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EVALUATION REPORT

UDF-KEN-09-297 – Voter Education and Voter Registration in Kenya

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All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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I. Executive Summary

(i) Project Data

The *Voter Education and Voter Registration in Kenya* project sought to increase the participation of marginalized persons in the electoral processes in six provinces of Kenya. It intended to increase the awareness of targeted communities through different media and forums to register to vote and to provide voter education to enhance their participation in the electoral processes. Its intended outcomes were to: 1) increase awareness and enhance participation of poor and marginalized persons in the electoral processes; 2) increase the number of youth, women and disabled citizens registered as voters; and, 3) enhance the capacity of at least 100 youth, female and disabled candidates to participate and contest in the national elections.

This was a two-year USD 200,000 project (1 April 2011- 31 March 2013). The project was implemented by the Community Organization Training Programme Trust (COTP), a Kenyan non-governmental organization (NGO). Its main intended activities were to:

- Organize grass-roots public events before and after the elections on the voter registration and electoral process;
- Undertake voter education road shows and advertising in the mass media;
- Produce voter education posters, T-Shirts and banners with messages targeted at disadvantaged and marginalized voters;
- Hold educational events and workshops for voters and candidates during which citizens could register to vote; and,
- Select, train and support women, youth and disabled candidates for national office to take advantage of the opportunities in the newly promulgated constitution (2010).

(ii) Evaluation Findings

The project objectives were directly **relevant** to the needs of the citizens for information on the new constitution in Kenya and the changes to the electoral system that followed the post-electoral violence in 2007 and 2008. There were also worries of voter apathy and that the women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWD) would not realize the opportunities afforded to them in the new constitution to compete for public office. The design was ambitious for the level of funding, with activities expected in eight different locations within each of six different provinces and for an organization with expertise in grass roots capacity building but not in supporting electoral or political participation. The capacity building activities were underdeveloped in the design and based on the assumptions that one workshop could result in adequate capacity building for candidates and that nomination fees were the main constraint to the participation of the target groups as candidates. These assumptions were too simplistic for the nature of the problems.

Project implementation followed the list of activities in the Project Document, but not all activities were fully implemented as described. The lack of basic project management systems, including aggregation of the number of forums held, advocacy efforts made, or persons reached in workshops, makes it impossible to assess the scope of what was done, or to determine if these efforts were **effective**. Efforts focused primarily on raising voter and potential candidate awareness and did not appear to go beyond that stage despite the intended outcome of increasing their capacity. Implementation was activity driven and centralized from Nairobi. COTP did use a small group of committed and impressive Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in the provinces to mobilize people for some of

their forums but did not leverage the opportunities that integrating them into the delivery of the project could have provided. This would have allowed for a far greater reach and follow up with participants. COTP was unaware of the other UNDEF-funded project in Kenya that also worked to support the electoral processes and which could have provided useful synergies with this project.

Project inputs were reportedly not enough to deliver all of the activities anticipated, and were not consistent with the intended outcomes which would have required more effort. The evaluation team is unable to assess the **efficiency** of the project. The financial reports were audited without major findings according to COTP, but the programmatic information provided to the evaluators through CBO and participant interviews did not corroborate the scope of the outputs as reported in the Final Narrative Report (FNR). Follow-up discussions with COTP revealed that it lacked the systems needed to track outputs and results, and that it used the project's targets as its illustrative results for the FNR. COTP believes that its outputs were greater in most cases than their targets, especially for their advocacy work with the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) on voter registration for the poor and marginalized. They also confirmed however, that the locations for some activities were consolidated within a province so were only done once, and in at least one case-- the post-election follow-ups-- was not done. The areas of project efficiency did seem to be the use of COTP networks to identify and mobilize participants and the local arrangements done with IEBC officials in workshop locations to use their civic educators during the workshops.

As the evaluators are unable to confirm the scale of the activities undertaken, it is not possible to assess **impact**. The team heard some anecdotes of positive changes taking place after an activity but little specific data was available for corroboration. The nature of implementation was likely to have achieved results at the level of increased awareness among individual participants on some voter education and participation messages. It seemed to have piqued the interest of some to take advantage of the increased opportunities for participation, but the lack of follow up or synergies with other programs that could have provided this, limited project impact beyond this. COTP efforts did however, contributed to the overall results achieved by national efforts to have a good voter registration and peaceful elections in March 1213. This was important given the critical necessity of Kenya to move forward and consolidate the gains made in the constitutional referendum of 2010.

The efforts were one time activities and were not **sustainable.** Although COTP worked with its grass roots networks and CBOs in the provinces, it did not do any capacity building of these CBOs so they could take over or follow up on the activities. It also did not develop any synergies with activities done by other NGOs and agencies in the sector for its targeted groups that could have provided its participants with the needed follow-up support and assistance, or undertake any real capacity building in its workshops beyond increasing awareness.

The **UNDEF value added** for this project was that it enabled this interested NGO to support the national efforts to get Kenya back on track following the post-electoral violence in 2007 and 2008. The funding enabled it to assist this process for two years and to feel that it made a substantial contribution to this effort. COTP was also able to use the fact that it was a UNDEF grantee to gain access to the IEBC and its civic education trainers. This connection was also then extended to the CBOs working with the project in the provinces for their own activities which they found valuable. The funding also allowed these organizations, along with others supported by donors, to start the voter education efforts far before the IEBC started its official campaigns.

(iii) Conclusions

The ***project focused on an important area of need in Kenya and reached the grass roots*** which many electoral support programs did not otherwise reach and which was important to help ensure that these marginalized groups were informed on and able to participle in the processes as voters and candidates. COTP had ***experience to do capacity building and developed an effective partnership with the IEBC officials at local levels to support its workshops.*** But it ***lacked the synergies needed beyond this to ensure that its workshops were more than one-off events.*** The project was ***activity driven and lacked the programmatic links needed*** to increase its relevance, effectiveness and impact***.***

COTP's CBO partners and grass roots networks were the right organizations to reach the targeted groups, but to be used effectively needed to be more integrated into project implementation. The centralized nature of project implementation marginalized their usefulness and contribution towards achievement of the project outcomes. ***Inputs and implementation approach were not adequate for the scope of activities contemplated in the project design*** with efforts dispersed over a wide area and in different activities. This resulted in the one-off activities and in some activities not being undertaken at all.

This ***project could have benefited from the experience and activities implemented by the other UNDEF-funded grantee in Kenya*** which was working on the same issues and had considerable experience in the sector. This ***project might have done more activities and achieved more results than was visible*** to the evaluators, but without aggregation of its data or tracking of results, it is not possible to know.

(iv) Recommendations

For similar projects in the future, the evaluators recommend that the grantees ***link with others working on the same issues*** especially for those who are not experts in that sector to help ensure a more effective project. ***Develop a vision for the project that goes beyond activities*** and ***provide the follow up and level of effort needed to contribute towards project outcomes. Decentralize implementation through a more effective use of CBO networks*** by providing subgrants and allowing them to deliver project activities rather than attempting to do it all directly from a central location. ***Concentrate efforts programmatically as well as geographically*** when resources are limited so that the activities can be developed into more than one-off events. Provide more capacity building, transfer of knowledge, and development of leadership skills for those who want to advocate and run for office.

Projects should ensure they adopt an appropriate performance monitoring plan that collects and aggregates output data as well as tracks their results with appropriate project-level indicators. ***Ensure UNDEF-funded grantees are aware of other UNDEF-funded projects within a country and encourage synergies*** between them, especially if they are working in the same sector.

II. Introduction and development context

(i) The project and evaluation objectives

The *Voter Education and Voter Registration in Kenya* project was a two-year USD 200,000 project implemented by the Community Organization Training Program Trust (COTP). USD 20,000 of this was retained by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation purposes. The project ran from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2013. Its main objectives were to increase the capacity of women, youth and disabled persons to participate in the electoral process both as voters and candidates. It intended to do this through: 1) civic education and information for the poor and marginalized groups; 2) increasing the number of disadvantaged persons registering to vote; and, 3) enhancing the capacity of 100 candidates from these target groups to compete in the elections.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger evaluation of the Round 2 and 3 UNDEF-funded projects. Its purpose is to "contribute towards a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved".[1]

(ii) Evaluation methodology

The evaluation took place in September - October 2013 with field work done in Kenya from 23 September - 4 October, 2013. This field time was shared with the evaluation of another UNDEF project in Kenya (UDF-KEN-09-296) that worked to support the same electoral processes as this project and some of the interviews were arranged to cover questions for both projects. The evaluation was conducted by Sue Nelson and Wangeci Chege, experts in electoral processes and democratic governance. The UNDEF evaluations are more qualitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluation questions that focus on the project's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and any value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex 1). This report follows that structure. The evaluators reviewed available documentation on the project and on the voter registration and electoral processes done in Kenya from 2011 through the elections held in March 2013 (Annex 2).

In Kenya, the team met with the COPT, the IEBC, other electoral assistance providers and NGOs working in the sector. This work was done in Nairobi and Coast Provinces, two of the six provinces where the project was implemented. In addition, the team undertook virtual interviews by phone with the main community based organizations that worked with COTP in the four other projects along with some of those project participants and IEBC officials. The list of persons interviewed is provided in Annex 3.

During the preparatory work, the evaluators identified several issues which they followed up on during their interviews. These included:

- Project design as the activities in project reporting were noted to have been insufficient to meet the need of the targeted groups.
- Effect of encouraging CSO members to serve as candidates instead of assisting marginalized candidates that had sought office unsuccessfully in earlier elections.

[1] Operational Manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, p. 6.

- Mobilizing marginalized groups and assessing what innovative methods were used to motivate these groups to participate in the project; and,
- Assessing impact since most of the project outcomes and indicators were output based.

In addition, the team looked at the issues raised by UNDEF which included:

- Proforma nature of reporting where actual results almost exactly matched intended results without substantive details on activities and their impact;
- Extent of partnerships and synergistic learning mentioned in project reporting;
- How the grantee measured the additionality of their efforts for voter registration;
- Effectiveness of the different voter education materials and methods used; and,
- If gender was mainstreamed in project programming or if women candidate training was treated as a separate element.

(iii) Development context

Kenya has had a multiparty democracy since 1991 with regular elections for national offices. However, there was widespread violence after the 2007 national elections triggered by a lack of public confidence in the results. This conflict took on ethnic overtones and resulted in more than 1,000 deaths. A national dialogue process led to a coalition government and structural reforms with a new constitution and the creation of a new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission to manage the elections.[2]

The new constitution was adopted by a national referendum undertaken in 2010 and established a bicameral Parliament, a devolved system of government to the county level and unlike the previous elections where two offices were competed, this time six offices were to be elected in one general election (President, Senator, Members of Parliament, Women's Representatives, Governor and County Assembly Representatives). Most of these are elected positions, with some seats in the National Assembly (12), Senate (20) and County Assemblies (varied) filled by political party nominees in proportion to the number of seats won in the elections. There was also a national redistricting done of the electoral boundaries, re-registration of voters and the holding of elections in March 2013. The elections were initially expected in 2012, but a late Supreme Court ruling and IEBC decision making pushed them into March 2013.

Women, youth and persons with disabilities face distinct challenges to political participation. Although women made up about 49 percent of the registered voters in 2013, and youth (those under 35) make up about 46 percent of those registered,[3] these groups are under-represented in elected office. In 2007, women had about 10 percent of the seats in Parliament. There were only seven women that contested Governors' positions in 2013 (out of 237 candidates) and only 19 women candidates for Senate (out of 244).[4] None of these women were elected. Representation of women, youth and PWD increased in the 2013 elections due to the affirmative action seats, with about 20 percent of the seats in Parliament going to women but only six percent of women were elected to Country Assemblies, along with eight persons with disabilities.

A gender audit of the political parties done just before the 2007 elections illustrated some of the basic problems facing women who want to run for office. These included:

[2] European Union, *Final Report, 4 March 2013 General Elections, European Union Election Observation Mission, Kenya, Observer Report*
[3] IEBC statistics
[4] UN Women, Project Progress Report, SERP, Promoting Women's Leadership and Participation in Politics through Gender Responsive Electoral Process, p 10

- Limited financial support for women candidates or access to political networks;
- Lack of political party support for female candidates with male dominated decision making, norms and party structures;
- Short changing women during political party nominations; and,
- Lack of grass root support for women candidates.[5]

A UN Women's report from its activities for the 2013 elections showed that women candidates suffered from verbal abuse and false propaganda[6] (81 percent of the respondents to a short questionnaire sent to women candidates experienced abusive language, 65 percent had false rumors spread about them, 44 percent were attacked in the social media and 23 percent had leaflet attacks against them). They also were threatened by violence, including rape, and in isolated cases they or their supporters were victims of physical violence. The report also noted that in some locations, husbands instructed their wives on who to vote for, and in some cases requiring a photograph of their ballot paper to prove they voted for the right person.[7]

A study of youth participation in 2007 also identified some of the main obstacles to youth participation. These included the slow evolution of the democratic culture in Kenya; the assumption that younger people are less prepared to deal with issues of policy and governance; and, the unequal distribution of resources. Most youth do not have the resources needed to campaign for office, and if they did, most parties favoured older candidates with money. Youth also face a lack of understanding of the issues that made them angry and violent, or apathetic and disinterested.[8]

Persons with disabilities make up about seven percent of the Kenyan population. A 2007 survey found that about 74 percent of them reported being denied the right to make decisions on issues that affected their own lives. More than 86 percent reported being treated unequally by others. The situation for women with disabilities was worse, with more women than men found to have problems and issues of self worth.[9]

There was a large assistance effort for these elections, both to strengthen the quality of the process and to ensure a peaceful election. More than 14 countries assisted the electoral process side of it providing over USD 115 million. More than a quarter of this funding for went voter education.[10] The UNDP Support for Electoral Reform (SERP) project that helped to support the IEBC to increase the credibility of the elections included large components for voter registration, civic and voter education, and increasing opportunities for women, youth, minorities and PWDs to participate in the electoral process.[11] There were also other programs that assisted specific target groups, such as the UN Women's Gender and Governance program focused on increasing women's participation, the International Republican Institute's (IRI) program to encourage the participation of marginalized constituencies, and the Ministry of Justice's civic education programme.

[5] Women Shadow Parliament- Kenya, Rapid Gender Assessment and Audit of Political Parties in Kenya. p 21
[6] Similar survey data for male candidates is not available for comparison purposes
[7] UN Women, *Project Progress Report, Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes (SERP); Promoting Women's Leadership and Participation in Politics through Gender Responsive Electoral Process*
[8] Imoite, John *Youth Participation in Kenyan Politics: Challenges and Opportunities*
[9] African Union of the Blind, State of Disabled Peoples Rights in Kenya (2007) Report, p 11
[10] Donor Group Matrix
[11] UNDP, *SERP Project Document*

III. Project strategy

(i) Project approach and strategy

With this project, the Community Organization Training Program Trust sought to increase and energize the participation of marginalized people in the electoral processes in Kenya, both as voters and candidates through various media and forums. It specifically targeted women, youth and disabled persons in six provinces in Kenya: Central, Coast, Nairobi, Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western (Figure 1). It felt this was needed following the 2007-2008 post-electoral violence in the country and the subsequent changes to the constitution and electoral system.

COTP identified several problems that it thought this project could help to address to strengthen the participation of its targeted groups. These were: the high number of spoilt ballots in the 2010 constitutional referendum; the re-registration of voters that was required before the 2013 elections; the increase in the number of offices that were to be contested on the next ballot which it felt might cause voter confusion; the historically low participation levels of women and youth as candidates; and the need to conduct enhanced voter education to encourage more women, youth and persons with disabilities to compete for the new opportunities available to them in these elections.

Figure 1: Map of Kenya with locations of intended project sites

COTP intended to address these issues by providing voter education to encourage women, youth and marginalized people to participate in the electoral processes; sensitize its targeted communities through different media and forums on the need to register and vote in the upcoming elections. Information was to be shared through public events, road shows, mass media advertisements and community forums. These were intended to increase general public awareness on the electoral process and the need for active voter participation. It also intended to identify, nurture and support a number of leaders from vulnerable and marginalized groups to compete for office. This was to include workshops and partial support for their nomination fees depending on the number of candidates supported. Specifically, payment of 50 percent of their fees at the party nomination level and the full amount at the IEBC nomination level.

The project intended to support 30 women candidates for National Assembly, six candidates with disabilities for special interest group seats in the National Assembly, and 10 women

candidates for Senate. COTP also expected to reach six million people[12] indirectly through their radio, TV and newspaper informational messages.

The project's intended outcomes were:

- Enhanced participation in electoral processes for the poor and marginalized (women, youth and the PWD) through civic and voter education;
- Increase in the number of youth, women and PWD registered as voters; and,
- Enhanced capacity for at least 100 candidates from marginalized and disadvantaged sectors of the population (women, youth and PWD) to participate and contest in the national elections.

The project strategy was based on the premise that voter education and the payment of nomination fees could help increase the electoral participation of the targeted groups. This assumed that: voter registration and education would take place within the project period; communities would be willing to participate voluntarily in planned activities; and the political environment would be conducive to project implementation.

COTP identified a number of risks to the project, including the issues of ethnicity, political interference, political instability and the nonattendance by marginalized populations in project events. It intended mitigate these risks by using skilled organizers with local knowledge of the target communities and by ensuring courtesy calls to authorities and political leaders in advance of trainings; sharing information in advance with leaders; enhancing the peace building activities to avoid a return to the 2008 violence; and with innovative and focused mobilization efforts specifically targeting the marginalized groups.

COTP intended to implement the project directly through using a COTP staff person as Project Coordinator, two administrative assistants and hiring six voter educators/mobilizers. These voter educators would form local teams of volunteers from the provinces to work with as needed. Consultants would provide any specialized services and technical expertise that might be required. At least five CBOs in each province would be recruited to participate in the project and were to be responsible for mobilizing for grassroots activities and identifying and supporting the potential candidates.

COTP also intended to develop collaborative arrangements with government bodies, such as the electoral commission and provincial administration with Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) developed on how they would support the project. These were to be done before the start of the project. Government bodies were seen as important for the implementation of the project because of statutory requirements such as registration and meeting licenses and they were also seen as being able to help with mobilization.

This effort was intended to be sustainable because it would increase the participants' knowledge and understanding of democratic process, elections and voting and instill the values needed to build and support democratic institutions that respected and recognized the participation of marginalized groups. These values were expected to last for many years within the culture of Kenyan voters. The candidates supported by the project would be encouraged to join political parties although it also recognized that some would want to serve as independent candidates. The project expected it would provide experiences from which the communities could learn and improve. COTP also intended to work with established CBO and grass roots organizations that would still be in existence at the end of the project. It also intended to feed into the on-going national programmes through its MOUs with the IEBC with the voter registration activities to take place during the national voter registration process.

[12] The target in the Project Document text is listed as six million, but the target listed in the Results Framework is four million which is the figure used in the Logical Framework (Section II (ii).

(ii) Logical framework

Project activities	Intended outcomes	Medium-term impacts	Long-term development objective
CIVIC AND VOTER EDUCATION FOR POOR AND MARGINALIZED			
• **Develop and deliver road show** in 6 provinces (8 locations each)	• Enhanced civic/voter education for 10,000 women, youth, disabled persons in each province	Increased participation and understanding of electoral processes among youth, women and disabled persons Reduced voter apathy	More responsive governance
• **Develop and distribute voter education materials and messages**	• Avoid confusion over changes to electoral system, increase turnout and reduce spoilt ballots • 4 million reached through mass media infomercial • 1,500 posters/fliers, 1,200 T Shirts distributed per province	Increased awareness of target groups on changes and importance of participation Reduced voter apathy and number of spoilt ballots and increased voter turnout	More knowledgeable and effective participation by citizens in electoral process
• **Develop and deliver grass roots community forums**	• 6 voter educators hired and trained (1 per county) • 4 public events organized per county targeting 100 women, youth, disabled	Increased participation and understanding of electoral processes among youth, women and disabled persons Reduced voter apathy	More responsive governance
ENSURING POOR AND MARGINALIZED ARE REGISTERD TO VOTE			
• **Mobile registration centers linked to road shows**	• MOU with IEBC for centers • 1,500 new voters registered in 48 centers (8 per province)	Increased participation of disadvantaged groups as voters	More responsive governance
INCREASING CAPACITY OF WOMEN, YOUTH AND DISABLED PERSONS TO CONTEST ELECTIVE POSITIONS			
• **Workshops and educational events**	• Increased capacity for 100 potential candidates per province to contest national elections	Increased interest of women, youth and disabled persons in running for elected office	More diverse and representative elected officials
• **Support for nominations**	• Increased ability of target groups to run for office by payment of half party and all IEBC nomination fees for 30 female candidates (National Assembly, 6 PWD candidates, and 10 female candidates (for Senate)	Increased number of women, and disabled persons in elected office	More responsive governance
• **Logistical support for candidates**	• Needs assessment done in each province • Survey of capacity building needs of candidates done • Logistical support for 100 candidates per province	Increased number of women, and disabled persons in elected office	More responsive governance

IV. Evaluation findings

(i) Relevance

This project intended to address the problem of voter apathy and nonparticipation by the poor and marginalized persons in the electoral process in Kenya by increasing the amount of information available to them on the opportunities available in the new constitution, on the importance of registering to vote, and by supporting those who wanted run for office by increasing their capacity to contest the elections. These objectives were directly relevant to the needs of Kenya following the adoption of the new constitution and changes to the electoral system following the widespread electoral violence in 2007/2008. There was demand for this information and assistance as noted by the participating CBOs, especially for persons with disabilities who faced physical constraints to participation as well as cultural.

The design was ambitious for the level of funding with activities expected in six provinces and in eight locations within each province (Figure 1), and for an organization with expertise in CBO capacity building but without experience in supporting electoral or political participation. Some of the project's assumptions proved to be unrealistic and although the approaches were well-meaning, they were not the most effective ones that could have been adopted to achieve the intended outcomes.

The capacity building activities were underdeveloped in the design and limited to a day each. To reach the intended project outcomes of increased participation of women, youth and disabled persons in the electoral process for "responsive governance" and for them to have "enhanced capacity" to contest elective positions, more substantive capacity building activities and follow up with the participations would have been needed.

The project assumptions that the main constraint for the targeted groups were the lack of information on the constitution and the payment of nomination fees for those wanting to be candidates did not reflect the complexity of the issues or needs. Although these groups from grass-roots and marginalized areas were less likely to receive voter education messages, there was still a large-scale national effort done throughout Kenya by national and international organizations, and by the IEBC to inform the public on the new constitution for the referendum in 2010, for voter registration in 2010 and 2012, and in preparation for the 2013 elections with specific programs targeting the same beneficiary groups. With the exception of the IEBC, none of these efforts were taken into account in the design or implementation which affected its relevance in some cases. As an example, one of the participants in the candidate workshop said she had attended five workshops on the same topics and had difficulty at this point differentiating out the COTP one.

Voter education forum Coast

In addition, some organizations, including at least one of the COTP CBO partners at the provincial level, had successfully lobbied parties to lower the nomination fees for the targeted groups and in some cases had gotten them waived completely. Electoral and gender experts also questioned the short-term approach of paying fees to facilitate the participation of these target groups as they felt that entrenched party and cultural attitudes were the primary constraints to their participation rather than the issues of fees.[13]

Figure 5: Participants in Nyeri workshop

The project was directly relevant to the interests of the COTP staff as it was with most civil society organizations in Kenya given the post-2007 electoral environment and the national efforts being made to have inclusive and peaceful elections in 2013. COTP had been providing capacity building support to CBOs since 1993. It did seem to be a nonpartisan organization, focused on its mission of helping the poor and marginalized, but also seemed to have limited experience in running development programs or in strengthening civic participation in the electoral processes. This affected the design of the project as noted, as well as its implementation, especially for something as specialized as candidate support.

COTP selected its six provinces based on their position in poverty index, physical presence of COTP and population size. COTP appeared to be based only in Nairobi, but it did seem to have long-standing grass roots networks within these provinces and with the main CBOs used in implementation. This gave them the ability to effectively reach the targeted groups through these contacts.

Figure 2:
CBO Contacts in Provinces

Central: Nyeri Social Forum, Nyeri
Coast: Ilishe Trust, Mombasa
Nairobi: Nairobi Amani Mashinani, Huruma
Nyanza: Grassroots Trust, Kisumu
Rift Valley: Mau Development Self Help Group, Njoro
Western: SMF, Kakamega

The six CBOs that COTP reported as its main contacts in the regions did seem to be the right organizations to include in a project of this nature (Figure 2). From the interviews, they seemed nonpartisan, experienced and dedicated organizations working to support their communities and constituencies. They seemed to be assets that the project could have entered into a more effective role in project planning and

[13] According to the Electoral Observations Group, "While the nomination fees were lowered by half for women candidates for a number of elective positions, the envisaged benefits were difficult to harness. For example, many women candidates who would ordinarily be excluded from nomination because of higher nomination fees participated in the nomination process. But without a comprehensive and supportive campaign finance statute, the difficulties faced by women in raising campaign funds remained. Although unprecedented and indicative of an aspiration to alleviate historical economic and political injustices, the lowering of fees on its own cannot significantly enhance participation of women in the electoral process." *Report of the Elections Observation Group on the 2013 General Elections,* p 47

design, especially in a more cascade type of program. This could have expanded project reach and provided more of a cohesive and substantial program of support for participants.

(ii) Effectiveness

It is difficult for the evaluation team to evaluate the scope of project implementation or its effectiveness as most of the basic data needed to make this type of assessment was not available. As discussed in Section III (iii), COTP did not aggregate its activity-level information so the actual number of workshops or persons reached are not known. The numbers provided in the reports are illustrated results based on the targets from the Project Document. Although COTP firmly believes that it reached more persons than its targets, corroboration was not possible from the information that was available. Nevertheless, the evaluators are able to make some generalizations about project effectiveness from the information gathered from interviews and available documents.

Project implementation appears to have generally followed the list of activities described in the Project Document, but not with the intended scope or depth. Interviews with the CBOs listed by COTP as its main partners confirmed that at least one or two workshops were done in each of the provinces, but in most cases, these seemed to have been done in one place with participants asked to come to a central location rather than holding forums in the eight different locations as mentioned in the Project Document. Several CBOs also confirmed the holding of one-day road shows for which they seemed to have provided mapping to show the locations for the 15 - 30 minutes stops where the road show would rally persons and distribute information. Road shows in general were said to be an effective mechanism to reach grass roots as these trucks would stop at markets and other locations where people gathered. In Nairobi in particular, the show went through slum areas and would have reached some of the most poor and marginalized in the city. The CBO that participated in the Nairobi road show said they used volunteers as dancers to attract the crowd and pass messages and felt that though costly it was an effective effort.

> "We made a big difference. I saw the fruits of this before and after the elections. We preached peace, and there was peace. We asked about issues of candidate integrity. People now in the slums are not allying along political parties or tribes but on issues. We made peace and had good elections."
> **John Igadwa, Nairobi Amani Mashinani, Huruma, Nairobi Province**

Road Show Nairobi

COTP also showed the evaluators a curriculum it said it developed for civic education although in the end it used the official IEBC voter education materials which was required for NGOs accredited by the IEBC for voter education. This curriculum looked generic but adequate for the level of education anticipated. It did not sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the IEBC to establish voter registry sites at its road show locations as intended. This was a good idea but would have been difficult in practice given the type of electronic registration system adopted

which was not particularly mobile and which also needed to be done within the voter's home constituency.[14] COTP did appear to have discussed voter registration issues with some IEBC staff in different provinces to advocate for registration in marginalized areas, and monitored, in at least two cases, on the election day proceedings itself.

Efforts in general seemed to focus mainly on providing voter information on registration, the importance of participation and on the opportunities available for the target groups in elected office. COTP provided a series of one-time events working out from its Nairobi offices. It used its CBO partners to mobilize their constituents to attend the workshops, but the CBOs did not appear to be used substantially much beyond this. The one day efforts were enough to pique the interest of participants, but then they felt it left them hanging as there was no follow up. COTP said it did not have the resources to do all that it needed to do with them, especially for the candidates, but it also did not try to use the CBOs that had helped mobilize the participants to follow up with them or make the links with other projects working in the same sectors that could have provided this follow on.

According to COTP, it followed up with 46 candidates out of the 100 candidates it trained per province with logistical support. Although COTP associated this in discussions with party agents, the nature of this support is not clear to the evaluators as the few candidates interviewed did not appear to have had contact with the project beyond the initial forum. COTP did not pay any fees with the reasons varying between a too great need to provide assistance, and not needed in cases because they were already waived. It also found that if needed to include the political parties in any future activities of this nature as the parties were the ones who determined who was nominated.

COTP did make the necessary links with the IEBC to implement voter education activities and was accredited by the IEBC to do so. Altogether more than 1,000 NGOs were accredited by the IEBC as voter educators. COTP also said that attended the monthly IEBC coordination meetings for voter education held at the IEBC's headquarters in Nairobi. The IEBC accreditation proved effective as it gave the COTP and its CBO partners access to the IEBC civic educators and offices in the provinces, as well as the IEBC voter information material. This was especially important for an NGO that was not an expert in the sector. Being accredited also demonstrated to others that COTP was nonpartisan which helped to build trust in its efforts.

The workshops were facilitated by COTP staff and trainers, and usually an IEBC civic educator and other locally available knowledgeable persons. Although COTP had developed its own civic education curriculum funded by the project, it was not used as the IEBC later developed an official curriculum that it required all accredited partners to use. This IEBC material was extremely late in coming, so it is understandable why COTP might have felt the need to start the process on its own. In fact, many of the decisions on the electoral process were not taken until late which caused voter registration to slip into November-December 2012 and the elections from 2012 to March 2013. This directly affected the implementation of the project which had planned to do these activities much earlier on and which resulted in a compressed timetable for them at the end.

According to COTP it held forums in Coast and Western Provinces in multiple locations, but in the other four provinces gathered participants in a central location. The consolidation of workshop locations made it difficult for many participants to attend as the provinces are large and some had to travel long distances to the workshop. This was especially difficult for the PWD, most of whom had to travel with a companion. A blind participant said he and his

[14] There were not enough machines for all sites, so some registration was still done manually, but all registration needed to be done within the home constituency of the voters.

companion left home at dawn, arrived at the workshop at 11:00 and the morning session was almost already over. It would have been more effective had COTP decentralized the workshops and ensured follow up with them through more effective use of its grass roots networks, than centralizing activities and attempting to cover everything themselves from Nairobi. Photos from the sessions show they were interactive and included break-out sessions and group work. Most seem to have had good attendance with more persons than anticipated wanting to attend.

The project worked in isolation from other on-going efforts. For example, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) had a curriculum and program for women candidates and could have assisted COTP with its design, materials and support for women interested in running for office and the work with party agents. The Kenya Women Parliamentary Association (KEWOPA), which is comprised of all women parliamentarians in Kenya and is assisted by UN Women, was also a significant resource that could have been leveraged. But in interviews, neither of NDI nor KEWOPA were aware of this project or its efforts. There were also massive registration and voter information/education efforts funded by the UNDP SERP project and done by other institutions that could have been used as well to provide follow-on support. This would have increased the project's relevance for the participants as well as increased its effectiveness and impact.

(iii) Efficiency

Project inputs were reportedly not enough to deliver all of the outputs intended in the project document. Factors cited by COTP were the Value Added Tax Act which increased the taxes on goods and services, inflation, cost of permits to hold events, and the size of party nomination fees. This resulted in some activities not being done, or scaled back, such as only doing the broadcast of advertisements rather than including the print ones. The project did have use of the COTP vehicle which was purchased through other grant funding. The rental for the trucks for the road shows was said to be expensive. In Nyanza, they used two cars instead and were able to do four different locations that provided for more than 10 days of shows, while the locations that used a truck- such as Nairobi- were only able to do one day.

The project seems to have reached the type of beneficiaries intended (poor, marginalized, women, youth and PWD) but it did not deliver all of the outputs as described in the project document. The financial reports were audited without major findings according to COTP, but the programmatic information provided to the evaluators through the CBO and participant interviews did not corroborate the scope of the outputs as reported in the FNR.

Follow-up with COTR established that the grantee did not have the systems in place to track the project's outputs and results, and that it used the project's targets as illustrative results for its reporting to UNDEF. COTP states emphatically that its outputs were greater in most cases than its targets, especially for their advocacy work with local IEBC offices on moving voter registration sites to locations where the poor and marginalized congregated. However, the evaluators were unable to corroborate the scope of their work with the six CBOs that they told the evaluators were its main partners. This may be because they used their own grass roots networks to identify locations for the open-air town hall meetings and piggybacking on the weekly administrative market day gatherings, rather than through the CBOs. However a more complete list of contacts was only provided to the evaluators at the end of their field work and there was not enough time left to contact this new group of organizations to verify their involvement in the project. COTP also confirmed that some activities were consolidated within a province so were only done once, and in the case of Output 6.3 (carry out six observation and monitoring grass roots forum) these were not done.



The lack of accurate information on outputs and corroboration for the scope of activities undertaken makes it difficult to assess project efficiency. The use of their grass roots networks and CBO contacts did seem to be an efficient way to mobilize local-level participants who might otherwise be overlooked, but COTP did not leverage these networks efficiently because of its centralized implementation approach. However, in some cases, the CBO contact did seem to participate as a facilitator in the workshop and engaged personally in some of the other activities. Although the evaluators only had limited contact and information on these CBOs, their contact persons seemed to be efficient and competent.

COTP expended most of the funds directly. As noted in Figure 3, according to the information provided to the team, almost 45 percent of the funding provided to COTP went for salaries of COTP staff and for the voter educators. The road shows and T-shirts used about 20 percent followed by the radio and TV spots at 12 percent. These figures should be used for illustrative purposes only as the breakdown for expenditures provided to the evaluators was the illustrative budget from the Project Document,

COTP seemed to have provided token support for its CBOs partners. Some mentioned receiving around 3,000 shillings (about USD 35) which most used to cover communications costs. This meant that most CBOs participated out of interest in supporting their constituents and provided their assistance as volunteers. This would have also affected the amount of time and level of effort they could contribute to the project. Participants received refreshments and lunch at the workshops and according to COTP and the CBOs bore the costs themselves for any costs associated with travel to the site. This was especially burdensome for the PWD participants interviewed who needed to travel with a companion and had long distances to cover to get to the workshop. The team did note that for one of the workshops[15] the participants signed for KS 300 for transport/lunch. This is about 0.35 USD which probably served more as a token than actual reimbursement of expenses.

COTP estimates that it spent 40 percent of its efforts on the voter education component, 35 percent on awareness raising for voter registration and 25 percent on candidates. However, the value of the different components or methods of delivering voter education (road shows, media spots, workshops, community forums, T shirts) and their effectiveness, is not known as data on the actual costs for these and their reach was not available.

COTP says their media advertisements on national radio and TV reached four million persons, but has no documentation from the stations to demonstrate this. 1,200 T Shirts were said to have been distributed that cost USD 10 each. These were said to have been divided evenly between provinces. According to CBOs there was a high demand for the shirts which they felt were efficient delivery mechanisms as the recipients would wear them into their areas and everyone they met would see the messages on the shirt. Among the photos provided to the evaluators, there was one of three or so spectators wearing the shirt,

[15] Out of the four workshops for which the evaluators were provided sign up sheets.

but according to CBOs it appears that most were provided to the volunteers and others who participated in the road shows.



TV advertisement

The use of IEBC civic educators and materials in project forums was efficient as this ensured consistency in messages being delivered to the citizens. These individuals had also been hired by the IEBC to provide this type of education through NGOs and other civic organizations so their use was appropriate. Although this was after COTP had already paid a consultant to develop its own curriculum it was the right choice to use the IEBC curriculum. The IEBC was extremely late in developing its official curriculum. However, at the same time there were already large numbers of different voter education materials and curriculums available in Kenya which could have been used by COTP without having to develop a new one. COTP said it was unaware of the availability of this material at the time.

Developing relationships with other programs as noted in Section III (ii) could have helped the project increase its efficiencies as it could have leveraged the existing knowledge and resources to better implement its project and provide its participants with options for follow-on assistance. There was also another UNDEF funded project in Kenya that was being implemented at the same time to support the electoral processes. Both grantees said they were unaware of this until told by the evaluators. The other UNDEF-grantee, the Institute for Educational Development (IED) was an experienced NGO in the electoral sector, and there were potentially strong synergies that could have been made between the two projects that could have benefited both.

Branding of the project was good. COTP and UNDEF are featured prominently in all project materials and in all of the venue photos. The TV narrative also specifically mentions the "UN Democracy Fund - Enhancing women's, youth, and disabled persons' participation in democratic processes."

(iv) Impact

The lack of reliable data makes it difficult to assess project impact. Even the anecdotes provided were too general to be able to follow up to gain more information. However, at the same time, the information provided by the CBO partners and participants was consistent enough that the team is able to make some generalizations about the project's potential impact.

The nature of the project's design and implementation was such that it is highly unlikely to have achieved its intended outcomes as stated in the project document, and most results are probably at the individual participant level. Some of the key factors that affected impact included the activity driven nature of project implementation, the limited nature of the activities and the lack of follow-up. The lack of synergies with others beyond COTP's own grass-roots networks and IEBC also affected its potential impact. None of the other persons interviewed in the sector beyond COTP's contacts and the IEBC officials that attended the workshops recognized the grantee or the project. The IEBC person responsible at its headquarters for partnerships noted that the IEBC accredited more than 1,000 NGOs as

voter educators for these elections. The COTP was, however, one of the few NGOs to get credentials from the IEBC that was already funded.

As far as the evaluators can determine, the project undertook activities in all six provinces targeted. These contributed to the results achieved by the national efforts done in Kenya to have a good voter registration effort and peaceful elections in March 1213. This was important given the critical necessity of moving forward and consolidating the gains made from the adoption of the new constitution and electoral system. At the macro level, the number of voters registered increased from 12,473,674 in 2010 to 14,352,545 for 2013. The registration rate for women also increased from 48.7 percent to 49.11 percent. However, the percentage of youth registered decreased from 47.88 of the roll in 2010 to 46.18 percent.[16]



In terms of women's participation, there were 19 women that ran for Senate (out of 244 candidates) and seven women candidates that ran for Governor (out of 237 candidates). None of these women won. Sixteen women were elected to the National Assembly and six percent of those elected as Country Representatives were women.

Given the number of actors working in the electoral sector, attribution for these results to any one project is not possible. This project likely contributed to the increased awareness and interest of some participants on registering to vote and/or putting themselves forward as candidates, especially for the affirmative action positions that were to be nominated by parties at the County Assembly level. For the most marginalized, this may have given them the opportunity to hear information that they might not have otherwise heard, or have increased their sense of personal empowerment and understanding of the process. This was certainly the case made by the CBO representative from Nairobi.

> "This was a good initiative. Especially for the disabled. We had 56 people for interfaith training and 60 disabled persons mobilized by the Ministry of Social Services and IEBC. It is important to mobilize people and empower them on the right to vote and present themselves for electoral positions."
> **Patrick Odama, IEBC, Nyeri**

One of the important aspects of the new constitution is devolution and the creation of the elected offices at the county level. This brings politics down to the level of most people. The impact for a project such of this is probably more likely to be felt at that level than at the national level of politics, where those candidates are likely to already have a good educational background and substantive political experience.

[16] IEBC statistics.

Out of the 100 persons per province that COTP said attended its candidate workshops, 46 of these allegedly became candidates. However, basic data for this is not available, such as their names, what office they were seeking and how many of these won office. Anecdotally, the CBO from Western Province reported assisting seven candidates (all women and youth) of which two were successful. The CBO from Nyeri said one of the women out of their 100 was nominated as a County Representative. A call to that person showed that she had won office but attributed her success to the leadership training provided by the Kenyan Human Rights Commission. Although she remembered the COTP training, she said it was one of many and was only a day. She also added that women required additional training on issues such as self-esteem and that voter education could not be done in isolation of the rest of the needs for voters to be able to participate effectively.

Voter education workshop Nairobi

One of the PWD participants from the Rift Valley who attended a workshop in Nyeri said four of the PWD participants, including himself, were interested in being nominated after training. None of them made it and an able person was nominated for the PWD position. He made a complaint which was still to be addressed by the IEBC dispute committee. This blocked the seating of this nominee in the County Assembly. He said he was still interested and would "go for it" after the IEBC ruling.

In at least two cases, the evaluators heard of the participants (primarily the CBOs) subsequently organizing meetings with candidates to ask for their platform. In Nyanza, the CBO reported that they would call these "accountability sessions" and tell the candidates "this is our agenda, what is yours?" While in the slum areas of Nairobi, the CBO said he brought 12 candidates for county representative and two MP candidates together with the community to explain their vision and platforms. After the elections, in Nyanza, the candidates who did not win contacted the CBO asking to start up a shadow county assembly focusing on the development agenda.

This project increased the experience and credibility of COTP as an organization as it was able to use its UNDEF funding to gain entry to IEBC officials and others. Even this evaluation was likely to have increased their awareness about the need to better track and aggregate their project outputs and collect information on their results. The contact persons for the CBOs seemed extremely competent, but this project gave them the opportunity to participate in the electoral process which they might not have had otherwise. Given the context, the sense of being able to contribute to the national effort to hold good, peaceful elections was important for all of these organizations.

(v) Sustainability

The efforts were one time activities and were not sustainable. Forums focused primarily on information sharing so the transfer of skills and knowledge beyond this was likely limited.

Voter education workshop Rift Valley

Although COTP worked with existing grass roots networks and CBOs that are still active in their sectors, it did not have any agreement with them or do any capacity building so that they could take over or follow up on the activities. It lacked the links with other on-going projects and programs in the sector that could have picked up the project participants and continued work with them.

The project did not pay the nomination fees, but the concept itself was not sustainable. Most experts saw this as a short term strategy to ensure fees were not a barrier but there was no plan for how these could be covered for future elections or what to do with the candidate once the fees were paid. One of the lessons learned by COTP as stated in the FNR was that the candidates had many needs that far surpassed the ability of the project to provide, and that for sustainability and effectiveness, the political parties needed to be involved in the efforts to identify and support these candidates.

Voters that may have registered as a result of this project are in the IEBC system and would have their voter identification card that would allow them to vote in the next elections. COTP still has the radio and TV spots that could be easily adapted for use in other future elections as they were generic awareness messages.

(vi) UNDEF added value

The UNDEF funding gave credibility to COTP efforts in the sector, and it was also able to use this to gain access to the IEBC and its civic education trainers. This connection was also then extended to the CBOs working with the project in the provinces for their own activities which they found useful as it gave them the access they would not have had otherwise.

V. Conclusions

Based on the evaluation findings, the team concludes:

(i) Project focused on an important area of need in Kenya and reached the grass roots level which many electoral support programs do not reach. This was important to help ensure these poor and marginalized groups were informed on and able to participate in the electoral process as voters and candidates, and to avoid the problems of the past. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), (iv) and (v).

(ii) COTP had experience to do capacity building and ***developed an effective partnership with IEBC officials at local levels to support its workshops.*** But it ***lacked the synergies needed beyond this to ensure that its workshops were more than one-off events*** and could deliver an effective program. The project purpose was grounded in the needs for the electoral process but not in the most effective ways to address those needs. There were many opportunities for synergies with other organizations with substantial levels of experience that could have strengthened this project and ensured follow up for its participants. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), (iii) (iv) and (v).

(iii) The project was activity driven and lacked the programmatic links needed to increase its relevance, effectiveness and impact. The project document seemed to provide for a more cohesive and potentially effective program than what was done. Implementation was focused on individual events and lacked the programmatic links between activities and the intended outcomes. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).

(iv) COTP's CBO partners and grass roots networks were the right organizations to reach the targeted groups, but to be used effectively needed to be more integrated into project implementation. These CBOs were assets that COTP could have leveraged more to help deliver the project, extend reach and provide follow up. But the centralized nature of implementation marginalized their usefulness and potential contribution to the achievement of project outcomes. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).

(v) Inputs and implementation approach were not adequate for the scope of activities contemplated in the project design. Efforts were dispersed over a wide area and in different activities. Implementation was also centralized so only one activity could take place at a time. This resulted in one-off events with no follow ups, and some activities not being undertaken as planned. It also left people hanging after peaking their interest or not being able to differentiate this workshop from others attended during the process. This limited the contribution that a project of this nature could have provided and would have been difficult to have all of the intended activities in the intended locations within the tight timeframe of an electoral calendar. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).

(vi) This project could have benefited from the experience and activities being implemented in country by the other UNDEF-funded grantee in Kenya

which was working on the same issues. That grantee's mission is supporting credible electoral processes and had substantial expertise, connections and programmatic experience that it could have shared with COTP. It could have also provided the other grantee access to COTP's grass roots networks for its election observation raining. This could have directly strengthened the COTP project, increased its visibility and performance. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), (iv) and (vi).

(vii) The project might have done more activities and achieved more results than was visible to the evaluators***,*** but without collecting or aggregating data or tracking results, it is not possible to know. Project reporting is not reliable as most seem to be a reformulation of the information and targets from the Project Document and do not reflect actual implementation. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).

VI. Recommendations

To strengthen similar projects in the future, the team recommends:

(i) Link with others working on the same issues, especially for those who are not experts in that sector. This could help to develop the synergies that can build more effective approaches and programs. This recommendation follows conclusions (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi).

(ii) Develop a vision for the project that goes beyond activities and ***provide the follow up and level of effort needed to contribute towards project outcomes.*** This recommendation follows conclusions ((i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).

(iii) Decentralize implementation through a more effective use of CBO networks. This can be done by providing subgrants and allowing them to deliver project activities rather than attempting to do it directly from a central location. This can help extend reach and ensure more follow-up of participants and allows for activities to take place in multiple locations at the same time which is often needed in the tight timeline of an electoral calendar. This recommendation follows conclusions (ii) and (iii).

(iv) Concentrate efforts programmatically as well as geographically when resources are limited so that the activities can be more than one-off events and can become a program of assistance that builds on the first training with the participants and sees them through the process. Provide more capacity building, transfer of knowledge, development of leadership skills and follow up for those who want to do advocacy and run for office. This recommendation follows conclusions (iii) and (iv).

(v) Projects should ensure they adopt an appropriate performance monitoring plan (PMP) that collects and aggregates output data as well as tracks results with appropriate project-level indicators. These plans should be able to track performance

over time and demonstrate results. For example, if each participant had been given a five or seven question survey at the start of the workshop, the project would have a simple baseline of the knowledge, attitudes and practices of its participants. And when repeated at the end of their participation with the project, would have provided them with their results. If grantees do not have PMP expertise, they should integrate it into their project activities and budget so that it can be contracted. This recommendation follows from conclusion (vii).

(vi) Ensure UNDEF-funded grantees within a country are aware of other UNDEF-funded projects and encourage synergies between them, especially if they are working in the same sector. This could help to increase the effectiveness of each project and strengthen the impact of UNDEF funding. This recommendation follows from conclusion (vi).

VII. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

UNDEF funding enabled this interested NGO to support the national efforts to get Kenya back on track following the post-electoral violence in 2007 and 2008. It provided them with funding that allowed them to assist this process for two years and to feel that it made a substantial contribution to the effort. At the same time, this NGO had no experience in the sector, or apparently with a large grant from an international organization. Its implementation of activities lacked the vision and experience needed to link the implementation of activities to the higher level outcomes articulated in the Project Document.

At the same time, UNDEF funded a very experienced NGO in Kenya for a similar electoral support project. It worked at a higher level than the marginalized groups targeted by this project but there were natural synergies between these two projects that could have been developed. But the two grantees were unaware of each other's project. The other grantee, the Institute for Education and Democracy could have provided mentoring and made some of the programmatic linkages for COTP and with other efforts that could have strengthened this project. COTP in return could have provided IED with greater reach for its program, especially for its training of election observers which it did through grass roots networks.

In the future, UNDEF-funded projects within a country, especially those that are working in the same sector and on the same issues, should be brought together, at a minimum for information and material sharing.

VIII. ANNEXES

Annex 1: Evaluation questions:

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context? ▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why? ▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached? ▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not? ▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives? ▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs? ▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability? ▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address? ▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative? ▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization? ▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact? ▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc). ▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?

Annex 2: Documents Reviewed:

African Union of the Blind, *State of Disabled Peoples Rights in Kenya (2007) Report,* Kenya

Elections Observation Group, *The Historic Vote, Report of the Elections Observation Group on the 2013 General Elections,* Nairobi, 2013

Imoite, John, *Youth Participation in Kenyan Politics: Challenges and Opportunities, in* Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Project and Leadership and Building State Capacity, *Youth and Politics in Conflict Contexts.* 2007

COTP, Sign up sheets for:

- Voter education workshop at Ellemos Hall, 16 September 2012
- Participants list Kakuma, 18 May 2012
- Workshop for potential candidates, Nyanza Province, 14 January 2012
- Coast region voter and civic education forum, undated

COTP, Additional information on contacts and project provided 1 October 2013

IEBC, *Voter Registration Statistics.* http://www.iebc.or.ke

UDF-KEN-09-297, *Voter Education and Voter Registration in Kenya, Project Document,* September 2011

UDF-KEN-09-297, *Voter Education and Voter Registration in Kenya, Mid-Term Progress Report,* January 2012

UDF-KEN-09-297, *Voter Education and Voter Registration in Kenya, Final Narrative Report,* 30 March 2013

UDF-KEN-09-297, *Voter Education and Voter Registration in Kenya, Milestone Verification Mission Report,* 14 January 2012

UDF-KEN-09-297, *Voter Education and Voter Registration in Kenya, Voter Education Curriculum,* Undated

UDF-KEN-09-297, *Voter Education and Voter Registration in Kenya, Milestone Financial Reports for* June 17, 2012; July 8, 2012; 27 February 2013.

UN Women, *Project Progress Report, Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes (SERP); Promoting Women's Leadership and Participation in Politics through Gender Responsive Electoral Process,* 2013

Women Shadow Parliament - Kenya, *Rapid Gender Assessment and Audit of Political Parties in Kenya, The Participation and Representation of Women in Management of Political Parties: An Unfinished Agenda in Kenya,* 2007

Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

22 September 2013	
Arrival international consultant	
23 September 2013	
Peter Ng'ang'a	COTP Program Coordinator
Abisai Mugata	COTP Training Officer
Ronald Guda Chunguli	COTP Trainer (women and youth)
Luciah Mwendwa	COTP Trainer (PWD)
John Igadawa	Nairobi Amani Mashinani, Huruma, Nairobi County
24 September 2013	
Ezra Chiloba Simiyu	Program Analyst, Democracy and Governance Unit, UNDP
Carmina Sanchez-Ruecas	Senior Technical Advisor, UNDP Support to Electoral Reform Project
Ann Nderitu	Manager, Partnerships, IEBC
25 September 2013	
Michael Yard	Chief of Party, International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Dr. Collins Odote	Program Director, National Democratic Institute
Lisa McLean	NDI Senior Resident Country Director
26 September 2013	
Travel to Coast Province	
Ali Hassan Mwakulonda	Constituency Electoral Coordinator, Coast North
George Oyugi Jaramba	Secretary, Kwale Human Rights Network, Kwale
Hamis Hassan Mwachengo-Matuga	Mshikamano Community Youth Organization, Kwale
Michael Nyanje Chidzao	Former IT Program Coordinator, Ilishe Trust, Kwale
27 September 2013	
Pauline Mbodze Chengo	Program Coordinator, Iishe Trust, Mombasa
Holliness Kahaso Agano	Finance and Administrative Officer, Ilishe Trust, Mombasa
Heavon Katana	IT Program Officer, Ilishe Trust, Mombasa
Jimmy Ngonde	IT Program Assistant, Ilishe Trust, Mombasa
Michael Nyanje Chidzao	Former Program Coordinator, Ilishe Trust, Mombasa
Chief Halima Kulola	Administration of Tudro Mshomoroni Samaki Stage, Mombasa
Return to Nairobi	
30 September 2013	
Lillian Muhaja Agoswa (virtual)	Nairobi Amani Mashinani, Huruma, Nairobi County
Patrick Kuria (virtual)	Nyeri Social Forum, Nyeri
Selma Oledi (virtual)	TNA nominee for County Representative, Participant in COTP forum in Nyeri
1 October 2013	
Patrick Odama (virtual)	Regional IEBC Coordinator, Nyeri

Margie Cook	Chief of Party, Drivers of Accountability Project. Former UNDP Chief Technical Advisor for UNDP Electoral Support Project 2007
James Makumi (virtual)	Mau Development Self Help Group, Njoro, Rift Valley
Lucy Ndungu'u	Director, Office of Political Parties Registrar
Mercy Njoroge	National Coordinator, Elections Observation Group
Lawrence Omule Apiuo	Grass Roots Trust, Nyanza Province
2 October 2013	
Wariu (virtual)	Nyeri Disabled Network, Nyeri
Wanjeru (virtual)	Nyandarua County Disability Forum
Abisai Mugata	COTP Training Officer
Peter Ng'ang'a	COTP Program Coordinator
3 October 2013	
Edward Mungala (virtual)	Western Province
4 October 2013	
Departure of International Consultant	
Dr. Ombaka (virtual)	County Assembly Representatives (women's nominated position) for Siaya County
10 October 2013	
Mohamed Ganiko (virtual)	Kwayero CBO, Coast Province
Athumani Thimba (virtual)	Tushirkiane Tiwi Youth, Coast Province
Namuna Ndege (virtual)	Tsimba CBO, Coast Province

Annex 4 : Acronyms

CBO	Community Based Organization
COTP	Community Organization Training Program Trust
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IED	Institute for Educational Development
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PWD	Person with disabilities
SERP	Support to Electoral Reform Project (UNDP)
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
USD	U.S. Dollar