The Role of International Monitoring, Inspection and Verification
Prohibitions of use of specific weapons –
like the dum-dum bullet, poison and bacteriological and chemical
weapons - were agreed upon long ago.
Some, back in the 19th century.
They were not coupled with any provisions about inspection.
It was felt that any violation - any use of a prohibited
weapon – would be manifest.
Not even fact-finding mechanisms were coupled with the
prohibitions, though such have been created separately later.
The enforcement, similarly, did not rely on any special
mechanisms. Retaliation - possibly in kind - was an option. It was widely believed
that Germany’s non-use of gas and other chemical weapons
during the Second World War was induced by the awareness that
such weapons existed on the other side as well, and that any use
– which would be evident - would trigger retaliation.
After the Second World War, the old prohibitions
of use have been supplemented by prohibitions or restrictions
in the production and possession of some weapons.
Some of these rules have been in bilateral agreements,
as between the United States and the former Soviet Union, others
have been in regional or global treaties, as the NPT and the CWC,
yet others have been UN injunctions, like the UNSC resolution
687 (1991) regarding Iraq.
A common feature of the new instruments is
the inclusion of obligations regarding inspection.
The possession or production of a category of weapons is
not as evident as the use of weapons.
Hence, the need to verify respect for the prohibition.
Nowhere is such need greater than as regards bans on the
production or possession of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear,
chemical, biological - and means of delivering them by missiles.
If a State is to renounce such weapons and exclude them
from their arsenals, it will want to rest very sure that other
States - not least those in its own region have similarly excluded
the weapons. The
verification must be effective.
If it is cosmetic, it might risk to lull into unjustified
confidence resulting in terrible surprises.
Before on-site inspection became generally
accepted, satellite observation was a means of verification, which
avoided the admission of foreign inspectors on the ground.
However, when such admission became internationally accepted,
the common pattern of verification became one consisting of:
(a) declarations
by the inspected party - of relevant sites and/or objects.
deed, that Memorandum
of Understanding, which I mentioned, confirmed that even eight
defined ‘presidential sites’ were subject to ‘entries’
by the inspecting authority. However, in deference to the dignity of the
state of Iraq, it laid down some special procedures for such entries,
including the presence of a group of diplomatic representatives.
So-called ‘sensitive sites’ are also subject
to inspection, but special procedures may be used.
The bottom line is thus that there may be special procedures
in the case of some sites but there are no sanctuaries.
Special lectures at this basic training course
will focus very concretely on how monitoring, verification and
inspection are to be performed.
Let me only say the following in this introductory lecture.
First, let me repeat that inspection must
be effective. Cosmetic inspection is
worse than none. Inspection has higher
credibility if the inspected party does not know in advance when
and where inspection will take place.
Hence, the need for no-notice or short notice inspection.
Second, UNMOVIC is engaged in the process
of working out a manual with guidelines for various kinds of inspection. Naturally, we are studying
the ‘standard operating procedures’ of UNSCOM and the
long years of practice of UNSCOM and the IAEA.
Where we find their procedures and practices rational and
appropriate, we shall adopt them. We seek no change for
the sake of change.
Thirdly, while discussing the past nine years,
Iraq has seemed often to regard inspection as a penalty to be
suffered and minimized rather than an opportunity that should
be maximized. UNMOVIC will not assume that this attitude
will continue. Indeed, whatever remains
of the proscribed programmes, the prospect of suspension or lifting
of sanctions, which is there if UN demands are fulfilled, would
seem to be far more valuable than any retention of remnants of
proscribed programmes.
Fourthly, regardless of what attitude is
taken by Iraq, inspections are to be carried out firmly and correctly. There is no aim to harass
or provoke. But there is an aim to
be aware of the history, culture and religions in Iraq and to
show respect for them. Hospitals, religious places,
are not off bounds for inspection, nor is UNMOVIC precluded from
activities on religious days but special regard and respect may
be called for.
Let me now turn to some rather special but
important features of the mandate given to UNMOVIC by the Security
Council.
In paragraph 33 of resolution 1284, it is
stipulated - as I have noted - that the Council intends to ‘suspend’
the economic restrictions imposed, if the Executive Chairman of
UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA report that Iraq
has ‘cooperated in all respects … in fulfilling the
work programmes’ for a period of 120 days and - paragraph
34 - that this cooperation comprises progress in resolving ‘key
remaining disarmament tasks’.
We would all wish that such cooperation materialize
so that it can be reported to the Security Council and suspension
take place under resolution 1284.
The further aim, of course, is a lifting of sanctions under
the 1991 resolution. However, we will need
to consider carefully what we should regard as ‘cooperation
in all respects’ and what would be considered non-cooperation.
We can hardly come to any exhaustive answer, but we may
find some helpful leads.
All inspections and verification are most
successful if there is practical spontaneous cooperation between
the inspected party and the inspecting party.
An inspected party cannot, alone, create confidence about
the absence of weapons, by simply claiming to be without them.
It needs the inspectors.
But the work of the inspectors will be made difficult,
if the inspected party does not cooperate - even more so if it
provides a hostile uncooperative environment. Suspicions will remain. Even with the best of
cooperation, an inspection authority will not be able to say categorically
‘there are no prohibited items’.
It can only report that it has pursued very extensive verification
and inspection with wholehearted cooperation and it has found
no evidence of any prohibited items. If it can report excellent
cooperation by the inspected party, the Security Council is not
likely to worry about that minor uncertainty.
Iraq can very legitimately demand to be clearly
told what is required of it by way of cooperation.
Therefore, I think it is important that UNMOVIC’s
operating procedures for monitoring, verification and inspection
be clear and precise. Iraq must know what cooperation
is expected. We cannot,
of course, ask Iraq to do things that are undoable.
But rejection by Iraq of requests with contrived explanations
cannot be viewed as adequate explanations.
There needs to be cooperation on various
down-to-earth practical matters.
For instance, Iraq will be requested to file many reports
about the status of sites monitored and changes of such sites.
To avoid unnecessary burden of reporting and of analysing
reports, we may discuss with Iraq the questions to be put.
The reports should be in such form that they could be recorded
electronically. This may prevent questions
already answered, to be repeated.
UNMOVIC will need to have practical arrangements
with Iraq about the escort of and assistance to inspection and
monitoring teams. Much of what UNSCOM did
in this regard will probably still be practical.
However, these are matters on which discussion with Iraq
may be needed.
A last example.
As I mentioned, the identification by UNMOVIC of ‘key
remaining disarmament tasks (paragraph 7) is important.
So important, indeed, that it will be the subject of Security
Council approval in the context of UNMOVIC’s working plan.
However, before we get to that stage, we need to list what
we regard as ‘unresolved disarmament issues’ (paragraph
2). This is no small
task. Our new staff
has been engaged in it for some time, examining UNSCOM reports
to the Security Council, inspection reports and other data. When we have come to a draft inventory of issues,
it might perhaps be transmitted to the Iraqi authorities for their
comments. If they decline to comment
or if they were simply to assert that there are no ‘unresolved
disarmament issues’, it would not be very helpful - or very
cooperative. If,
on the other hand, credible and convincing reasons or new information
were given why one or the other issue should be seen as solved,
then we should examine the arguments or information seriously. Of course, any attempt
to turn such an exchange into a negotiation would be unacceptable. We shall establish our list on a professional
and objective basis, but it is only fair to listen to comments,
in particular from Iraq.
What would we regard as ‘lack of cooperation’? It is not possible, of
course, to give a list, but let me give two obvious and important
examples: the first example that comes to mind relates to ‘access
to sites’. While - as I have explained
- special procedures exist for the inspection or entries into
some sites, the Security Council has firmly and repeatedly established
that access shall be ‘immediate, unconditional and unrestricted’.
Denial of access would be a failure of cooperation.
The other example is security.
The basic documents on which we carry out our missions
in Iraq stipulate that the Iraqi authorities shall facilitate
our work, inter alia, by providing security for
our staff. This applies
to all staff, regardless of nationality. The authorities of Iraq
have full executive power and any failure to exercise that in
the protection of our staff, equipment or operations would be
a failure of cooperation.
Some important points in resolution 1284
relate to the timetable of our UNMOVIC’s mission.
From the Iraqi side, concerns have been voiced that, after
eight years of inspection by UNSCOM and the IAEA, acceptance of
the new resolution might mean starting from scratch again.
I think such concerns are unfounded.
In one of the preambular paragraphs of resolution 1284,
the Security Council expressly acknowledges the progress made
by Iraq towards compliance with resolution 687. UNMOVIC does not start
from scratch but from where UNSCOM left off.
Indeed, part of the heavy work we are engaged in is to
examine the voluminous dossiers accumulated by UNSCOM.
What then is the timetable?
First, we are using the time before Iraq accepts resolution
1284 to intense preparation for our mission, training staff, analysing
data available and obtaining new data through other means than
on-site inspection. Thereafter?
Let me think aloud!
From the moment Iraq accepts resolution 1284, and there
is a decision to resume activities in Iraq, a new clock would
start to tick.
Operation of paragraph 7 of resolution 1284
stipulates that not later than 60 days after UNMOVIC and the IAEA
“have both started to work in Iraq”, each will draw
up for approval by the Council “a work programme for the
discharge of their mandates”.
We can hardly interpret “started to work” to
mean the day of Iraqi acceptance of resolution 1284, nor the first
day we set our foot in Baghdad. If our work is to start
where UNSCOM left off, we need to cover the information gap that
has opened since the end of 1998, when the inspection and monitoring
activity ceased. There are several hundred
sites of varying importance for which data existed at that time
and for which new data will need to be given by Iraq - data that
will then need to be verified. This - rebaselining -
process will be important for our task to draw up a work programme. It would be desirable that this task be completed
before we start drawing up the work programme.
The completion will depend upon several factors, notably
cooperation by the Iraqi authorities. On the assumption that
this cooperation is forthcoming, it would not seem unrealistic
to expect that the part of the rebaselining that is essential
as a basis for drawing up the work programme, could be undertaken
within some three months.
Hence, it should be possible to commence the drawing up
of the work programme some three months after Iraq has submitted
the information requested to update the records that existed for
sites monitored at the end of 1998.
There is yet another point that is important
for the UNMOVIC timetable.
Paragraph 33 of resolution 1284 required reports that Iraq
has ‘cooperated in all respects’ with UNMOVIC and that
IAEA for a period of 120 days in fulfilment of the work programme,
the time counted from reports from both organizations that the
reinforced system of OMV “is fully operational”.
When is that?
I take it that “full operation”
of the system means that surveillance and containment systems
- e.g. cameras, monitoring equipment and seals - are in place
and that inspection and monitoring teams are in place.
Achieving this obviously depends upon UNMOVIC but also
on Iraqi cooperation. On
the assumption that the requisite cooperation is offered, perhaps
one would dare to hope that the system should be “fully operational”
at the time when the Security Council gives the green light to
the ‘work programme’?
Anyone can add together the periods I have
discussed. They do not amount to
an endless timetable. UNMOVIC
will work with all deliberate speed.
If Iraq is equally committed to ‘cooperate in all
respects’ the light at the end of the tunnel need not be
that far away.
Let me conclude by comments on some important
organizational matters and on the aims beyond UNMOVIC’s immediate
mission.
UNMOVIC is a subsidiary organ of the Security
Council. However, although it has
a separate budget and autonomy in its internal decision-making,
it does not exist in isolation to the Secretariat of the UN, nor,
indeed, to some other bodies in the UN system.
Our reports are channelled to the Security Council through
the Secretary-General and we have at all times a close liaison
with his office. His
mandate is global and his views and actions concerning weapons
of mass destruction, the Middle East and Iraq are of relevance
to UNMOVIC, just as our views and actions regarding Iraq are of
relevance to him. We have a close and fruitful
cooperation with the office of the Secretary-General and with
the Department for Disarmament Affairs.
We are further dependant on the UN Secretariat for advice
on some legal issues, for administrative support and assistance.
We have further close contact with the Office of the Iraq
Programme, which administers the oil for food programme.
Our office in Baghdad is co-located with the offices of
the UN humanitarian activities and it is important that we realize
that their activities and ours are not at variance.
Both serve - in their different ways - humanitarian purposes.
We fully concur with the efforts to alleviate some of the
consequences of the sanctions.
And I am sure that those who are responsible for the humanitarian
programme share our ambition to rid Iraq of its capacity in the
field of WMD and long-range missiles. We further have close
cooperation with and many actions jointly with the IAEA.
Besides the Centre in Baghdad, we hope to have an office in Bahrain, where our inspectors can gather and prepare for flying into Iraq. A building constructed for UNSCOM stands ready and we expect soon to have an agreement with Bahrain about our use of the building and about the conditions for our transiting activities in Bahrain.
I have stressed that UNMOVIC is a subsidiary body of the Security Council and that resolution 1284 is our charter. I should add that the Council has also created a College of Commissioners to give us policy advice. Our reports to the Council are channelled through this College, which consists of 16 members appointed in their personal expert capacity by the Secretary-General. As the College is representative of the UN membership and of the Security Council, it may help us to devise policies and action that will have the support of the Council – provided, of course, that agreement can be reached within the College. The experience so far has been very good. Needless to say, the Security Council’s consensus support for UNMOVIC activities is important for their effectiveness and success. It is our interest to facilitate such consensus and the College is one instrument that can be used for this purpose.
Eliminating Iraq’s WMD and long-range missiles and monitoring its capacity is, indeed, the mission of UNMOVIC as it was that of UNSCOM. However, both resolutions 687 of 1991 and 1284 of 1999 show that there is a Security Council aim that goes beyond this difficult task. There is the aim to establish a zone free of WMD in the Middle East and the neutralization of Iraq’s WMD capacity is seen as a step in this direction. All countries - including Iraq - seek to live in a long-term strategic military equilibrium in their region. To prevent incentives to bring about equilibrium by the acquisition of more arms, in particular, WMD, regional approaches are needed which seek to guarantee equilibrium at low levels of armaments and without WMD. All States in the region endorse the creation of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East. Needless to say, the current crisis on the peace process is not conducive to progress. Nevertheless, the aim represents a vital long-term ambition and the experiences we make in Iraq are likely to become of great use once the countries in the region are able to negotiate the zone into reality.
I am sometimes asked if it is not odd to build up an organization and draft guidelines for its activities without knowing whether it will ever be enabled to operate. My chief answer is that the Security Council - the highest and most powerful global authority charged with the maintenance of peace - has called the organization into being to use it for inspection and monitoring in Iraq. If we did not build up UNMOVIC, the Council would have no instrument at its disposal.
Awaiting the time when inspection activities can be resumed in Iraq, we have much preparatory work to do. That we do not start from scratch means also that we must absorb and master the vast material of knowledge that has been accumulated. The preparatory work does not require that we have hundreds of inspectors waiting in New York or Bahrain to fly in, but it does require that you all have a basic training and are ready and available for periods of work in the field or at headquarters. We are grateful to you for this readiness and when we shall ask you to serve, we think it will be for a mission that is meaningful both to the world and for yourself individually.