes. This declaration contains
new information on: the history and organizational
structure of the past programmes; the weaponization of chemical weapons agents;
the procurement of chemical weapons-related materials; and the material balance
for precursor chemicals and chemical weapons agents produced and
weaponized. Iraq has agreed to provide
additional information and clarifications concerning these new declarations as
required and upon the Commission's request.
Any such additional information will be attached as an addendum to the
new declaration.
27. In
the new declaration, Iraq has revised some of the data previously
provided. The most significant change
relates to the quantities of chemical warfare agents produced. Iraq now declares that it produced 290 tons
of chemical weapons agents less than previously stated. The declaration also indicated that, in
1985, certain biological activities were undertaken at Iraq's principal
chemical weapons site, Muthanna. The
Commission has started the process of verifying this new information. Verification of the statement relating to
biological activities at Muthanna is dependent on full verification of Iraq's
declarations concerning its biological activities in this time-frame.
28. On
the basis of this new information, the Commission's understanding of Iraq's
past chemical weapons programmes is as follows.
Agent production
29. Iraq
started research into the production of chemical weapons agents in the 1970s
and started batch production of agents in the early 1980s. At that stage, production was heavily
reliant on the import of precursor chemicals from foreign suppliers.
30. In
1981, Iraq started producing the blister agent mustard (HD). Iraq's earlier declarations of 3,080 tons
produced have been reduced in the latest disclosure to 2,850 tons. The quality of the mustard agent was good
(not less than 80 per cent pure) and was such that the agent could be
stored for long periods, either in bulk or in weaponized form. Even years after its production, the mustard
agent analysed by the Commission was found to be in good and usable condition.
31. Production
of the nerve gases tabun (GA) and sarin (GB) started in 1984 and the method of
production changed over time in order to resolve stabilization problems. Iraq's latest declarations have reduced the
stated amount of tabun produced from 250 tons to 210 tons and of sarin produced
from 812 tons to 790 tons.
32. The
tabun produced was poor, being of a maximum purity of
60 per cent. As a result, the
agent did not store well and could only be stored for a limited period. Furthermore, Iraq experienced problems in
the production of tabun owing to salt blockages forming in pipes during
synthesis. Because of these problems,
Iraq refocused its nerve agent research, development and production efforts on
sarin (GB/GF).
33. The
sarin produced was also of poor quality (maximum purity of
60 per cent when solvent is taken into account) and so too could only
be stored for short periods. In order
to overcome this problem, Iraq resorted to a binary approach to
weaponization: the precursor chemicals
for sarin (DF 2/ and the alcohols cyclohexanol and isopropanol) were
stored separately for mixing in the munitions immediately prior to use to
produce a mixture of two G-series nerve agents, GB and GF. Given that the locally manufactured DF had a
purity of more than 95 per cent and the alcohols were imported and of
100 per cent purity, this process could be expected to yield
relatively pure sarin.
34. Over
the period from June 1992 to June 1994, the Commission's Chemical Destruction
Group destroyed 30 tons of tabun, 70 tons of sarin and 600 tons of mustard
agent, stored in bulk and in munitions.
35. Research
into the production of CS was initiated at the Salman Pak site in the late
1970s and early 1980s for the purposes of riot control. It was conducted under the auspices of the
Committee for National Security, not the Armed Forces. A few tons were produced at this site. In the early 1980s, military scale
production of CS was started at the Muthanna site. The Commission has been unable to establish how much CS was
produced in total. It is known that
RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades, 250- and 500-gauge bombs and 82mm and 120mm mortar
shells were filled with CS, but again the quantity of munitions so filled
cannot be established. Consequently,
the Commission is unable to establish any kind of material balance for Iraq's
CS-related activities.
36. Iraq
also had a research and development programme for the production of a further
nerve agent, VX. According to Iraq's
account, VX was the focus of its research efforts in the period after September
1987. Iraq has stated that between late
1987 and early 1988, a total of 250 tons of phosphorous pentasulphide and 200
tons of di-isopropylamine were imported, these being two key precursors
required for the production of VX. For
the other precursors required, Iraq claims to have used only approximately 1
ton of methyl phosphonyl chloride (MPC) from a total of 660 tons produced
indigenously. The remaining MPC is
claimed to have been used to produce DF, then used in GB/GF production. The fourth precursor required for VX,
ethylene oxide, was generally available, being a multi-purpose chemical.
37. Iraq
states that it produced a total of only 10 tons of choline from the
di-isopropylamine and ethylene oxide and approximately 3 tons of methyl
thiophosphonyl dichloride from the phosphorous pentasulphide and methyl
phosphonyl chloride. From this, Iraq
states that it produced experimental quantities of VX (recently increased to
260 kg from 160 kg). Iraq has recently
admitted that three 250-gauge aerial bombs had been filled with VX for
experimental purposes.
38. Iraq
claims that further attempts to produce VX were unsuccessful and the programme
was finally abandoned in September 1988.
According to Iraq's account, the remaining choline from the 10 tons was
burned in early 1988 and the remaining 247 tons of phosphorous pentasulphide
was discarded in 1991 by scattering it over an area of land and putting it in
pits. Iraq also claims that 213 tons of
di-isopropylamine was destroyed by bombing during the Gulf war. However, while the Commission has found
traces of these chemicals at the sites at which Iraq states their destruction
occurred, it has not been able to verify the quantities destroyed. Thus, precursors for the production of at
least 200 to 250 tons of VX cannot be definitively accounted for.
39. The
Commission has supervised the destruction, or verified Iraq's unilateral
destruction, of 125 250-gauge bombs and several thousands 120mm mortar
shells. In its new declaration, Iraq
declared an additional 350 500-gauge and 100 250-gauge aerial bombs filled with
CS in 1987.
Precursor chemical production
40. In
the early stages of its chemical weapons programme, Iraq imported all its
precursor chemicals. Over time,
however, Iraq sought to obtain the capability to produce indigenously all the
precursors required for the production of the agents noted above. Iraq acknowledges that it had or was on the
brink of having the capability to produce in quantity the precursors for tabun
(GA): D4 and phosphorous oxychloride
(POCl3), the sarin/cyclosarin (GB/GF) precursors: methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF), methyl
phosphonyl dichloride (MPC), dimethylmethyl phosphonate (DMMP),
trimethylphosphite (TMP), hydrogen fluoride (HF), phosphorous trichloride (PCl3)
and thionyl chloride (SOCl2).
Phosphorous trichloride and thionylchoride are also the main precursors
for the production of mustard (HD).
41. Iraq
also had the capability to produce, at least at laboratory scale, sodium
sulphide (Na2S) and thiodiglycol (both for sulphur mustard agent
production), methyl benzilate (for BZ production), triethanol amine (for
nitrogen-mustard agent production) and potassium bifluoride and ammonium
bifluoride (for GB/GF production). In
addition, Iraq had the capability to produce the VX precursors choline, methyl
thiophosphonyl dichloride (MPS) at the least at pilot-plant scale.
42. Clearly,
any ongoing monitoring and verification system in the chemical area will need
to address these capabilities.
Equipment
43. For
its past chemical weapons programme, Iraq had equipment for research and for
production purposes, both of which need to be covered by the monitoring
system. Iraq claims that all the
laboratory equipment used for research purposes was destroyed during the Gulf
war. However, the Commission has been
unable to verify this independently and hence cannot definitively account for
all the equipment of concern.
44. Of
the production equipment, the Commission tagged and inventoried 240 key pieces,
of which 40 were subsequently destroyed under the Commission's
supervision. This equipment includes
reaction vessels, heat exchangers, distillation columns and corrosion-resistant
fittings. It is estimated that a
further 50 key pieces of equipment, known to have been imported by Iraq, were
destroyed during the Gulf war.
45. Iraq
has the capability to produce certain of this dual-purpose equipment
indigenously, at welding and heavy engineering plants. However, Iraq is still reliant on imports of
corrosion-resistant metal alloys to do so.
46. The
chemical component of the ongoing monitoring and verification system has been
designed to ensure monitoring of all the appropriate laboratory and production
equipment identified and the facilities where this equipment could be
manufactured indigenously.
Munitions
47. Iraq
has declared that it weaponized for chemical weapons purposes the following
munitions: RPG-7 rocket-propelled
grenades and 82mm and 120mm mortar shells exclusively for CS; 130mm and 155mm
artillery shells for mustard agent; 250- and 500-gauge aerial bombs for
mustard, tabun, sarin and CS; 122mm rockets, R-400 and DB-2 aerial bombs for
sarin and mixtures of GB/GF; and Al Hussein missile warheads for sarin. Of these, Iraq acquired the capability to
produce all of the aerial bomb types listed and the Al Hussein missile warheads
and chemical containers for 122mm rockets.
It was reliant on imports of the other empty munitions but had the
capability to empty conventional artillery shells and aerial bombs for
subsequent refill with chemical-weapons agent.
48. While
the Commission can verify and confirm with Governments of suppliers the
declared quantities of munitions imports, it cannot yet be sure that the
declarations are comprehensive in this regard.
However, the Commission's main efforts to establish a material balance
for the chemical-weapons programmes as a whole rely more on material balances
for agents and precursor chemicals than for munitions.
49. The
major part of Iraq's chemical-weapons production and weaponization facilities
has been destroyed. Identified chemical
production equipment of dual-use character has been tagged. After the completion of the destruction of
the relevant facilities, stockpiles and approximately 40 pieces of production
equipment, the Commission's attention focused on Iraq's dual-purpose chemical
capabilities in its non-proscribed industries.
Baseline data
50. The
above indicates the technologies mastered by Iraq, chemicals, materials, items
and equipment available to it and activities undertaken by it. The Commission clearly has to monitor these
if it is to assure the Security Council that it is effectively monitoring
Iraq's compliance not to reacquire chemical weapons. In addition, in order to ensure that it designed an effective and
comprehensive monitoring system in the chemical area, the Commission had to
conduct a survey of Iraq's non-proscribed chemical industries to assess the
following: the level of research and
development which could be applied to the production of chemical weapons agents
and their precursors, either in laboratory or production quantities; the
ability of Iraq to purify, stabilize and store either chemical weapons agents
or their precursor chemicals; Iraq's capability to produce dual-use equipment
which could be used to produce chemical weapons agents and precursors and its
mastery of technologies, such as production of corrosion-resistant alloys and
special welding technologies, required to manufacture such equipment; and
Iraq's capability to develop, produce, fill or store munitions which could be
used for chemical weapons purposes (e.g., white-phosphorous-filled 155mm
shells, multi-purpose aerial bombs, etc.).
Such capabilities are found in the organophosphorous and organohalide
industries (such as pesticides, insecticides and fertilizers), the
petrochemical industry, chemical laboratories, leather tanning, military
munitions and heavy engineering plants, and hence the Commission conducted
baseline inspections of these industries in order to assess which sites and
facilities required monitoring.
51. In
1994, the Commission completed baseline inspections of 57 chemical sites, and
monitoring and verification protocols were prepared for those sites related to
production and storage of chemicals of concern and for sites involved in the
manufacture of chemical production equipment.
52. In
January and February 1995, baseline inspections were conducted at 17
universities, colleges and research institutions to assess their potential and
hence their relevance for monitoring.
In addition, five military storage depots were visited because of their
potential to store munitions for chemical weapons (empty or filled). Unless other dual-purpose facilities come to
the attention of the Commission, this completed the process of preparing
monitoring and verification protocols for the sites to be monitored. However, it is expected that the number of
chemical sites to be monitored by the Commission will increase along with the
development of Iraq's chemical industry.
53. With
the exception of two facilities in Iraq related to pesticide formulation, none
of the chemical sites currently monitored has the capability to produce banned
items. In addition, the research
laboratories inspected currently have no potential for conducting significant
chemical weapons-related research and development.
Ongoing monitoring and verification apparatus
54. In
addition to the monitoring capabilities shared across the disciplines, such as
aerial surveillance, chemical monitoring is centred around visits by the
monitoring group to sites to be monitored, tagging and inventorying of key
materials and equipment, collection and analysis of air samples using automatic
air samplers located at certain of these sites, and monitoring of key items of
equipment by remote-controlled cameras.
In the future, flow meters and seals may also be deployed at certain
production facilities.
55. On
2 October 1994, the first chemical monitoring team (CG-1) started its monitoring
activities from its base in the Baghdad Monitoring Centre. Currently, the third chemical monitoring
group (CG-3) is in Iraq. The chemical
monitoring groups have conducted 70 inspections to date. Beyond conducting ongoing monitoring and
verification activities at sites for which monitoring and verification
protocols have been prepared, the groups also visit chemical facilities which
are currently not monitored, as part of a programme to ensure that such sites
have not in fact acquired any capabilities which would require monitoring. If the group does identify a site at which
monitoring should be conducted, it will establish procedures for regular
monitoring of the site.
56. By
the end of January 1995, all the sensor systems had been installed at the sites
of interest. At six sites, 30
remote-controlled cameras were emplaced.
At eight sites, 15 computer-controlled air samplers were installed. Sites so monitored include those capable of
the production of precursors, dual-use equipment and pesticides.
57. At
the end of February 1995, a chemical laboratory was installed at the Baghdad
Monitoring Centre. The Centre now has
the capability to analyse all types of chemical samples, including the samples
from the air-sampling devices. The
laboratory has a highly sensitive analytical capability using instruments and
wet chemistry, providing sensitivity to parts per billion.
58. Minor
adjustments are being made to the air-sampling devices to increase their
reliability. These adjustments will be
completed in May 1995. Meanwhile,
manual-transportable air samplers will be made available to the chemical
monitoring group. This will enable the
group to take random air samples at sites during inspections. By the end of May 1995, the group will also
be equipped with personal detection and protection equipment suitable for
protection against all possible occupational and industrial hazards that might
be encountered at Iraq's chemical facilities.
3. Biological activities
Summary
59. The
task of establishing ongoing monitoring and verification in the biological area
has taken longer than in other areas for two reasons: the nature and scope of the task made it a more difficult
proposition; and Iraq's declarations about its dual-use capabilities were
initially far from complete and the data contained in them varied from
declaration to declaration to the point of contradiction. These difficulties notwithstanding, through
the activities of its inspection teams, the Commission has been able to
establish sufficient baseline data on key sites for it to commence
monitoring. All the apparatus for
biological monitoring is now in place and monitoring is proceeding.
60. However,
Iraq has not provided an account of its past biological warfare programme and a
new full, final and complete declaration recently received from Iraq does not
redress the problem. It is unable to
account definitively for all the materials and items that may have been used in
such a programme and are known to have been acquired by Iraq. The Commission assesses that Iraq obtained
or sought to obtain all the items and materials required to produce biological
warfare agents in Iraq. With Iraq's
failure to account for all these items and materials for legitimate purposes,
the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they
had been purchased and in part used for proscribed purposes - the production of
agents for biological weapons. In these
circumstances, the Commission cannot conclude that its biological monitoring is
comprehensive in coverage and properly focused, i.e., that it is monitoring all
biological facilities, activities, materials and items that should be subject
to monitoring.
Past programmes
61. Iraq
maintains that it had no biological weapons-related activities, only a basic
military biological research programme.
This programme, declared to have been conducted solely at the Salman Pak
site, is stated by Iraq to have been initiated in 1986 and discontinued in 1990. It is stated to have employed 10 persons and
to have produced only 10 basic research papers on various aspects of three
bacteria (B. anthracis, C1. botulinum and C1. perfringens). It is further claimed that no decision had
been taken as to the longer-term direction of the programme until the
programme's discontinuation in autumn 1990.
In its declarations, Iraq fails to explain or account for various
aspects of its procurement or construction activities in the biological area in
this time-frame.
Complex growth media
62. Iraq
acknowledges that it procured, through the Technical and Scientific Materials
Import Division (TSMID), 3/ very large quantities of complex growth
media 4/ in 1988 but has failed to provide an accounting for the
purposes of this importation and for the use of a significant portion of it.
63. Iraq
claims that, while the media was imported by TSMID, the import was on behalf of
the Ministry of Health for the purposes of hospital diagnostic
laboratories. This importation of media
by types, quantities and packaging is grossly out of proportion to Iraq's
stated requirements for hospital use.
Iraq explains the excessive quantities imported and the inappropriate
size of the packaging as being a one-of-a-kind mistake and attempts to justify
the import as appropriate and required for medical diagnostic purposes.
64. However,
for hospital diagnostic purposes, only small quantities are needed. According to Iraq's declarations, which are
imprecise and changing, over the period 1987-1994 Iraq's total hospital
consumption of all such media was less than 200 kg per annum. But in 1988 alone, TSMID imported nearly
39,000 kg of such media, which has a manufacturer's guarantee of 4 to 5
years. A further incongruity is that,
of all the types of media required for hospital use, only a select few were
"mistakenly" imported by TSMID in large quantities. These did not include those most frequently
used in hospitals.
65. Furthermore,
the packaging of TSMID imports is inconsistent with declared hospital
usage: diagnostic assays use very small
quantities of media and so, because the media deteriorates rapidly once a
package has been opened, media for diagnostic purposes is normally distributed
in 0.1-1 kg packages. However, the
media imported by Iraq in 1988 was packaged in 25-100 kg drums. This style of packaging is consistent with
the large-scale usage of media associated with the production of biological
agents. The types of media imported are
suitable for the production of anthrax and botulinum, known biological warfare
agents researched by Iraq in its declared biological military programme.
66. The
Special Commission has only accounted for some 22 tons of the 39 tons of
complex media imported by TSMID in 1988.
The media accounted for is still stored in Iraq (in large packages) and
is under the Commission's monitoring regime.
However, some 17 tons remain unaccounted for. Iraq claims that this quantity was distributed in original packages
to numerous hospitals in 1989 but that it was all destroyed (along with
documentation concerning its distribution, storage and consumption in
hospitals) during riots that occurred in the aftermath of the Gulf war. It is claimed that no media was distributed
to hospitals in regions where no riots occurred, e.g., in the Baghdad
region. No attempts were made by Iraq
to resupply the affected regions or hospitals to compensate for losses,
although large amounts of the same imported media in good condition were still
available in Iraq.
67. Iraq
initially presented a set of documents in an attempt to prove that media had
been received by a Ministry of Health storage site and was partly distributed
to certain regional health centres.
Iraq subsequently admitted that these documents had in fact been
"recreated" and now claims that all originals have been destroyed,
misplaced or lost.
68. The
Commission has information that, in addition to media delivered to Iraq in
1988, quantities of media were also purchased by Iraq in 1989 and 1990. Evidence of additional supplies in large
packages was found in Iraq. This
undermines Iraq's explanation that the TSMID purchases in 1988 were a
one-of-a-kind mistake as to types and packaging of media imported, as does the
fact that the Ministry of Health continued, through its own import division,
its regular small-quantity purchases of media consistent with its diagnostic
requirements throughout the period, including the purchase of kilogram
quantities of two growth media only months after TSMID purchased 2¼ tons of the
same media.
69. Iraq's
current accounting of media importation and disposal is not acceptable. Full and substantial accounting by Iraq for
the media, eminently suitable for production of biological agents, is an
essential task if the Commission is to have any confidence that there was no
production of biological agent for weapons purposes and that Iraq's dual-use
capabilities are sufficiently monitored to ensure that Iraq cannot
clandestinely reacquire biological weapons.
Equipment
70. Iraq
has not provided satisfactory explanations for some other significant
procurement efforts by TSMID related to the acquisition of dual-purpose
biological equipment and supplies critical to a biological warfare
capability. The following illustrates
some issues of concern.
71. When
confronted by the Commission with evidence, Iraq acknowledged the purchase by
TSMID in 1989 of four filling machines, ostensibly for a biopesticide project
at the Salman Pak site. Until this
acknowledgement, Iraq, while declaring Salman Pak to be the site of its
biological military research programme, had not declared any biopesticide
activity there. Filling machines, while
having many uses, are required for filling bacterial warfare agent into
munitions or containers. Full
accounting for these machines is therefore a requirement. Iraq claims that these four machines were
destroyed by bombing in the Gulf war.
No evidence (e.g., scrap) has been provided to support this claim. Furthermore, before describing this loss of
the filling machines, Iraq had previously declared that all equipment at Salman
Pak had been dispersed prior to the commencement of the air war in order to
protect it from bombing and that no equipment had been destroyed at Salman Pak.
72. TSMID
procured a spray dryer in 1989. Again,
it is claimed that this was for the above-mentioned biopesticide project at
Salman Pak. This spray dryer has
technical specifications which provide a capability of drying the bacterial
slurry resulting from the fermentation process to produce dry matter with
particle sizes in the range of 1 to 10 μ.
This particle size is associated with efficient dispersion of biological
warfare agents, not with the production of biopesticides. Furthermore, dry bacterial matter is easier
to store for longer periods. Such spray
dryers, therefore, would be a crucial component in acquiring an indigenous
capability to produce viable and durable biological weapons.
73. TSMID
attempted to order various named and virulent anthrax strains, known to be
particularly appropriate for biological warfare purposes. Iraq flatly denies this, despite
confirmation to the Commission by the potential supplier.
Construction of biological facilities
74. As
noted above, in addition to Iraq's procurement activities, its construction
activities for biological purposes are also a matter of concern. In particular, the production facility at
the Al Hakam site has long raised concerns relating to its original intent, as
opposed to its current use. Iraq claims
that this facility is and always was intended only as a single-cell protein
(SCP) plant for the production of animal feed.
However, certain design features of the Al Hakam facility were
superfluous to the requirements of an SCP plant, and more consistent with the
requirements of a biological warfare agent facility. Some examples follow.
75. The
original design for Al Hakam had many costly features associated with work with
toxic or infectious materials.
Production of SCP does not involve the use of such materials and so
would not require such safety features.
An example of these features was the sophisticated air filtration
system, using HEPA filters, 5/ for both input and output air on the
declared animal house. Iraq argues that
this system was required to prevent the spread of animal diseases. If, as claimed, the building were to house
only animals for feeding, there would be no requirement for such safety
features. On the other hand, such an
air filtration system would be desirable if the building were planned for
animal experiments involving infectious agents. According to information available to the Commission from the
potential supplier, Iraq also ordered a similar air filtration system for another
building at Al Hakam, housing laboratories.
Iraq denies that such an order was made. When asked to present an air ventilation design plan for the
building, Iraq stated that that particular page of the plans for the Al Hakam
facility had been lost.
76. The
layout of Al Hakam and the security arrangements there were more consistent
with a military facility or a facility to produce toxic or pathogenic material
than with a commercial SCP plant. The
facility was constructed and equipped under conditions of great secrecy, akin
to those used in Iraq's other proscribed programmes. No documents are available which identified Al Hakam, at the time
of construction, as a purely civilian production project. Iraq could not provide any public
announcements that were made about what it has since claimed was intended to be
one of the world's largest SCP plants.
No foreign contractors or suppliers ever visited the site. Iraq falsified the information on an
end-user certificate for a fermenter purchased for Al Hakam, claiming that it
would be installed at another site and under the management and supervision of
another organization. It similarly
falsified information for the import of spare parts for equipment available at
Al Hakam.
Baseline data
77. While
monitoring activities, by definition, concentrate on current dual-purpose
biological capabilities and require comprehensive and verified baseline data on
these capabilities, designing efficient and effective monitoring also
necessitates a full understanding of Iraq's past biological programme. For example, knowledge of Iraq's past
procurement methods for currently proscribed items or information on Iraq's
past programme priorities provides important indicators in identifying choke
points (either in terms of physical assets or in terms of technologies) in
Iraq's ability to reacquire banned capabilities and hence for identifying where
monitoring efforts can most profitably be focused.
78. In
preparation for monitoring Iraq's biological activities, the Commission
evaluated those dual-purpose technologies, activities, materials, items and
equipment which could contribute to a biological warfare capability and
proceeded to identify those sites or facilities in Iraq which, through the
possession of same, contribute to such a capability. The basis for the above was Iraq's declarations of its
dual-purpose capabilities, in turn verified by the Commission, and information
obtained by the Commission in the course of its inspections of sites and
facilities in Iraq.
79. The
previous report submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution
715 (1991) (S/1994/1138) detailed the problems encountered by the
Commission in establishing complete and accurate baseline data for Iraq's
dual-purpose biological capabilities:
incomplete and inaccurate initial declarations submitted by Iraq,
inconsistencies in the data contained in Iraq's various declarations and
between them and the findings of inspection teams, and undeclared movement of
items to be monitored between inspections so that inconsistencies arose between
the findings of inspection teams. All
this made it impossible for the Commission to establish firm baseline data from
which to start its monitoring of Iraq's biological activities.
80. The
difficulties in obtaining reliable, accurate and complete declarations on
biological sites necessitated a more radical and intensive approach to
obtaining the baseline information required.
The already intense schedule of biological inspections was further
intensified with the initiation in December 1994 of a coordinated series
of intrusive inspections. Interim
biological monitoring began on 1 December 1994, comprising a Baghdad-based
monitoring team that, in concert with special ad hoc teams of experts, sought
to establish the baseline data necessary for the commencement of
monitoring. Biological audits were
conducted at 10 priority sites for which the information supplied by Iraq and
obtained by earlier inspection teams was the most disparate.
81. The
aim of these inspections was: to obtain
information not yet provided but required for monitoring purposes; to assess
Iraq's ability to produce indigenously key dual-purpose biological equipment;
to examine records at organizations involved in the import and maintenance of
such equipment; to prepare a full inventory of dual-use equipment in Iraq; and,
through technical talks and interviews, to obtain a complete understanding of
Iraq's past military biological programme.
For sites of particular concern for the monitoring regime, the teams
sought to obtain an in-depth understanding of the current activities and plans
with regard to personnel, chain of command, reporting structure, operations and
production, research and development activities, and production capability.
82. By
pursuing interim monitoring as a means of obtaining the baseline data required
for monitoring, the Commission was relying less on Iraq's openness and more on
inspection findings than originally intended.
This approach required a greater outlay of resources and so could only
be applied to a few sites. The interim
monitoring process did not obviate the need for Iraq to report accurately all
its biological activities which required declaration under the plan for ongoing
monitoring and verification.
Ongoing monitoring and verification apparatus
83. Given
the nature of biological weapons, effective monitoring in the biological area
necessitates a broader monitoring effort than is required in the other
areas. The Commission will monitor
Iraq's basic biological research potential, its stocks of micro-organisms and
complex growth media, its biological production capacity (i.e., fermenters and
incubators), its ability to isolate micro-organisms from fermenter slurry
(i.e., spray and drum dryers) and to create particles of a size appropriate for
biological warfare (milling machines), its ability to fill containers with
biological materials and its ability to disperse such material.
84. These
capabilities can be found in the following types of institutions in Iraq (hence
monitoring efforts will take the Commission's teams to such facilities): biological laboratories (found in hospitals,
universities and the food industry), biological production facilities (e.g.,
single-cell protein production, vaccine production, drug formulation and
production, breweries and distilleries), and agricultural crop sprayers. In all, monitoring of Iraq's biological
activities covers some 80 sites.
85. Monitoring
is based on maintaining a comprehensive and accurate inventory of dual-purpose
items and activities in Iraq, primarily through on-site inspections, i.e., by
updating the baseline data contained in the monitoring and verification
protocols. This involves the
identification of any sites not yet subject to ongoing monitoring and
verification which acquire dual-purpose capabilities requiring monitoring, the
identification of newly acquired dual-use equipment, the inventorying and
tagging of such equipment and assessment of its intended use and the assessment
of how such newly acquired capabilities increase Iraq's overall biological
warfare capabilities. Monitoring
modalities include: on-site inspections (with or without prior notice); aerial
surveillance; interviews with key personnel at monitored sites; examination of
site records; updating of inventories; continuous flow monitoring and
sensor-activated camera monitoring; sample taking; notifications of transfers
within Iraq of inventoried items; and notification of modification, import or
other acquisition of dual-purpose biological research and production equipment of
dual-use character.
86. Monitoring
efforts have resulted in the installation of 24 cameras at 5 key sites and
locations (16 of them at 3 locations at the Al Hakam site) and the initiation
of monitoring at those sites for which monitoring and verification protocols
were ready. A total of 13 biological
inspections were undertaken in the period from October 1994 to March 1995. The interim monitoring groups conducted 51
visits to 20 sites. A biological room
has been installed at the Baghdad Monitoring Centre for the processing,
packaging and onward transmission of biological samples taken during the course
of monitoring.
87. Monitoring
and verification protocols have now been completed for all the key biological
sites in Iraq identified to date and monitoring of them is now proceeding. However, the failure of Iraq to disclose
fully all aspects of its past biological military research programme means that
the Commission cannot be certain that its monitoring programme in the
biological area is covering all the sites, facilities and capabilities that
require monitoring under the terms of the plan approved by the Security
Council.
4. Nuclear activities
88. The
Commission, in accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (iii) of resolution
687 (1991), and paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 715 (1991), provides
assistance and cooperation to the IAEA 687 Action Team set up to implement
provisions of those resolutions pertaining to nuclear weapons. This includes the designation of undeclared
sites to be inspected. The Commission
provides expertise for logistical, information and other operational support
for the Action Team's conduct of ongoing monitoring and verification. Monitoring activities in Iraq are
coordinated across disciplines, including the nuclear area, not only to ensure
the most effective and efficient use of resources, but also to benefit from the
synergies ensuing from a multidisciplinary approach to the monitoring of sites
of interest to more than one discipline.
89. During
the period under review, the Commission has:
provided comments on Iraqi requests to relocate nuclear-related,
dual-use materials and equipment within Iraq; participated in inspections and
monitoring teams of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); provided
fixed-wing (C-160) and rotating wing (CH-53g) aircraft for the transport of
IAEA inspectors into Iraq from Bahrain, and between points within Iraq; and
provided the IAEA 687 Action Team with logistic support for its inspection
activities through the Baghdad Monitoring Centre.
90. Iraqi
requests to relocate materials, items and machine tools of potential nuclear
application are approved only after two technical evaluations are
concluded. The first evaluation,
provided by IAEA, checks significance to past nuclear programmes, or potential
value to a renewed nuclear programme.
The Commission, in turn, looks for significance to all weapon
programmes, including ballistic missiles and chemical and biological
weapons. It provides its decision on
request as required under paragraph 3 (c) of Security Council resolution
707 (1991). Close coordination
between IAEA and the Commission is particularly important in the management and
control of machine tool movements within Iraq.
For example, flow-forming machines are under the monitoring of both the
Commission and IAEA.
91. During
the period since the last report, the Commission's nuclear experts have
participated in several IAEA monitoring and inspection teams. Such joint operations have resulted in an
increase in operating efficiency and improved decision-making on such issues as
site designation and equipment movement.
92. In
addition to routine transport of IAEA inspectors from Bahrain to Habbaniyah by
C-160 fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter support has proved invaluable in
facilitating long-haul monitoring campaigns by IAEA environmental‑sampling
experts. Water sampling sites range
from as far north as Zakho close to the Turkish border, to a western site on
the Euphrates just west of Al Qa'im, to far south at several sites near Al
Basrah. Without helicopter support, an
effective widespread water sampling programme would be rendered difficult. In addition to supporting the surface-water
sampling programme, the Commission has recently approved fitting its
helicopters with air samplers. The
helicopter-borne air samplers will complement IAEA's ability to investigate
nuclear contaminant transport throughout the surface-water system and thus
provide a more fully integrated and effective environmental sampling programme.
5. Aerial surveillance
93. The
Commission's aerial inspection assets, the high-altitude surveillance aircraft
(U2) and the Baghdad-based Aerial Inspection Team, continue to play an
important role in the monitoring regime.
94. Both
of the above assets continue to conduct aerial surveillance of sites under monitoring
in Iraq, at the direction of the Commission, on a regular basis. With the advent of the permanent monitoring
teams in Iraq, experts from the teams now accompany the team in order to assist
it in focusing on particular areas of relevance at sites. The results obtained from these aerial
missions is an important part of the overall inspection process in Iraq.
95. Both
aerial assets will also continue to undertake missions at new sites in Iraq to
ensure that the monitoring regime continues to encompass all activities and
facilities within Iraq of relevance to the monitoring regime.
96. To
date some 243 missions have been undertaken by the U2 and 550 missions by the
Aerial Inspection Team.
B. Export/import mechanism
Summary
97. The
proposal for the export/import mechanism prepared by the Commission and IAEA is
now before the Sanctions Committee for appropriate action to co-sponsor the
proposal so that it may be submitted to the Security Council for approval. The revised annexes to the Commission's and
the IAEA's plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, which list the items
to be notified under the mechanism, have been circulated to the Council and
made available to the Sanctions Committee.
98. Planning
continues for the setting up by the Commission and IAEA of a Joint Unit to
process notifications received under the mechanism, and for taking all other
actions necessary to put the mechanism into effect when the Council so decides.
1. Actions to establish the mechanism
99. Under
paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) the Security Council requested the
Commission, in cooperation with the Committee established under resolution 661
(1990) (the Sanctions Committee) and the Director General of IAEA "to
develop ... a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other
countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of
resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions, including the present resolution
and the plans approved hereunder".
100. The
Commission and IAEA therefore undertook to prepare a proposal outlining a
mechanism which, in their view, would fulfil these requirements. The mechanism envisaged rested on a system
of notifications, made by Iraq and the Governments of exporters, concerning the
supply of dual-purpose items to Iraq,
dual-purpose in this context being those items referred to in the
relevant annexes to the plans of the Commission and IAEA for ongoing monitoring
and verification approved by the Council in resolution 715 (1991). 6/ The mechanism also envisaged the provision
of information by Governments on any attempts by Iraq to procure items
prohibited to it under the Council resolutions.
101. In
February 1994, a seminar of invited export control experts was convened at the
Commission's offices in New York, in order to explain the principles of the
mechanism envisaged and to obtain views on how it might be implemented in
practice. The seminar was attended by
representatives of IAEA and experts from those Governments which had wide experience
of exporting goods to Iraq, prior to the imposition of sanctions, which would
now need to be notified under the mechanism.
On 28 and 29 May 1994, the Executive Chairman of the Commission met
senior representatives of the Government of Iraq, in order to explain the
principles of the mechanism, and an agreed summary of that meeting was signed
by both sides.
102. On 13
May 1994, the Executive Chairman wrote to the Sanctions Committee Chairman,
transmitting the proposal for consideration and approval by the Committee. The Executive Chairman noted that paragraph
7 of resolution 715 (1991) was intended to make provision for the
monitoring of sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of relevant dual-purpose
items after the general sanctions imposed by resolution 661 (1990) on those
items had been lifted, pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991). In order to avoid confusion between the
sanctions regime and the monitoring mechanism, the Executive Chairman proposed
that the two regimes should be kept entirely separate. The role of the Sanctions Committee would
have priority for as long as items covered by the plans for ongoing monitoring
and verification remained subject to the general sanctions under resolution 661
(1990). Once the sanctions under
resolution 661 (1990) on any dual-purpose items or categories of items were
lifted or whenever the Committee allowed Iraq to input such items under an
exemption from the general sanctions, those items would become subject to the
proposed export/import mechanism.
103. Informal
discussions in the Sanctions Committee appeared to reveal that a consensus
could be arrived at on the mechanism contained in the proposal. However, before going to the Security
Council with the required tripartite proposal for the export/import mechanism,
the members of the Committee preferred to see a more detailed list of items to
be notified than already appeared in the relevant annexes to the Commission's
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.
Such a list would provide greater specification, in technical terms, of
what constituted a dual-purpose item and hence the export of which to Iraq
would be subject to notification. A
general requirement to revise the annexes had already become apparent during
the course of inspections in Iraq and the establishment of the ongoing
monitoring and verification regime.
Iraq had also requested that provisions of the annexes to the
Commission's plan be specified in greater detail.
104. The
Commission's plan, as approved by the Security Council in its resolution 715
(1991), lays down in its paragraph 26 the following procedure for revising the
annexes: "The Special Commission,
may, however after informing the Security Council, update and revise the
annexes in the light of information and experience gained in the course of
implementation of resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991) and of the plan. The Special Commission shall inform Iraq of
any such changes."
105. In
October 1994, the Commission convened a further informal seminar of international
experts to review the proposed changes to the annexes. While these lists were in large measure
accepted, proposals were made for further changes. In January 1995, a third seminar was held to review the draft of
the final versions of the lists, to consider the draft notification forms to be
completed by Governments pursuant to the mechanism, and to discuss the
practical implementation of the mechanism.
106. The
final version of the revised annexes to the Commission's Plan were submitted to
the Security Council on 17 March 1995 (S/1995/208) and to the IAEA's plan on 23
March 1995 (S/1995/215).
107. The
joint proposal by the Commission and IAEA was resubmitted to the Sanctions
Committee on 15 February 1995. The
mechanism, upon receiving the concurrence of the Sanctions Committee, will be
transmitted to the Council for approval.
It is anticipated that this will be done in the very near future.
2. Actions to implement the mechanism
108. The
mechanism envisages the creation of a Joint Unit, staffed by personnel from the
Commission and IAEA. The Joint Unit
will be represented by staff in New York and in the Monitoring Centre in
Baghdad.
109. Measures
to establish these offices and the practical procedures to implement the
mechanism began some 18 months ago with the recruitment of expert
personnel to the Commission to focus primarily on the export/import mechanism,
in the context of the overall ongoing monitoring and verification regime. These experts are also preparing the
documentation which will explain, in detail, the workings of the mechanism in
respect of the notification requirements levied on Iraq and the exporting
Governments. These documents will be
transmitted to Governments in a circular note.
A customized computer database is also being developed at the
Commission's office in New York, in order to ensure the swift processing of
notification data and to support analytical requirements.
110. The
Joint Units in New York and Baghdad will be staffed by customs experts and
data-entry clerks. They will be
responsible for receiving and processing, in manual and computerized format,
the notifications provided by Iraq and exporting Governments. The notifications will also be analysed by
experts of the Commission and IAEA and appropriate actions taken on the basis
of their recommendations.
111. In
Iraq, Joint Unit personnel, in conjunction with the resident monitoring team
experts, will be responsible for inspecting notified items and associated
paperwork, on their arrival in Iraq.
They will also undertake no-notice inspections at points of entry into
Iraq and other sites, in order to verify that all notifiable items are being
declared.
112. As
further preparation for the implementation of the export/import mechanism, the
Commission has undertaken studies to ascertain the likely volume of data which
the mechanism will generate. The
results of these internal studies, and others undertaken by outside bodies,
indicate that the number of shipments of dual-use goods could be expected not
to exceed 2,000 during a normal year.
Plans to acquire personnel and equipment to support this volume of
shipments are being put into effect.
113. The
Commission has also begun a dialogue with Iraq, in order to gain a full
understanding of the existing customs and import systems in place in the
country and so better to plan operations associated with the mechanism. In addition, the Commission will also
shortly conduct baseline inspections of points of entry into Iraq as further
preparation with the aim of foreshortening the time required to have a fully
operational mechanism after its adoption and the easing or lifting of
sanctions.
C. National implementation measures
114. Paragraphs
20 and 21 of the Commission's monitoring plan require Iraq to adopt the
measures necessary to implement its obligations under section C of resolution
687 (1991), resolution 707 (1991) and the plan itself, to include a prohibition
and penal legislation forbidding all natural and legal persons under Iraq's
jurisdiction from undertaking anywhere any activity prohibited for Iraq by
resolution 687 (1991) and all other related resolutions.
115. Iraq
has consulted the Commission on the draft of a decision by the Revolution
Command Council intended to give effect to those requirements. The Commission made certain suggestions to
the Iraqi authorities concerning the need for such legislation to follow closely
the language of the Council's resolutions.
Attention was also drawn to the need for such legislation promptly to
incorporate any changes to the lists of controlled items contained in the
annexes to the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification and to the need to
provide assurances to those who might cooperate with the Commission and IAEA in
the performance of their tasks that such cooperation per se would not be
the subject of any legal or other punitive measures.
116. It is
the Commission's understanding that a revised draft now stands before the
Revolution Command Council for adoption and, during the most recent high-level
discussions in Baghdad in March 1995, the Iraqi authorities gave assurances
that such adoption could be anticipated early in April 1995. The Commission has also been provided with a
copy of regulations which the National Monitoring Directorate will issue to
give full effect to the Revolution Command Council's decision. These regulations have now been translated
from Arabic into English at United Nations Headquarters. They are available to any interested
delegations in the Office of the Executive Chairman.
D. Organization
1. Executive Office, New York
117. In
order to respond to changing priorities and tasks, the organization and
equipping of the Executive Office of the Special Commission in New York has
undergone substantial changes since Iraq accepted Security Council resolution
715 (1991) in November 1993. The
increase in the number of staff to cope with the increased workload has
resulted in acute overcrowding of the office space available to the
Commission. If this issue is not
resolved, it is bound to affect adversely the work performance of the staff.
118. Under
the terms of the plan approved under resolution 715 (1991), Iraq is required to
produce a substantial volume and range of declarations on a regular basis. Thus the immediate requirement for the
Commission was to increase the number of staff in New York, in order to handle
the additional data. However, in
addition to further experts specialized in proscribed weapons systems, there
was also a necessity to recruit from supporting Governments individuals with
knowledge of relevant civil industries in which dual-use items and equipment
might be used and others to assist the experts in the processing, handling and
storage of the data.
119. Assistance
was also required to collate much of the material required for the creation of
the site protocols and to update those protocols in the light of declarations
from Iraq and reports from the inspection teams conducting baseline inspections
in Iraq. At the conclusion of the
baseline process it also became apparent that such assistance would continue to
be central to the successful maintenance of the monitoring system as the
Commission established a multi‑layered system with the introduction of
sensors, primarily cameras and air-sampling equipment, at sites under
monitoring in Iraq. The product from
these sensors is an integral part of the monitoring regime and, as such, must
be collated and analysed in the context of overall knowledge of the functions
of sites under monitoring.
120. As
noted in section B above, describing preparations for the export-import
mechanism, the Commission began preparations for establishing the mechanism
some 18 months ago with the recruitment of staff specialized in customs
procedures. In 1994, in the light of
the highly specialized requirements of administering such a mechanism, further
staff were recruited. In the event of a
modification to the existing sanctions regime, additional staff will be
recruited to administer the export/import mechanism and to oversee the conduct
of operations in Iraq. Analysis of the
notifications provided by Iraq and Governments of exporters under the mechanism
will be undertaken by the existing expert staff.
121. To
support the above change of emphasis in mission focus, the Commission has made
major upgrades to its automated data-processing equipment. This has involved an upgrade to the
Commission's local area network (LAN) system and individual workstations. Many of these upgrades have been undertaken
by donations of equipment by supporting Governments. The Commission has also been able to take advantage of existing
computerized systems developed in other forums in support of other arms-control
efforts.
122. To
support the export/import mechanism, a dedicated, customized database is being
created, modelled on the export control computer database used by a supporting
Government. One prime concern in
respect of handling the notifications received under the mechanism will be to
ensure the security of such data, recognizing its commercial sensitivity. The computer equipment required to sustain
the export/import database will also be donated by supporting Governments.
2. Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre
123. Preparations
for the establishment of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, its
staffing and early operations, are described in annex II to the Commission's
report of 7 October 1994 (S/1994/1138), which briefly describes the current
operational status of the Centre.
124. The
Commission plans to complete its initial projects for the Centre facilities
during this summer. A principal
delaying factor has been the lack of funding to purchase materials and supplies
for renovation and construction.
Several contributing Governments have made direct donations of
materials, equipment and supplies so that seconded craftsmen and technicians
could accomplish their work. The
remaining projects are not essential for effective ongoing monitoring and
verification but will, once completed, contribute to the improved efficiency of
the Centre.
125. The
Centre currently provides: space for an
operations room, supporting radio and telephone (voice and facsimile)
communications and real-time monitoring of sites through 107 remote-controlled
cameras; offices for the aerial inspection team, and the biological, chemical,
missile and nuclear monitoring groups (the latter group is staffed by IAEA);
aerial photography, biological and chemical laboratories; a medical clinic; and
offices for the Director and his support staff. The Centre staff also includes a German army detachment with three
CH-53G helicopters at Al-Rasheed air base, deployed to support the operations
of inspection teams and monitoring groups throughout Iraq. Approximately 80 staff are assigned to
the Centre.
126. The
next development within the Centre will be preparations to support an
export/import mechanism at the appropriate time. The Centre includes adequate space for this purpose, and specific
facility modifications for the group are anticipated to be minimal.
127. The
operation of the Centre is supported by the United Nations Administrative
Unit-Baghdad which, inter alia, provides maintenance for the
Commission's vehicles. Air
transportation to support the Centre continues to be provided from Bahrain by a
German air-force detachment with two C-160 Transall aircraft. This function, and all arrangements for the
movement of experts and technicians as well as for cargoes of supplies,
materials and equipment, is managed by the Commission's field office in
Bahrain.
IV. FUTURE OPERATIONS
A. Financial status of the Special
Commission
128. In
order to plan for future monitoring and verification activities, including
those related to export/import, the Commission needs secure long-term funding,
rather than the ad hoc funding of the present situation. Lack of secure long-term funding has complicated
the Commission's task of implementing its mandate and planning future
operations.
129. Funds
have only been identified for the first half of 1995 and are being received
piecemeal. At present, there is no
indication that additional funds will be made available to the Commission to
cover operations for the remainder of 1995.
An additional $13 million is required to support the Commission's
operations until the end of 1995.
130. If
further funds are not identified in the near future, the incremental shut-down
of the Commission's operations, as indicated in the Commission's letter to the
President of the Security Council of 3 November 1994, will ensue.
Status of finance of
the Special Commission
as at 31 March
1995
United States
dollars
Total funds provided through
loans/contributions
9 405 500
Designation of 778 funds 82 190 000
Total
available for operations 91 595 500
Expenditures from inception to 31 December
1993 55 230 704
1994 expenditures (estimated)
24 390 000
1995 projected requirements
25 000 000
Estimated total requirements from inception
to 31
December 1995 104 620 704
Surplus/(deficit) against available funds (13 025 204)
B. Operations and organization
131. As
indicated in chapter III above, the main focus of the Commission's activities
in Iraq is currently the operation of the system of ongoing monitoring and
verification. Funding permitting, the
Commission expects this to continue to be the case. Further effort will continue to be devoted to clarifying and
resolving the remaining outstanding issues in relation to the past programmes
and, once the export/import mechanism has been adopted, also as indicated
above, a greater share of resources will be devoted to the operation of the
mechanism.
132. It is
envisaged that, until the implementation of the export/import mechanism,
ongoing monitoring and verification activities will comprise primarily the
following types of activities:
(a) Inspection to verify the completeness of the
list of sites monitored and of the inventories, to verify declarations as to
the activities conducted at sites or to pursue any information obtained that
might question Iraq's compliance with its obligations under paragraph 10 of
resolution 687 (1991);
(b) Aerial surveillance, from both the
Commission's high-altitude surveillance aircraft (the U-2) and its helicopters;
(c) Maintenance of the site monitoring and
verification protocols by the monitoring experts at the Baghdad Monitoring
Centre;
(d) Monitoring activities conducted by experts
dispatched to Iraq for a specific purpose because either the expertise required
for the activity is not available amongst the staff of the Centre or because
the scope of the activity is too great for the staff of the Centre to undertake
without additional assistance;
(e) Review and analysis of the product of the
sensors installed at the various sites.
V. CONCLUSIONS
133. The
elements of ongoing monitoring and verification are now in place and the system
is operational. Over time, additional
elements may be added or existing elements may be adapted in the light of
experience in order better to focus monitoring efforts, to respond to
developments in Iraq's industrial base and to increase the level of assurance
it provides that Iraq is not reacquiring banned capabilities. The Commission wishes to place on record
that it has received full cooperation from Iraq in the setting up and operation
of the monitoring system. Some issues,
however, still remain.
134. There
must be confidence that the system is comprehensive in its coverage of all that
needs to be monitored. Accounting by
Iraq for the materials, items and equipment acquired for past programmes and
the use to which they have been put is thus required. An understanding of the levels of technologies attained by Iraq
in its past programmes is also required if the Commission's efforts are to be
correctly focused. If this accounting
and understanding is not credibly provided by Iraq, the Commission will not be
able to state with confidence that its monitoring is comprehensive and
correctly focused, as is now illustrated by the situation in the biological
area.
135. As
described elsewhere in the present report, the Commission has continued its
investigation in all areas of the past proscribed weapons activities in Iraq
and its verification of Iraq's declarations.
The Commission has come to the conclusion that Iraq has not provided a
full and comprehensive disclosure of its past military biological programme or
accounted for items and materials acquired for that programme. With Iraq's failure to account for the use
of these items and materials for legitimate purposes, the only conclusion that
can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they had been purchased and used
for a proscribed purpose - acquisition of biological warfare agent. The Commission will continue its intensive
efforts to elucidate all such outstanding issues arising from this and the
other past programmes. It notes that,
if Iraq decided to provide full, accurate and verifiable information, such
matters could be resolved expeditiously.
136. An
essential element of the system of ongoing monitoring and verification will be
the export/import mechanism. The
Commission and IAEA have completed work on all the components of the mechanism
and it is now for the Sanctions Committee and the Security Council to consider
and take action on the proposal for the mechanism prepared by the Commission
and IAEA. The monitoring system, under
Security Council resolution 715 (1991), will not be complete until the Council
has acted on this matter.
Notes
1/ I.e., those which have permitted uses but
which could be used for the acquisition of banned weapons.
2/ Methyl phosphonyl difluoride.
3/ The Technical and Scientific Materials Import
Division, the purchasing arm of the Technical Research Centre that was, within
the Military Industrialization Corporation, directly responsible for Iraq's
military biological programme.
4/ Complex growth media constitute the substrate
on or in which bacteria or viruses are grown.
Types imported by Iraq can be used in hospitals or laboratories as a
diagnostic tool or for large-scale production of bacteria and viruses, be it
for biological weapons purposes or civilian use, e.g., vaccine production.
5/ These filters are of the sort used to create
clean environments or to ensure that contaminants are not released from a
workplace into the surrounding environment.
They are therefore associated with work requiring high containment, such
as work on pathogens or toxins.
6/ S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1,
amended by S/1995/208 and S/1995/215, respectively.
APPENDIX
Inspection
schedule
(in-country
dates)
Nuclear
15
May-21 May 1991
IAEA1/UNSCOM 1
22
June-3 July 1991
IAEA2/UNSCOM 4
7 July-18 July 1991 IAEA3/UNSCOM
5
27
July-10 August 1991
IAEA4/UNSCOM 6
14
September-20 September 1991
IAEA5/UNSCOM 14
21
September-30 September 1991 IAEA6/UNSCOM 16
11
October-22 October 1991
IAEA7/UNSCOM 19
11
November-18 November 1991
IAEA8/UNSCOM 22
11
January-14 January 1992
IAEA9/UNSCOM 25
5 February-13 February 1992 IAEA10/UNSCOM 27
7 April-15 April 1992 IAEA11/UNSCOM 33
26
May-4 June 1992 IAEA12/UNSCOM
37
14
July-21 July 1992 IAEA13/UNSCOM
41
31
August-7 September 1992 IAEA14/UNSCOM
43
8 November-19 November 1992 IAEA15/UNSCOM 46
6 December-14 December 1992 IAEA16/UNSCOM 47
22
January-27 January 1993 IAEA17/UNSCOM
49
3 March-11 March 1993 IAEA18/UNSCOM 52
30
April-7 May 1993 IAEA19/UNSCOM
56
25
June-30 June 1993 IAEA20/UNSCOM
58
23
July-28 July 1993 IAEA21/UNSCOM
61
1 November-9 November 1993 IAEA22/UNSCOM 64
4 February-11 February 1994 IAEA23/UNSCOM 68
11
April-22 April 1994 IAEA24/UNSCOM
73
21
June-1 July 1994 IAEA25/UNSCOM
83
22
August-2 September 1994 IAEA26/UNSCOM
90
7 September-29 September 1994 NMG 94-01
14
October-21 October 1994 IAEA27/UNSCOM
93
29
September-21 October 1994 NMG
94-02
21
October-9 November 1994 NMG
94-03
8 November-29 November 1994 NMG 94-04
29
November-16 December 1994 NMG
94-05
16
December 1994-13 January 1995 NMG 94-06
12
January-2 February 1995 NMG
95-01
2 February-28 February 1995 NMG 95-02
28
February-16 March 1995 NMG
95-03
16
March-6 April 1995 NMG
95-04
6 April-26 April 1995 NMG 95-05
Chemical
9 June-15 June 1991
CW1/UNSCOM 2
15
August-22 August 1991 CW2/UNSCOM 9
31
August-8 September 1991 CW3/UNSCOM 11
31
August-5 September 1991 CW4/UNSCOM 12
6 October-9 November 1991
CW5/UNSCOM 17
22
October-2 November 1991 CW6/UNSCOM 20
18
November-1 December 1991 CBW1/UNSCOM 21
27
January-5 February 1992 CW7/UNSCOM 26
21
February-24 March 1992 CD1/UNSCOM 29
5 April-13 April 1992 CD2/UNSCOM
32
15
April-29 April 1992 CW8/UNSCOM 35
18
June 92-14 June 94 CDG/UNSCOM 38
26
June-10 July 1992 CBW2/UNSCOM 39
21
September-29 September 1992 CW9/UNSCOM 44
6 December-14 December 1992 CBW3/UNSCOM 47
6 April-18 April 1993
CW10/UNSCOM 55
27
June-30 June 1993 CW11/UNSCOM 59
19
November-22 November 1993 CW12/UNSCOM 65
1 February-14 February 1994
CW13/UNSCOM 67
20
March-26 March 1994 CW14/UNSCOM 70
18
April-22 April 1994 CW15/UNSCOM 74
25
May-5 June 1994 CW16/UNSCOM 75
31
May-12 June 1994 CW17/UNSCOM 76
8 June-14 June 1994
CW18/UNSCOM 77
10
August-23 August 1994 CW19/UNSCOM 89
13
September-24 September 1994 CW20/UNSCOM 91
2 October 1994-14 January 1995
CG 1
23
October-27 October 1994 CW21/UNSCOM 95
11
January-21 January 1995 CW23/UNSCOM108
16
January-22 January 1995 CW22/UNSCOM107
14
January-15 April 1995 CG 2
16
April-4 July 1995 CG 3
Biological
2 August-8 August 1991
BW1/UNSCOM 7
20
September-3 October 1991 BW2/UNSCOM 15
11
March-18 March 1993 BW3/UNSCOM 53
8 April-26 April 1994 BW4/UNSCOM
72
28
May-7 June 1994 BW5/UNSCOM 78
24
June-5 July 1994 BW6/UNSCOM 84
5 June-8 June 1994
BW7/UNSCOM 86
25
July-7 September 1994 BW8/UNSCOM 87
20
August-25 August 1994 BW9/UNSCOM 88
29
August-3 September 1994 BW10/UNSCOM 92
29
September-14 October 1994 BW11/UNSCOM 94
23
September-26 September 1994 BW12/UNSCOM 96
15
November-22 November 1994 BW15/UNSCOM104
2 December-10 December 1994
BW16/UNSCOM105 (IMT)
2 December-13 December 1994
BW13/UNSCOM 99 (IMT)
9 December-18 December 1994
BW17/UNSCOM106 (IMT)
28
December 1994-31 January 1995 IBG 1
10
January-22 January 1995 BW18/UNSCOM109
20
January-6 February 1995 BW19/UNSCOM110
23
January-3 February 1995 BW22/UNSCOM113
3 February-17 February 1995
BW20/UNSCOM111
3 February-17 February 1995
BW21/UNSCOM112
12
March-18 March 1995 BW23/UNSCOM115
24
March-6 April 1995 BW24/UNSCOM116
1 February-3 April 1995 IBG 2
4 April-9 July 1995 BG 1
Ballistic missiles
30
June-7 July 1991 BM1/UNSCOM 3
18
July-20 July 1991 BM2/UNSCOM 10
8 August-15 August 1991 BM3/UNSCOM 8
6 September-13 September 1991
BM4/UNSCOM 13
1 October-9 October 1991
BM5/UNSCOM 18
1 December-9 December 1991
BM6/UNSCOM 23
9 December-17 December 1991
BM7/UNSCOM 24
21
February-29 February 1992 BM8/UNSCOM 28
21
March-29 March 1992 BM9/UNSCOM 31
13
April-21 April 1992 BM10/UNSCOM 34
14
May-22 May 1992 BM11/UNSCOM 36
11
July-29 July 1992 BM12/UNSCOM 40 A+B
7 August-18 August 1992 BM13/UNSCOM 42
16
October-30 October 1992 BM14/UNSCOM 45
25
January-23 March 1993 IMT1a/UNSCOM 48
12
February-21 February 1993 BM15/UNSCOM 50
22
February-23 February 1993 BM16/UNSCOM 51
27
March-17 May 1993 IMT1b/UNSCOM 54
5 June-28 June 1993
IMT1c/UNSCOM 57
10
July-11 July 1993 BM17/UNSCOM 60
24
August-15 September 1993 BM18/UNSCOM 62
28
September-1 November 1993 BM19/UNSCOM 63
21
January-29 January 1994 BM20/UNSCOM 66
17
February-25 February 1994 BM21/UNSCOM 69
30
March-20 May 1994 BM22/UNSCOM 71
20
May-8 June 1994 BM23/UNSCOM 79
10
June-24 June 1994 BM24/UNSCOM 80
14
June-22 June 1994 BM25/UNSCOM 81
3 July-28 July 1994
BM26/UNSCOM 82
15
July-24 July 1994 BM27/UNSCOM 85
17
August-9 October 1994 MG 1
2 October-6 October 1994
BM28/UNSCOM 98A
23
October-28 October 1994 BM28/UNSCOM 98B
14
October 1994-21 February 1995 MG 2
19
October-22 October 1994 MG 2A
2 December-6 December 1994
MG 2B
9 December-14 December 1994 BM29/UNSCOM101
9 December-16 December 1994
BM30/UNSCOM102
27
January-31 January 1995 MG 2C
22
February- ... 1995 MG 3
6 March-14 March 1995
UNSCOM103/BM31
Computer search
12 February 1992
UNSCOM 30
Special missions
30
June-3 July 1991
11
August-14 August 1991
4 October-6 October 1991
11
November-15 November 1991
27
January-30 January 1992
21
February-24 February 1992
17
July-19 July 1992
28
July-29 July 1992
6 September-12 September 1992
4 November-9 November 1992
4 November-8 November 1992
12
March-18 March 1993
14
March-20 March 1993
19
April-24 April 1993
4 June-5 July 1993
15
July-19 July 1993
25
July-5 August 1993
9 August-12 August 1993
10
September-24 September 1993
27
September-1 October 1993
1 October-8 October 1993
5 October-16 February 1994
2 December-10 December 1993
2 December-16 December 1993
21
January-27 January 1994
2 February-6 February 1994
10
April-14 April 1994
24
April-26 April 1994
28
May-29 May 1994
4 July-6 July 1994
8 August-16 August 1994
15
September-19 September 1994
21
September-25 September 1994
23
September-26 September 1994
3 October-6 October 1994
4 November-20 November 1994
7 November-12 November 1994
14
November-17 November 1994
4 December-18 December 1994
14
December-20 December 1994
7 January-31 January 1995
7 January-21 January 1995
13
January-26 January 1995
13
January-16 March 1995
12
January-28 January 1995
23
January-14 February 1995
25
January-4 February 1995
19
February-23 February 1995
22
February-28 February 1995
28
February-18 March 1995
16
March-29 March 1995
24 March-27 March 1995
-----