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EVALUATION REPORT

UDF-GEO-10-396 - Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia

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Acknowledgements

Disclaimer

Authors

This report was written by Sue Nelson and Levon Isakhanyan. Landis McKellar, the Evaluation Team Leader, provided editorial and methodological advice. Ms. Aurélie Ferreira was Evaluation Manager and provided quality assurance. Mr. Eric Tourres was Project Director at Transtec.

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I. Executive Summary

(i) Project Data

The *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia* project sought to promote free and fair elections in Georgia through citizen monitoring and reporting on elections in cooperation with professional journalists. This was expected to reduce electoral fraud and increase trust in the electoral results. Its intended outcomes were: 1) widespread information and better functioning of the citizen-journalism tool; 2) more extensive media coverage of the post-election period and increased skills of the media representatives on election reporting; and, 3) greater transparency and public availability of information on the electoral process in Georgia.

This was a two-year USD 157,000 project (1 December 2011 and 30 November 2013). It was implemented by the Civic Development Institute (CDI), a Georgian Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) based in Tbilisi. Its main intended activities were to:

- Train journalists from the 11 locations on the electoral process and critical thinking for the 2012 Georgian parliamentary elections;
- Meet with community members in 11 cities to sensitize them to report electoral violations as citizen journalists to an improved CDI website;
- Have their reports verified by professional journalists and undertake a legal review of problems to submit complaints to the Central Election Commission (CEC);
- Write a series of analytical articles on the electoral process in each of the 11 locations and three in-depth articles by participating journalists, and produce two TV films on the elections after the elections; and,
- Produce and disseminate interim and final reports on the electoral process.

(ii) Evaluation Findings

The project objectives were directly **relevant** to the needs at the time to strengthen the integrity of the electoral process and ensure the dissemination of objective information. Georgia had the autocratic legacy of the former Soviet Union and an entrenched ruling party. For these elections, the country was polarized between the ruling United National Movement (UNM) and the opposition parties led by the Georgian Dream coalition. Much of the media reporting was highly partisan, and Georgia lacked a tradition of citizen engagement or peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box. The media focus for this project was relevant to the experience of CDI which is led by a professional journalist and which had media contacts throughout Georgia. This project and its activities were directly relevant to the personal and professional interests of those groups.

The project delivered most of its anticipated outputs. The citizen journalists, which included media professionals, NGO members and political party representatives, received one training and a memory stick, along with a contact card with information on the CDI website and telephone number. They were then left alone to report, or not to report, on problems witnessed to CDI. CDI used financial incentives, providing USD 40 for each verified report. The **effectiveness** of this strategy is uncertain as it resulted in only 173 reports over a six month period, with 75 percent of these done in the month around the election event itself. The local focal point in each of the 11 locations were used for logistical purposes, and they and the 2 professional journalists contracted per location to write articles, could have been used more effectively by helping to develop a more cohesive citizen journalism effort. Relaying information to the CEC did seem to be effective as it resolved some of the issues brought to its attention.

The project inputs were consistent with the delivery of the activities but not with the intent of developing a citizen journalism effort. That would have required more than a one-time training and payment for verified reports. CDI based this project on an earlier effort funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). It also used the Facebook page of its Executive Director, who had with 5,000 friends and 12,000 followers, to advertise the project. CDI did undertake an open competition to commission three in depth articles and two film documentaries. Otherwise, it relied heavily on personal contacts to recruit participants, including journalists from the Charter of Ethical Journalists which CDI had created under an earlier EU project.

This was **efficient** in the context as these persons were known to be independent and this helped CDI to maintain the perception of impartiality. At the same time, this limited the reach of the project to persons who were already civically active. There were no links apparent between this effort and other more substantial efforts for citizen journalism, election reporting or observation.

The effort was primarily focused on exposing problems in the 2012 parliamentary elections and any higher level **impact** beyond this is unlikely. In part, this was intentional as CDI did not want to further inflame the politicized context by widely disseminating materials that showed violations primarily by one side. But it was also a result of the one-off nature and limited reach of the activities. Most of the persons who submitted reports appeared to be journalists or affiliated with the media or an NGO. It is possible that some ordinary citizens participated because of the 10,000 CDI cards distributed that guaranteed anonymity for reports. Most of the participating journalists appeared to be seasoned professionals and it is unlikely that training would have increased their critical thinking or reporting skills. However, it is possible that it increased the awareness for some regional journalists on what constituted electoral violations. CDI did undertake a good internal monitoring effort to track progress of project indicators, but these indicators primarily tracked outputs. Most of the information on higher level outcomes was anecdotal and without more data, it is not possible to know the extent of its results. However from these anecdotes, it is likely that, to a limited extent, this project: provided journalists with leads they might not have gotten otherwise; resolved some electoral violations which also acted as a deterrent; and, contributed to a more even playing field for some candidates and opposition parties.

The system established of using the CDI's institutional website as a place where concerned persons could have their reports posted is **sustainable** as long as CDI continues to operate its website and has interest. The reports are still posted there and available to read. CDI now has the experience of doing this type of a project and extended since to an educational project. The two films it produced are posted on You Tube. It is likely that some of the participants may retain an increased awareness of what constitutes a violation and the importance of reporting it. Efforts beyond this were not sustained. The project itself was focused on the parliamentary elections event and the structures created were not used for the remainder of the electoral cycle, notably the 2013 presidential election which was held within the life of this project, and the upcoming 2014 local elections.

(iii) Conclusions

The ***project's objectives were important*** in the context of Georgia's democratic transition. It worked in a difficult environment and the dedication of CDI and participating journalists was evident. The ability to ***maintain a perception of impartiality*** in the highly politicized context was important to the credibility of the effort. The project r**aised awareness of what constituted a violation and acted as a deterrent in some cases, while contributing to**

the pool of change-makers and to a more even playing field. The use of incentives was a motivating factor for some, but it lacked some programmatic elements needed to deliver a component, in this case, the citizen journalism effort. This conclusion follows the findings on effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Many of the *project concepts were good* ones, including linking professional journalists to citizen journalists, doing a series of articles on the same topics from different locations, posting photos of violations on a public website, and documenting the process in film. However, they *lacked the programmatic links* needed to develop them and links were also not made with advocacy or other groups who could use that information to promote electoral reform. Some of its efforts also *worked in parallel* to other efforts done in the sector.

Project implementation was *highly centralized* even though it took place in 11 cities. The focal points and professional journalists were valuable assets that could have been used more in this regard. The *social media was not effectively integrated* into the project beyond the CDI link in and advertising on the Executive Director's Facebook page. This could have expanded its reach and made it more dynamic. The *use of incentives* was a motivating factor for some but was not enough to carry a project that did not have the other programmatic elements in place, especially for the citizen journalism component. This project *might have had more significant results* than was visible to the evaluators, but this is unknown as it did not collect information on its results beyond output data*.*

(iv) Recommendations

For similar projects in the future, the evaluators recommend that the grantees ensure *clarity of purpose* and *conceptualize it more fully as a development program*. Enlarging the concept of election reporting beyond violations and embedding it within the broader electoral process and its democratic meaning would help to avoid an event-based project. These types of civic action projects are important and should be *prioritized by donors* in similar circumstances. Project implementation could be decentralized with *local focal points integrated into the substance* of the project and used to *make the programmatic links and follow up with citizen journalists.* The *reach of the project* should be extended through *better use of social networks* beyond the staff's Facebook pages, and the *use of participating media organizations to promote* citizen reporting, the website and project purpose.

Reporting projects should *provide systematic analysis and synthesis of the individual bits of information* and *link with advocacy and electoral observation groups* that can use this information to improve the electoral processes. NGOs should collaborate with other projects to *avoid duplication of efforts and to develop synergistic programming.* Incentives should be used in conjunction with well developed programmatic elements, and phased out by the end of a project to ensure sustainability. Monitoring and evaluation plans should ensure the use of *appropriate indicators* that can measure results as well as the outputs of the project.

II. Introduction and development context

(i) The project and evaluation objectives

Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections In Georgia (UDF-GEO--10-396) was a two-year USD 175,000 project implemented by the Civic Development Institute. USD 17,500 of this was retained by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation purposes. The project ran from 1 December 2011 to 30 November 2013. Its main objective was to promote free and fair elections in Georgia using citizen journalism as a tool to expose and deter electoral fraud. It intended to do this through: 1) strengthening citizen journalism on election reporting on election issues 2) increasing voter awareness on the voter registration and electoral processes; 3) increasing post-electoral media coverage and the skills of media representatives on election reporting; and 4) increasing transparency and the availability of information on the Georgian electoral process.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger evaluation of the Rounds 2, 3 and 4 UNDEF-funded projects. Its purpose is to "contribute towards a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved".[1]

(ii) Evaluation methodology

The evaluation took place in March - April 2014 with field work done in Georgia from 31 March - 4 April, 2014. The evaluation was conducted by Sue Nelson and Levon Isakhanyan, experts in democratic governance and electoral processes. The UNDEF evaluations are more qualitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluation questions that focus on the project's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and any value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex 1). This report follows that structure. The evaluators reviewed available documentation on the project and on the 2012 electoral process (Annex 2).

In Georgia, the team met with CDI, its focal points, participating journalists, citizen journalists, political party representatives, as well as with the former CEC Chairman and USAID. This work was done in Tbilisi, Gori and Gurjaani, three locations where the project was implemented. The list of persons interviewed in provided in Annex 3.

During the preparatory work, the evaluators identified several issues which they followed up on during their interviews. These included:

- **Effectiveness of the strategy** of training citizen journalists to report on election infractions and whether this built on the lessons learned from a similar 2010 project;
- **Extent of results** beyond citizen reporting and if this contributed to increasing the credibility of the electoral process and its management;
- **Impartiality of project activities and monitoring** as project reporting included some allusions to partisanship;
- **Activities in year two** as the project was designed to monitor the parliamentary elections in Georgia which were completed in year one of the project;
- **Use of the project website** that was created for this project and its use:

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[1] Operational Manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, p. 6.

- **Sustainability of citizen monitoring/journalists** and if the reach extended beyond the 11 project locations.

(iii) Development context

Georgia was one of the first Soviet republics to declare its independence and introduced a multiparty system in 1991. The two-term presidency of President Shevardnadze, a former first secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia, ended in the 2003 when he resigned after public demonstrations in the Rose Revolution. Subsequent elections brought Mikheil Saakashvili of the United National Movement into power. He embarked on a modernization program which improved public services and security, but which lagged behind for democratic progress. Russia had occupied two parts of Georgia for 20 years: South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and they declared independence in 2008 that has only been recognized by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru.[2]

The UNM also won the polls in 2008, gaining 119 out of the 150 seats in parliament. Georgia has a mixed electoral system. Seventy three of the parliament seats are elected in single mandate constituencies under a majoritarian system with the remainder elected by party lists in one nationwide constituency under a proportional representation system. The elections are administered by the CEC which has offices at the district and precinct levels. A 2010 constitutional amendment changed Georgia from a semi- presidential system to a parliamentary one. These changes took place for the 2012 parliamentary elections and the 2013 presidential elections.

UNM was expected to win the 2012 elections until a video showing prison officers abusing prisoners shocked Georgian voters, and led to a surge of support for the opposition Georgian Dream coalition. This was led by a billionaire, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who entered politics in 2011. This infused a large amount of funding into the opposition efforts, including the creation of television stations which the opposition used for campaigning.

According to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the October 2012 parliamentary election was an important step for the consolidation of democratic elections. They were competitive with active citizen participation. However, the atmosphere was tense with harsh rhetoric and some incidents of violence. Campaigns often focused on the incumbency advantage and the financial assets of the opposition, rather than on issues or political platforms. Observers felt the CEC was efficient and transparent, and it held open meetings with observers, party representatives and the media.[3]

The media environment was diverse but highly politicized. Some private television stations had limited coverage within the country which prevented voter access to different perspectives. According to OSCE/ODHIR media monitoring, the only station that provided politically balanced news coverage of the campaign was the Georgian Public Broadcaster. A "Must Carry Must Offer" provision was applied to the pre-election campaign which enabled pro-opposition TV channels to access cable networks. This then offered viewers a wider variety of talk shows and political debates.[4]

The parliamentary election day was mostly calm and peaceful. International observers found that procedures were generally adhered to although there were some issues during the vote tabulation. The observers felt that domestic observation groups improved the overall transparency of the election and that the authorities were open and receptive to their

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[2] Background information from Freedom House, *Nations in Transition, Georgia.*
[3] Information on the 2012 elections and its context from OSCE/ODHIr *Election Observation Mission Final Report*
[4] UNDP, *Elections and the Media*

initiatives. Elections were rerun in 11 precincts in three majoritarian constituencies where the vote had been cancelled because of irregularities and violations. The Georgian Dream coalition won the majority in the new parliament with 85 seats. Mr. Ivanishvili was named Prime Minister.

II.   Project strategy

(i)   Project approach and strategy

With this project, the Civic Development Institute intended to strengthen the freeness and fairness of the elections in Georgia by strengthening the professional development of journalists on election reporting, popularizing citizen journalism and linking citizen journalists with professional ones. CDI felt this would address several areas of need that it had identified in the electoral process. These included:

- *Lack of investigative journalism and media monitoring* which is needed to challenge biased and misleading reporting;

- *Lack of skills of journalists and media organizations on election reporting* and ability to provide objective, systemic overviews of problems;

- *Lack of a direct communication channel between journalists and citizens* which limits reporting to information primarily provided by electoral authorities and interest groups;

- *Lack of objective election observation and citizen monitoring* of the process which is needed to safeguard the fairness of the election results.

By supporting activities in these areas, CDI felt that the project would strengthen the 2012 parliamentary election process. In particular, CDI intended to:

- *Support the professional development of journalists on election reporting* through training on the election law and rights of journalist in the electoral process; planning for election reporting and monitoring; applying critical thinking to election reporting; developing effective communication strategies; and, coordinating reporting on the electoral process;

- *Popularize citizen journalism as a mechanism* to promote free and fair elections by providing community members information on citizen journalism and the elections. CDI intended to provide this information through training for 120 persons in 11 locations where informational leaflets would also be distributed; and,

- *Strengthen the cooperation between community members and journalists.* CDI expected the professional journalists to verify the reports by citizen journalists. The uploaded reports to the CDI website would be spread through social networks to extend its reach. Participating journalists were also to develop ten articles on electoral problems in each of the 11 locations, three in-depth articles and two films which were expected to further enhance the cooperation between community members and the journalists.

The main project assumptions for these activities were that: there would be continued political, social and economic stability in Georgia: the parliamentary elections would be held in the fall of 2012; and, citizen journalists would participate in the project. The risks identified were related to those assumptions: that there might be political, economic and/or social instability; the date for the elections might change; and, the citizen journalists might not continue to participate in the project. CDI intended to mitigate these risks by monitoring the political and social situation to minimize their impact; amending the project activity plan if the election date changed, and, by carefully selecting citizen journalists and providing them with ongoing coaching to maintain their commitment to the project objectives.

CDI intended to publicize its work through interim and final reporting that it would share with the CEC and CSOs. All problems identified were to be discussed with a lawyer, with appeals submitted to the CEC as warranted.

The intended outcomes for this project were:
- Widespread information and better functioning of the citizen journalism tool;
- More extensive media coverage of the post-election period and increased skills of media representatives on election reporting; and,
- Greater transparency and public availability of the information regarding the election process in Georgia.

CDI based this design on an earlier project implemented with IFES for the local elections in 2010. That USD 37,000 project was similar in nature and was done in four locations and included a media monitoring component. All journalists participating in the UNDEF project were expected to be members of the Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics which was developed by CDI in an earlier project supported by the EU.

Sustainability of results was to be done through the active participation of media and NGO networks and through the increased awareness and participation of community members. Gender issues and marginalized/vulnerable groups were not specifically targeted but women were expected to be equally represented as citizen journalists. Marginalized and vulnerable groups would be able to use the citizen reporting tool because of the modest cost of sending a SMS message to CDI to report the information.

(ii) Logical framework

Project activities	Intended outcomes	Medium-term impacts	Long-term development objective

Popularizing citizen journalism as a tool to promote free and fair elections

• Web-portal developed • 4 meetings with citizens in 11 cities each (1,320 citizens total) • 10,000 info cards printed and distributed • Citizen reports uploaded • 110 complaints (from reports uploaded) submitted to CEC	• Citizens in 11 locations aware of citizen journalism • Citizens report election violations • Journalists have increased sources of information • CEC investigates complaints • More information available on electoral process before and after event	Increased citizen journalism on election violations Reduced number of election-related violations	Free and fair elections

Professional development of journalists

• 22 journalists trained • 2 interim, 1 final report done and published on website and distributed	• Media continues election coverage after election day • Coordinate effort by media to cover elections • More information available on electoral process before and after event • More professional journalists	Increased professional coverage of election and post-election period Better informed citizens More transparent electoral processes	Free and fair elections

Strengthen cooperation between community members and journalists

• 110 analytical articles done on 10 topics • 2 TV films done • Journalists verify citizen reports	• More information available to public on elections before, during and after election day	More transparent electoral processes	Free and fair elections

III.   Evaluation findings

(i) Relevance

The project objectives were relevant to the needs at the time to strengthen the credibility of the electoral process and to increase the amount of objective information available to the public. Georgia had the autocratic legacy of the Soviet Union and an entrenched ruling party. The parliamentary elections in 2012 were seen as the opportunity to make change of government, resulting in a highly contested and polarized context between the ruling United Nationalist Movement and the opposition parties led by the Georgian Dream party (GDP). The electoral climate was tense and mot media reporting was highly partisan.

Figure 1: Location of project activities

Source: Wikimedia

Georgia lacks the tradition of citizen engagement and the peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box. A project that could capture the interest of citizens in the integrity of the electoral process and on the importance of reporting incidents would directly contribute strengthening the democratization process underway in Georgia. This project gave them the opportunity to participate as well as to remain anonymous which was reassuring to some in the context. This would reduce the likelihood that they could become victims for making a report.

In implementation, the project focused almost exclusively on professional journalists and members of media organizations or NGOs. The media focus was relevant to the experience of CDI which is led by a professional journalist and which had a national network of media contacts, including media-related NGOs, developed from its earlier citizen journalist effort with IFES. This project was directly relevant to the personal and professional interests of the members of this group.

> ""As a citizen, I felt responsible, but I didn't send reports as I didn't find anything similar to what I saw in the workshop."
> "I became involved as I was convinced I could make a difference. But everything I observed was already observed by others."
> **Project participants, Gori**

The implementation of the project in 11 cities (Figure 1) increased the project's relevance as local areas have less media presence and those who speak out are much more visible and vulnerable. It also included the capital Tbilisi where much of the political activity occurs and the media is concentrated. According to the CDI Executive Director there was more demand for the training in Tbilisi, than elsewhere, except for the parties. In most cases the parties sent junior campaign staff, and in the case of Tbilisi, none came except for the Georgia Dream which sent campaigners after pleas through personal channels.

The 11 cities were selected based on the existence of independent media and an active civil society. The project kept a direct focus on opposition and ruling parties, and cross-cutting

issues such as inclusion of ethnic minorities or gender were not integrated into the project. Minority areas do have the same election issues as other locations in addition to the marginalization that results from their minority status. There was also no targeting apparent based on areas with a history of electoral problems.

Figure 2: Copy of CDI card for project

The types of activities undertaken were relevant to the electoral cycle in Georgia, and the presidential elections that were also held within the lifetime of the project. But it focused uniquely on the parliamentary election which limited its potential relevance and effectiveness to achieving its higher level objectives.

(ii) Effectiveness

The project delivered most of its anticipated outputs, but needed more programmatic engagement and links within the citizen journalist component to make it an effective citizen journalist project. According to project reporting, it reached 1,320 "citizen journalists" selected by CDI or its focal points. This group was composed of NGO and media members, party representatives and other citizens, including students in some cases. They received one short training each and a memory stick containing instructions on how to report violations and for use to record violations. CDI also distributed a business-sized contact card along with an assurance of anonymity for anything reported (Figure 2). The citizen journalists were then left alone to report, or not to report, on problems witnessed. Those who submitted verified information to CDI received USD 40 for each report. Verified meant it included a photo, audio file or other type of proof.

From the sample of participants contacted by the evaluators, almost none were ordinary citizens and very few said they had done any reports. The project expected these persons to act as de facto election observers, but without the protective umbrella given to domestic observers through electoral management body accreditation or continued contact with their networks. Many of the participants interviewed said they were afraid to report problems or to be seen using a camera. This was especially notable in Gori where one of the participating journalists had been beaten while covering a story. In Tbilisi, one NGO person said she was followed by the police because of her affiliation with the project and they broke her camera when they saw her taking pictures.

> ""We needed someone local and trusted to give the information. My neighbours told me the police were following me. People said the intelligence agencies were watching you on Facebook. I was afraid to upload anything."
> "You should involve more people-- those not already involved in other projects. That would increase civic awareness."
> **Project participants Gori**

Thirty-three professional journalists participated in the project. Eleven of these were the focal points, and 22 were the journalists paid to deliver the 10 stories per city. The journalists felt the project had been effective, generating information that might not have been available

otherwise as normally they do not receive information from citizens. This was especially important at the village level where information was more difficult to obtain.

The use of financial incentives guaranteed the participation of the journalists and delivery of their articles, but it did not generate the amount of citizen reporting anticipated. Some participants said they never sought payment, but the journalists and media/NGO persons felt "*when there is an incentive to work in bad conditions, you do more and better quality work.*" Another journalist noted that it covered the cost of gas to go out and check something. The task-based payments however, did not serve to link the journalists with the citizen journalism component. The focal points were also contracted for logistical support but were valuable resources that could have been used much more effectively.

Training, CDI Photo

The focal points and journalists seemed extremely professional. The citizen journalism component could have been developed using them as a mentor or coach for citizen journalists within their areas. This could have provided the follow up needed within that component. The journalists in Gori appeared to play a more active role on their own in following up with some of the citizen journalists, perhaps because of the extremely difficult environment.

Producing 110 articles on issues related to the elections would seem to be an effective way to increase the amount of information available on the process, but there is no information available that would give an idea of the extent of their reach or impact. Doing a series of articles in 11 different cities on the same topics could have also allowed for a good comparative analysis of the issues and situation. This is the type of information that is used by advocates and those who managed the process to make improvements. Although the evaluators were shown some bullets on the content of five topics, it is not clear if this information was then disseminated or if more in depth analysis was done. The lists did show some interesting trends about the use of state resources for campaigning and flaws with the voter lists.

Most of the violations reported to the website related to the actions of the ruling party and government. The internal monitor warned CDI in his reporting about being perceived as partisan if they only used violations from the ruling party as examples in training.[5] However, in evaluation interviews, the project was perceived as impartial, including by the participants from the former ruling party. Factors seem to be the reputation of CDI Executive Director's journalistic integrity, the selection of focal points and journalists who were known as

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[5] One of the training survey respondents noted: "During the information meetings with the communities, the presentations made included too much negative video and photo material discussion of the National Movement Party pre-election campaign. This case seems biased while being objective is supposed to be the main goal of the project. The participant citizens should not have an impression during the meetings that the project fights only one political organization or their faults, the citizens should have a feeling of covering the election process in an unbiased manner, they should observe activities of the National Movement as well as any other during the election process. They should be unbiased and fair." *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Monitoring plan and results,* p 26

independent journalists, and because CDI reports of violations by opposition parties were also posted.

CDI reportedly improved its website under the project so it was more user friendly. Reports were sent directly to CDI with those with evidence posted in the verified section, and those without it in the unverified section. The effectiveness of the website is unknown as CDI did not collect user statistics. It has a screen shot of a Georgian rating site that says it received the most hits of any legal, NGO or union site on the parliamentary election day. It also has data from before and on election day (Figure 4) on the number of visitors, but it does not have any information on which parts of the CDI organizational website they viewed, the bounce rates or the amount of time spent at the site which are important elements to understanding the actual use of the reports. The data for Facebook is from the Executive Director's personal Facebook page which had a link to the CDI website.

Figure 3: Use of CDI website	
Visits before E-Day	986
Unique visitors including E-Day	1,259
Total visits including E-Day	2,534
Unique visitors including E-Day	1,999
Facebook Statistics	
Verified shared	12,420
Verified liked	1,600
Unverified shared	2,349
Unverified liked	762

CDI received 173 reports from May to November 2012. Ninety three of these were verified. Almost 75 percent of these were received in September-October (elections were 1 October 2012). Most of its reports were verified in the pre-electoral period, with the largest number of unverified reports sent in October: 62 percent were unverified in October compared to 50 percent in September and 0.05 percent in August. This may reflect the more active role played by the CEC and observer groups around election day in reporting on problems. This would have reduced the need for journalists to investigate unsubstantiated reporting done on the CDI website. The data collected on those who submitted the reports is limited so generating a profile of who submitted what type of reports is limited. From payment records, 31 persons were paid for 92 reports-- 14 men and 17 women. Eleven were professional journalists-- two men and nine women. Three of the most active persons seemed to be from NGOs.


Photos showing changed results forms:
337 Georgian Dream and 207 UNM to 436 UNM and 146 Georgia Dream

The project lacked links with others doing similar work, such as election observers although some of the participants may have also been observers for other efforts. There was a more substantial USAID-funded citizen journalism effort that covered the entire electoral cycle (parliamentary, presidential and local elections), implemented by the International Society for Fair Elections in Democracy (ISFED) in collaboration with the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Transparency International and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

This project used trained observers to monitor the process and reports on problems from crowd sourcing. Citizens could report election violations by SMS, email or post. Its interactive website mapped violations that was searchable by type of problem, location and perpetrator (Figure 6). This site also provided electoral data such as results, turnout, and votes per minute.[7]

Figure 4
ISFED Elections Portal
**Interactive map of 2012 election day violations[6]**

Coordination with this effort could have avoided parallel efforts and increased the effectiveness of both. The other effort had the professional election monitoring expertise, crowd sourcing and more comprehensive website, while CDI had a nationwide network of journalists that could have analyzed and disseminated the information.

(iii) Efficiency

The project inputs were consistent with the delivery of the activities but not with the intent of developing a citizen journalism effort or generating a critical mass of reports which would have required more effort. This is reflected in the use of the budget where only nine percent of the budget went for citizen journalism (training and information cards) while 37 percent went for professional journalists (training, articles and films) with 12 percent for dissemination of the films, website and payment for verified reports (Figure 7). Thirty one persons were paid for the 92 verified reports for a total of USD8, 000.

CDI used its experience from its 2.5 month, USD 37,000 project done for the 2010 local elections in four locations. CDI expand this effort to eleven locations, using its networks created from other projects. This allowed for a relatively quick launch and easy implementation. CDI also benefited from the personal Facebook page of its Executive Director, who has 5,000 friends and 12,000 followers. It used this site to advertise the opportunities in the project as well as a well known local internet job site. The Executive Director is a well-known journalist and most people were willing to risk reporting problems to CDI and trusted that it would be kept anonymous.

Figure 5 Project Expenditures
- Project staff & transpor
- Focal Points
- Journalist training
- Articles
- Indepth articles
- Films
- Film presentation
- Citizen training
- Info Cards
- Verified reports

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[6]Elections Portal, **http://www.electionsportal.ge/eng/map?map=2&category=0&dist=0**
[7] https://www.ndi.org/Georgia-elections-portal

There did not appear to be any criteria for the selection of citizen journalists other than that they seemed to be known to CDI or to the focal points. This gave the project people it could trust in a very polarized context. At the same time, it limited the reach of the project and the range of participants and resulted in very few submissions. There was no active campaign done to raise awareness of the citizen journalism efforts other than distributing the contact cards to training participants. Selection criteria for the journalists seemed to be their location, reputation as objective journalists and membership in the Charter of Journalist Ethics, an association created by CDI in an earlier project. The only participants selected through open competition were those contracted for the three in depth articles and the two film documentaries.

CDI did use the USAID-funded local resource centers in six locations. This provided a free, safe place for civil society to meet and for CDI to hold its trainings. CDI also used local media offices and a public library in other locations. They had difficulties finding places to hold their trainings in two locations. In one, they said the authorities threatened the landlord as they were seen as opposition, and in another one (Boriti) they were locked out of the building and held their meeting outside in the rain. However, in Poti, the local theater was made available to them free of charge to show the project movie as the local authorities thought it was important.

Implementation was centralized despite having local focal points in each city. CDI implemented all of the trainings itself instead of using a cascade system that could have reached more persons. Incident reports also were to be submitted directly to them which they saw as essential for confidentiality reasons. However, more programmatic use of the focal points could have increased the project's efficiency as well as its effectiveness. In Gori the citizen journalists said they wanted to give information to their focal point as he was a trusted confident. The CEC also had trainers available during elections that any organization could use free of charge. Closer collaboration with the CEC trainers could have also increased project efficiencies although CDI used the CEC once for in a professional journalist training held in Tbilisi.

> "Thanks to UNDEF for funding this project. It played an important role in the parliamentary elections. In elections it is not difficult to disseminate information. But this project could report violations in seconds. I took photos of polling officials in ballot booths telling voters who to vote for. It was uploaded on the CDI site in 4 minutes. I reported other incidents as well and got USD 80."
> **Party representative, Gurjaani**

(iv) Impact

The impact of this project is difficult to assess. CDI hired an internal monitor to track its indicators and assess the quality of its trainings. This was a good initiative and provided some useful implementation information. However, the project indicators were primarily for outputs and did not measure performance beyond that level. For example, Indicator 3 is that *two interim reports and one final report are prepared*, *published and distributed*. This does not provide any indication on its use or contribution towards *greater transparency and public availability of information on the electoral process* (Outcome 3). That would depend on what was in the reports and the reach of its distribution. There is also no indicator or outcome that would measure the level of cooperation between citizen journalists and professional journalists.

> "The idea of the project is good, it allows to show real problems that exist. Each citizen was a potential journalist, who could make a problem public. I took a video and uploaded it of a policeman who kept parking on our apartment building's grass. Next day his car was gone."
>
> "I didn't upload anything, I didn't need to as we always had TV cameras following us. This was a hotspot and there were a lot of TVs here. But civil monitoring played an important role."
> **Political party representatives Gori**

In essence, the project focused on exposing violations made during the parliamentary elections and documenting that through the citizen "reports", articles and films. These outputs were done. Higher level impact beyond these products is unlikely for the reasons already discussed. In part, this was intentional. CDI did not want to further inflame the polarized context by widely disseminating materials that showed violations that were principally done by one side. But this was also a result of the project's limited focus, reach and follow up.

To put this effort in context there were 62,000 civil society and 59,000 party observers accredited by the CEC to observe the parliamentary election[8]. This project did not accredit its citizen journalists although some may have had CEC accreditation through their own NGO or party affiliations. The CEC was active in the media sector and had 100 journalists work with them as part of their programmes and provided regional training for journalists through four regional media associations. It also provided training for political parties and NGO leadership. It also sponsored a reporting contest on the elections, and the first prize was won by one of this project's participating journalists in Gori. He attributed some of his success to the project training done on how to write professional articles on elections.

For popularizing citizen journalism, most of the 1,320 participants were already in the NGO-media network or were affiliated with parties. It is possible that some ordinary citizens attended a training or saw one of the CDI cards and submitted a report, but the scale of this is unknown as that type of disaggregated data for participants and reports was not done. For increasing the professionalism of journalists, most of the journalists who participated appeared to be seasoned professionals. It is unlikely that the trainings would have increased their reporting or critical thinking skills. However, it is possible that it increased the awareness on what constituted an electoral violation for some regional journalists

The project's objective was to *promote free and fair elections* but it focused primarily on the event. An electoral cycle approach, that included the presidential elections which was within the timeframe of the project, could have increased its impact by raising its focus to the process more than the events. CDI felt the presidential elections were not as contentious as the parliamentary elections so this was not needed, but election observation and reporting is more than something that is done only in contentious elections.

Nevertheless, from the anecdotal information provided by the project and collected during the interviews, it is likely that, to a limited extent, this project:

- ***Provided a resource for professional journalists for leads on stories they might not have otherwise gotten.*** It was hard for the independent and opposition media to get access to information in the context, especially at the village level. The verified data was important for them as it contained photos and other evidence. The unverified data gave them leads. For example, an uploaded photo allegedly showing vote buying with sugar distributions in Nicosi village was followed up by the Gori

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[8] Interview with CEC.

journalists.[9]

- ***Raised awareness of some training participants*** on what constituted a violation and the importance of reporting problems. It also probable that the 110 articles increased the readers' awareness on the issues in the process, and in turn the information helped to promote the transparency of process. The extent of their reach and impact of this though is unknown.

- ***Resolved some of the problems exposed.*** There was anecdotal information on action taken by the CEC and other local authorities to resolve some of the issues identified and that were forwarded to them by CDI. For example, in Karajala, Kakheti, a video uploaded on the CDI site showed a local administrator instructing two women on who to vote for. The results for that polling station were subsequently cancelled. In another case, a participant said she went to vote and found she was already marked off as having voted along with five others. She called CDI who came with TV9 to cover the story and the CDI legal adviser told her how to make a complaint and involve the observers. She was subsequently allowed to vote.

- ***Acted as a deterrence in some cases*** as the presence of persons with cameras recording problems was noted by officials according to interviews, and the possibility of being exposed was felt to have deterred some potential abuses. In Gurjaani, one of the party representatives said he was told by the local CEC representative to inform him if he saw any campaign posters in public offices after a photo showing this was posted on the website. Even if no action is taken, posting an audio recording, such as the one of a regional governor instructing his local administration on how to use administrative resources for the ruling party, was seen as important. As noted by a party representative in Gori, "*these kinds of projects are important. They are the only place where light can come to dark places.*"

- ***Contributed to the pool of change-makers*** who think they can contribute to the future of the country in a context where many citizens are conditioned to being dictated to. One coordinator noted that if a person sees a photo of a violation uploaded and sees change resulting from this, they become more confident and become change makers. The extent of this is unknown as all of the participants seemed to have been civically and politically active before the project.

- ***Contributed to a more even playing field*** for some candidates and parties, and in particular for the opposition. The extent of this is uncertain as party representatives sent to trainings were primarily young short-term campaign workers, and most party representatives said they already had their own channels to report problems and reach the media. But it did provide an alternative mechanism for them to get their messages out and complaints heard.

(v) Sustainability

The reports submitted to CDI for this project are still available on the CDI website for anyone who is interested. The two films it produced documented some of the process and are posted on You Tube and are also available for viewing. The professional journalists who were associated with the project are still reporting and actively engaged in following the upcoming local elections for their respective media outlets. In some cases, this was with other media

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[9] In this case, coverage had no effect on stopping the activity. The journalists were questioned by police for allegedly entering the local administrative building illegally (where the distributions were taking place) and while they were with the police, the remainder of the sugar was distributed.

outlets than the ones worked with under the project, as several of the outlets, such as TV 9, where they worked during the project, closed down after the parliamentary elections.

It is likely that some of the participants will retain an increased awareness of the importance of what constitutes a violation and may report them to authorities or observers in the upcoming local elections.

The effort itself was not sustained. The project focused on the event of the parliamentary elections, and the structures created for that were not used for the other elections within the cycle, notably the 2012 presidential elections- which was held within the timeframe of this project-- and the local elections that will be held in summer 2014. The CEC adopted the motto to "*turn precedent into tradition*" by continuing the peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box that had been done in the parliamentary elections. Continuing the citizen journalism effort could have supported this, and without compensation could have been sustainable if there had been enough interest and momentum generated among the participants.

Campaign poster photo uploaded of placed in no campaign zone in Old Batumi.

The centralized and personalized nature of the project (through use of the personal contacts of the Executive Director and focal points) along with the anonymous reporting meant the structures were dependent on the center and without its continued engagement, the efforts were not sustainable. CDI only saw this type of an effort as necessary for the parliamentary elections and not for the remainder of the elections in the cycle. However, sustainable change is a long-term process that does not end with election event or change of government. Some of the local participants are now disillusioned as they say they see the new government continuing some of the problems of the past. All of the local journalists and focal points felt that the presidential elections and especially the local elections should have been covered. As noted by one of the political party representatives in Gurjaani, "*those people who did the violations are still in their posts. So it is still important to continue monitoring at local administration levels.*"

IV.   Conclusions

Based on the evaluation findings, the team concludes:

  (i) The **project's objectives were important** in the context of Georgia's democratic transition. Strengthening the freeness and fairness of the electoral process was key to holding elected officials accountable for their actions and ensuring to the legitimacy of the newly elected government. The project was done in a very difficult environment and the dedication of the CDI staff and participating journalists was evident. This conclusion follows the findings on relevance and effectiveness.

  (ii) These types of projects **must maintain a perception of impartiality** to be credible. CDI was successful at having this project perceived as impartial despite the highly politicized environment. The seemed to be a result of the professional reputations of the CDI Executive Director and participating journalists as independent journalists. This encouraged persons to participate and lent validity to the content of the verified reports. This conclusion follows the findings on relevance and effectiveness.

  (iii) The design included **many good concepts,** including linking professional journalists to citizen journalists, doing a series of articles on the same topics from different locations, posting photos of violations on a public website, and documenting the process in film.

The project **raised awareness of what constituted a violation and acted as a deterrent in some cases, while contributing to the pool of change-makers and to a more even playing field. The use of incentives** was a motivating factor for some, but it lacked some programmatic elements needed to deliver a component, in this case, the citizen journalism effort.. This conclusion follows the findings on effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

  (iv) Although some issues were forwarded to the CEC, **links were not made** between this work and advocates and policy makers who could use the information generated to promote electoral reform and administrative changes. Much of this project worked **in parallel to other efforts** in the sector. Developing synergies between efforts could have strengthened this project and helped CSOs to build a more critical mass of citizen watchdogs. This conclusion follows the findings on effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

  (v) Project implementation was **highly centralized** even though it took place in 11 locations. Everything was done out of Tbilisi even though the project had good assets in place once the focal points and participating journalists were recruited. More programmatic use of these assets in the citizen journalism component could have expanded the reach and potential impact of the project. This conclusion follows the findings on efficiency, impact and sustainability.

  (vi) Social media was not effectively integrated into this project beyond the use of the Executive Director's Facebook page. Expanding this could have played a more

important role in the citizen journalism element. The CDI website was said to be more user friendly but it was static. Developing a network of citizen journalists who could contact each other and the professional journalists directly and share information and advice could have made the effort more dynamic. This conclusion follows the findings for effectiveness, efficiency and impact.

*(vii)*This project **might have had more significant results** than was visible to the evaluators, but this is unknown as it did not collect information on its results beyond its **outputs.** This conclusion follows the findings on effectiveness and impact.

IV. Recommendations

To strengthen similar projects in the future, the team recommends:

(i) ***Ensure clarity of project purpose*** and that the activities selected are developed enough to contribute directly towards achieving that purpose. This is especially important in a multi-component effort such as this one. For example, if the project purpose was primarily to gather reports of problems in the electoral process, then a good mechanism to address that would have been to massively advertise the website contact information and how to use it and what to look for, for crowd sourcing. The training funds could have then been used for the advertising and as the payment for the expanded number of verified reports. This recommendation follows conclusions (iii) and (iv).

(ii) ***Conceptualize projects as 'development' programmes*** rather than as a series of activities or focused on an event. Even if the event is important, the process is more important as this sets the precedents for future elections. Activities need to be linked so that each one builds on the other and as a whole they contribute to the ultimate objective of the project. As an example, enlarging the concept of citizen election reporting beyond violations and embedding it within the broader electoral process and its democratic meaning could help avoid an activity or event-based project. This would also help to address issues of sustainability and how to ensure the activities and their results continue after the end of the project. This recommendation follows conclusions (iii), (iv), (vii) and (viii).

(iii) ***Prioritize civic action and watchdog projects by donors*** in places with similar circumstances. This should also include investigatory journalism. These are important elements of a democratic society that are not developed in some transitional democracies. These can shine a light on problems that affect the quality of citizen lives and the nature of their government. This is also one of the important ways of making governments and officials accountable for their actions. This recommendation follows conclusion (i).

(iv) ***Continue efforts to maintain public perceptions of project impartiality*** to ensure credibility. This is critical for the success of civil society activities for democratization in any context and especially in a highly partisan and politically charged electoral environment. This recommendation follows conclusion (ii).

(v) ***Undertake systematic analysis and synthesis*** of the individual bits of information in reporting projects, and widely disseminate this information so that others can use it. In this regard, ***links should be made with other watchdog, advocacy and election observation groups*** that can utilize the project's products and information in their efforts to improve the electoral processes and hold officials accountable for their actions. This recommendation follows conclusion (iv) and (v).

(vi) ***Decentralize project implementation*** to extend project reach and promote replication of activities. As an example, the grantee serves as the trainer-of-trainers, ensures quality control and provides programmatic direction, while local focal points are used

to deliver trainings in their locations that could then be replicated by NGO and party participants for their network members. Focal points could also collect citizen reports, do the analysis for the problems identified in their locations, serve as a liaison with local authorities and election officials, and develop a vibrant citizen journalism network in their areas. Confidentiality could still be maintained through the use of pseudonym user-names in a virtual network if participants felt threatened. This recommendation follows conclusion (vi).

*(vii) **Extend the reach of the project by using participating media organizations.*** The project had a nationwide network of journalists and media organizations participating in the project. They could be used to promote and explain the concept of citizen journalism, what to look out for and where and how to send information. More business cards with this information could have also been more systematically distributed through the media and NGO networks by their participating staff members. This recommendation follows conclusion (vii).

*(viii) **Incentives need to be used in conjunction with strong programmatic elements*** that carry the activity more than the incentives. In this case the citizen journalism effort should be further developed into a network with continual contact and actual links made between them and the professional journalists and focal points who could act as mentors as well as verifiers of information. Incentives can also help jumpstart a project but a phase out plan should be developed to help promote sustainability of the efforts. This recommendation follows conclusion (viii).

*(ix) **Adopt appropriate indicators that can measure results as well as outputs.*** Indicators should be able to track the progress of the activities undertaken and measure changes made as a result of the activities. As an example, instead of an indicator of "number of trainings", it could be "increased awareness of training participants on (topic)." This could be measured easily through a short questionnaire given to all project participants before the first training and at the end of the last training that asks a few questions about their attitudes towards the training purpose, their knowledge on topics covered by the training and their practices (such as if they report incidents to authorities). A comparison of these before and after answers should show if the training was effective and what changes of attitude, knowledge and practice it generated. Website use should also be tracked so that corrective measures can be taken if they show visitors stay for less than a minute on a page or never return. This recommendation follows conclusion (vi).

V. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

This project was essentially a project by journalists for journalists. Although it had some good concepts in its design, it lacked the developmental focus needed to tie them together and make it an effective and sustainable effort. The outputs were delivered but with some tweaking and more programmatic efforts, it could have delivered much more than outputs and some anecdotal reports of results. CDI put its efforts into developing a network and mechanism to report on problems in the electoral process. But this was only conceptualized as supporting an event. Strengthening the freeness and fairness of the electoral process in a transitional democracy takes more than supporting one event. It was a shame that the network and mechanism created were not used for these subsequent elections. The lack of integration of this endeavor into the larger and more substantive election reporting and observation efforts that were being done at the time. This would have directly increased its relevance, effectiveness and impact.

The concept of tying citizen watchdogs to the professional efforts by others in the sector is a good one and is needed in difficult circumstances. This is a best practice that could be used in similar contexts. In this case whether it was professional journalists, accredited election observers or human rights monitors, these professionals can provide the citizens with encouragement and cover and use their information to make sustainable changes. However, these links need to be more deliberately made and programmatically used for future efforts.

Annex 1: Evaluation questions:

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	• Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context? • Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why? • Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	• To what extent have the project's objectives been reached? • To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not? • Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives? • What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	• Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs? • Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability? • Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	• To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address? • Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative? • To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization? • Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	• To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact? • Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	• What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc). • Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?

Annex 2: Documents Reviewed:

Civic Development Institute, website: http://cdi.org.ge/en/

Civic Development Institution, *Election 2010- Development of Social Media Space in Georgia, Findings, Analysis and Suggestions,* Tbilisi 2010

Headlines.ge website, http://www.headlines.ge/index.php?lang=en

Freedom House, *Nations in Transition, Georgia 2012,* 2012

National Democratic Institute, *Interactive Georgian Website Gives Citizens Access to Election Data, https://www.ndi.org/Georgia-elections-portal* 2 September 2012

OSCE/ODIHR, *Election Observation Mission Final Report, Georgia, Parliamentary Elections, 1 October 2012*

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Project Document*, October 2011

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Mid-Term Narrative Report,* December 2012

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Financial Utilization Report-* December 2012

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Financial Utilization Report- Final,* November 2013

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Final Monitoring Report,* October 2013

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Monitoring plan and results,* December 2012

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Milestone Verification Mission Report,* June 2012

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Launch Note,* 5 February 2014

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Budget Final Balance,* April 2014

UDF-GEO-10-396, *Citizen Journalists for Free and Fair Elections in Georgia, Analysis of 5 Topics,* undated

UNDP, *Elections and the Media,* http://www.us.undp.org/content/georgia/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/successstories/elections-and-the-media/

Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

31 March 2014	
Arrival international consultant	
Tamar Mosiashvili	Project Coordinator, CDI
Tamark Kubaneishvli	Web Manager, CDI
Ia Antadze	Project Manager, CDI, by skype
Nino Berishvili	Accountant, CDI
Tamar Chkhaidze	Public Relations Manager, CDI
1 April 2014	
Zurab Kharatishvili	Former Chairperson, Central Elections Commission of Georgia
Giorgi Jologua	Local coordinator
Irakli Absandze	Journalist
Tamar Rukhadze	Journalist
Salome Tsetskhladze	Journalist
Manana Iashvili	Citizen journalist
Marika Eliozishvili	Citizen journalist
Lali Amanatashvili	Citizen journalist
2 April 2014	
Departure for Gori	
Goga Aptsiauri	Local coordinator, Journalist
Rezo Okruashvili	Journalist
Saba Tsitsikashvili	Journalist
Kakha Toliashvili	Politician
David Tsertsvadze	Politician
Tamaz Makashvili	Politician
Marta Bibilashvili	Citizen Journalist
Ekaterine Kotolashvili	Citizen Journalist
Maia Tsertsvadze	Citizen Journalist
Lia Gorelishvili	Citizen Journalist
Return to Tbilisi	
3 April 2014	
Departure for Gurjaani	
Levan Aleksishvili	Local coordinator, Journalist
Natalia Barbakadze	Journalist
Maia Mamulashvili	Journalist
Natalia Tsiskarashvili	Journalist
Nikoloz Vardoshvili	Politician
Giorgi Mosiashvili	Politician
Maia Arutinovi	Citizen Journalist
Maia Kalabegashvili	Citizen Journalist
Nana Khubutia	Citizen Journalist, by phone

Ana Gvelukashvili	Citizen Journalist, by phone
Salome Zakalashvili	Citizen Journalist, by phone
Lia Khutsishvili	Citizen Journalist, by phone
Tamila Gurashvili	Citizen Journalist, by phone
Return to Tbilisi	
4 April 2014	
Ia Antadze	Project Manager, CDI, by skype
Tamar Mosiashvili	Project Coordinator, CDI
Nino Berishvili	Accountant, CDI
Tamar Chkhaidze	Public Relations Manager, CDI
Tamar Bartaia	TV Documentalist
Toma Chagelishvili	TV Documentalist
Giorgi Urchukhishvili	Monitoring and Evaluation Expert (Internal Monitor)
Danielle Reiff	USAID, Office of Democracy and Governance, Director
Khatuna Khvichia	USAID, Office of Democracy and Governance, Project Management Specialist
Keti Bakradze	USAID, Office of Democracy and Governance, Senior Civil Society and Media Advisor
Raindi Lortkipanidze	Citizen Journalist, by phone
5 April 2014	
Departure of international consultant	

Annex 4 : Acronyms

CDI	Civic Development Initiative
CEC	Central Elections Commission
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
ISFED	Society for Fair Elections in Democracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSCE/ODHIR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNM	United National Movement
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar